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Abstract: 
This project seeks to reimagine human agency at scale. It does so first by destabilizing 
ideas of collectivity such as the “crowd,” “multitude”, and “proletariat,” and second, 
through exploring a new understanding of collective agency, one which is diffuse and 
pervasive. The first chapter charts the emergence of a vast, empirical non-identical 
Many within the last three decades of 18th-century Germany. During this time, the social 
structures of estate society were almost entirely eroded, but, critically, they were not 
immediately replaced by the new economic order of capitalist class society. Collectively 
the non-identical Many had no shared identity, or even a way in which to imagine a 
shared commonality. Chapter Two examines the influence exerted by the present-
absence of this non-identical Many on the works of Jakob Michael Reinhold Lenz. Lenz 
famously rejected the unities of time, action and place, and his plays were known for 
their disorienting formal structure. I argue that with the creation of his so-called 
“Komödie,” Lenz organizes his plays around a new sense of the interrelatedness of all 
individuals, an emergent sense of the totality of society, and that the seemingly fractured 
and chaotic form of Lenz’s plays must therefore be read as a co-authorship of the non-
identical Many, a writing of a heterogeneous influence into the structure of the play itself. 
In the third chapter, I examine the inaugural 1788 edition of the Braunschweigisches 
Journal as a case study of a particular form of fragmentary, experiential writing which 
once again is the result of perceived pressure from a non-identical Many. The editors of 
this journal and others like it positioned their writing as a response to a new audience, 
one which they are unable to describe, except in the negative, as a “nicht Gelehrten 
Publicum,” bending their writing to match its imagined demands. I conclude by looking 
forward, suggesting that the figure of the non-identical Many could be a useful lens for 
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understanding the rapid media changes which occurred in the early 20th century, as well 
as the relationship which exists between social media and the Many in our own time.  
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Introduction: Beyond the Crowd, Beyond Masses, Beyond the 
Public Sphere 
This project seeks to reimagine human agency at scale. To do so requires two reciprocal 
motions: first, I destabilize and decenter ideas of human collectivity, arguing that the 
process of conceptualization itself obfuscates the possibility of non-heterogeneous 
groups, groups which are bound together by no internal commonality and which have no 
physical presence in any one place or time. Second, I claim that connected to imagining 
a new kind of collectivity, it is likewise necessary to rethink what human agency can be, 
moving away from the direct actions of the crowd or even actions on a historical scale by 
larger groups such as classes, towards a diffuse and pervasive agency, an agency 
which, like the non-group from which it emanates, is reflected in no one act, but rather 
manifests itself in the responses and re-actions of others to the perceived demands of a 
present-absence. The tension which exists between conceptualizing groups and the kind 
of agency which can be ascribed to them has long been recognized. The importance of 
this relationship is reflected in the great care afforded to the choice of terms used to 
describe collectives; in the mid 20th century, Marxist scholars such as George Rudé and 
E.P. Thompson sought to recharacterize major social events typically ascribed to the 
mob​ phenomenon to actions of the ​crowd​. This minor shift in terminology represented a 
drastic change in perspective. Traditional, serious historical accounts by the likes of 
Edmund Burke, as well as fictional descriptions by canonical authors such as Charles 
Dickens, portrayed mass-events such as the French Revolution not as the actions of a 
thinking collective, but rather the re-actions of a savage animal horde. Social institutions 
were the bulwark against the ever-present threat of the chaos of an infinite rabble 
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gnashing at the gates of civilized society. With the ​crowd​, Thompson and Rudé imagined 
a different kind of collectivity, and with it, a different narrative of history. For example, in 
his essay “The Moral Economy of the English Crowd in the Eighteenth Century,” 
Thompson shows that the actions of the crowd had been rational, calculated, and the 
result of a collective imagination and memory stretching back hundreds of years. The 
crowd remembered, not only the social realities of Christian patriarchal society as it had 
existed, but also the philosophical ideals on which it was based. With this shift, new 
actors come to light. Through the figure of the thinking crowd, the agency of the poor, 
and in particular, women becomes visible. For it was women who were responsible for 
the household economy, women who understood market dynamics and what 
represented a fair price, and finally women who organized the collective resistance, 
frequently using their own pseudo-legal status as a shield against serious criminal 
repercussions. As Thompson humorously puts it, these women seemed blissfully 
unaware that they were supposed to wait over a century for their own emancipation. 
And yet, despite the invaluable perspective provided by Thompson, Rudé and 
others like them, “the crowd,” still has a flattening effect on the people who comprise it. 
Thompson and Rudé and were keenly aware of this difficulty: as a small example, 
Thompson describes the difficulty of selecting ​one​ pamphlet as representative for the 
crowds of the Bread Riots: any given pamphlet is only ever one selected from 
hundreds--and these hundreds are only the surviving specimens of a category of 
thousands--and these thousands were typically written not by members of the crowd 
themselves, but rather anti-mercantilist nobility sympathetic to their cause. But despite 
these acknowledged short-comings, the benefit of showing the unwashed masses 
thinking, speaking and acting was too great to be sacrificed in the name of absolute 
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fidelity. The crowd may speak and act as one, but at least through “the crowd,” 
collectively they can be shown to have agency. Other, more recent works of collective 
dynamics similarly struggle against the reductive tendencies of concepts of the crowd. In 
Multitudes; War and Democracy in the Age of Empire, ​Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri’s 
2004 work intended as the utopian counterpart to ​Empire, ​the authors set out to create a 
classification of collectivity which does not suffer from the failings associated with 
traditional terms. “Multitude,” they tell us, does not assert homogeneity and ignore 
difference, like “people” and “masses,” nor does it create artificial boundaries between 
individuals in the same way that “classes” segment societies. They insist “multitude” is 
inherently subversive, open and inclusive--it is like the internet in that “the various nodes 
remain different but are all connected in the Web, and… the external boundaries of the 
network are open such that new nodes and new relationships can always be added” 
(XV). But despite protestations to the contrary, once ​the​ “multitude” takes its place in 
binary opposition to “empire,” little evidence remains of the purported internal diversity. 
Multitude​ inspired and was inspired by similar works which sought to reveal a hidden 
“swarm intelligence” of the multitudes. Simply put, swarm intelligence, when applied to 
humans, argues that together, groups of people collectively and critically, ​unconsciously​, 
can form a super-mind, something whose processing power far exceeds that of any one 
individual within the “swarm.” It is telling that explanations of swarm intelligence, such as 
the variant produced in ​Multitude​, invariably rely on metaphors of the internet, computer 
processors, insect swarms, or the biological functioning of the human mind, as the 
individuals within the swarm are reduced respectively to nodes, integer circuits, drones 
or neurons. Collective agency has been granted superhuman abilities, but at the cost of 
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the internal life and character of the individual, as well as any pretense towards group 
diversity. 
In what follows, I hold that the problem of speaking ​of ​or ​for ​“the crowd,” 
“multitude,” “swarm,” etc., is fundamentally a problem of concepts. Through recognizing 
the agency of an acting crowd, a false singularity of purpose is imposed on the many 
individuals who comprise any given crowd. I believe this indicates the homogenizing 
nature of concepts, as explored by Theodore Adorno in ​Negative Dialektik​. Adorno 
argues that to conceptualize is to categorize, to define through exclusion, to say ​this ​is 
not ​that​. The process of creating the identity of a concept is dialectical. Internally, it 
demands homogeneity, a consistency of parts, so that the whole can be claimed to be 
self-same, identical. Identity simultaneously demands the creation of an excluded 
external, the stripping away of a vast non-identity, and it is against this non-identical 
external that the concept is defined. The problem with this mode of thought is that that 
which has been determined to be non-identical and therefore external to, and not 
belonging to the essence of the concept, is precisely that which makes the individual 
example unique. This is a danger with which we are all intuitively familiar. It describes 
the vague discomfort one feels when pressed to define concepts like freedom or 
morality, a discomfort which grows sharp when applied to conceptual borders like what it 
means to be human, or where gender divisions lie. Wherever a boundary is placed, 
violence is done not only to that which is excluded, but also to the internal life of that 
which is bounded by the concept. I argue that when this process of conceptualization is 
applied to human collectives, the resulting flattening is even more radical. When 
Thompson speaks of ​the ​crowd, of ​its ​memory, ​its ​morality, ​its ​agency, he means the 
people physically gathered in protest, a throng which gathered at some time, at some 
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place. The apparent solidity of people gathered together in protest makes for a tempting 
object of study, as well as a potential source of political strength. But crowds are 
inherently ephemeral, constantly gaining and losing members, members who individually 
each have different ideas as to why they have gathered and what they hope to achieve. 
When speaking of ​the crowd​, the question therefore becomes, ​which​ crowd is meant, 
which particular configuration of people and principles, and more importantly, which 
cross-section of which group at which moment is going to be taken as representative? 
And what of those who are unable to attend, the vast hidden majority who helped 
facilitate this particular crowd and in whose interests this crowd attempts to speak? 
Recent work on collectives have attempted to circumvent this difficulty by 
operating at the level of discourse. Michael Gamper’s ​Masse Lesen, Masse Schreiben: 
Eine Diskurs- und Imaginationsgeschichte der Menschenmenge 1765-1930​, published in 
2007, is a work of staggering rigor and depth, one which examines the evolution of 
concepts of the multitudes in literature, statistics, politics, and philosophy. As such, 
Masse Lesen​ functions in part as a ​Begriffsgeschichte​, although Gamper is quick to note 
that, rather than tracking a presumably stable object through time, by focusing on an 
entire semantic field instead of a single concept, he hopes to leave the central idea of 
the “Menschenmenge” as open as possible. By contrast, Patrick Eiden-Offe’s 2017 ​Die 
Poesie der Klasse; Romantischer Antikapitalismus​ shows the process of self-writing 
during the ​Vormärz ​period which enabled the transformation of what was 
“buntscheckiger Haufen” of disparate individuals into the politically potent figure of the 
“Proletariat.” As suggested by the title, he is interested in the “Poesie,” those imaginary 
constructs which combined with material realities to allow for the creation of a class 
consciousness. Through this lens, Eiden-Offe, moves seamlessly between “literature” 
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and “theory,” not only in order to show the becoming of imagined homogeneity, but as a 
form of “Rettungshistoriografie,” that is, the attempt to rediscover the potential and 
possibilities of futures lost. This creates a necessary doubling of his “Romantischer 
Antikapitalismus” concept, which speaks of the historical creation in the early 19th 
century of nostalgic pasts, both as a critical tool to mark what had been lost in the 
transition to “modernity,” while inevitably also creating a series of alternate timelines, 
past and present, in the mind of the contemporary audience. 
The works of Gamper and Eiden-Offe are invaluable in creating a more nuanced 
understanding of the history and the many faces of the many. However, I argue that 
what is lost in discursive approaches such as these is the possibility of group agency. 
The collective becomes some ​thing​ which is written about or in the process of being 
written, once again relegated to the status of passive object of history. By contrast, this 
dissertation highlights collective agency, while simultaneously avoiding the 
homogenization and violence inherent to concepts. It introduces what I refer to as a 
“non-identical Many,” a Many which is defined only through its ​exclusion from​ conceptual 
and social systems. As implied by the inclusion of conceptual ​and​ social systems, I 
understand this non-identical Many in two ways; first, as an empirical, heterogeneous 
group which had a (paradoxical as it may sound) concrete non-existence in Germany at 
the end of the 18th century. As the social constructs of estate society were eroded and 
before the mechanisms of capitalism had been instituted, an ever increasing and 
increasingly diverse portion of the population was displaced from their homes, 
employment and social situation. I argue that this empirical non-identical Many had a 
conceptual counterpart within popular late-Enlightenment writing forms, specifically in 
Enlightenment journals and theatrical works. Within these works, the non-identical Many 
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is not directly thematized but rather exists in the hopes, fears, and dreams of the authors 
and editors. I believe that the ​diffuse, pervasive​ agency of a non-identical Many can be 
seen in changes within these writing forms, changes which the authors invariably 
attribute to unseen forces which lie beyond their comprehension or control. I argue that 
these changes in writing forms therefore must be understood as a co-authorship by a 
non-identical Many, the result of an inexorable and inexpressible pressure exerted by an 
unseen but felt present/absence.  
The first chapter, “The Specificity of the Premodern World,” charts the creation of 
a vast, ​empirical ​non-identical Many within the last three decades of 18th century 
Germany. I examine this period as a period of rupture, and in so doing, follow the 
premodern/modern divide established by the likes of Foucault, Koselleck, Kittsteiner and 
others. However, rather than using this division as a means of comparing two distinct 
epochs, I am interested in the moment of dissolution itself, the so-called “Sattelzeit” or 
transitional period. During this time, the social structures of estate society were almost 
entirely eroded, but, critically, they were not immediately replaced by the new economic 
order of capitalist class society. In order to show the void which this created, I apply the 
intentionally anachronistic concepts of markets, labor and property to traditional society, 
demonstrating that they have no point of reference within traditional society. The 
fungibility of time, people and place within capitalism provides a totalizing network of 
institutions, one which has no outside and which is capable of incorporating all 
individuals into ​the body social​. This does not imply that all members of society are 
provided for within capitalism, but rather, that even (or perhaps especially) those 
members of society who are excluded from institutional protections within capitalism are 
still included in the economic calculus of society as a “potential labor reserve.” Without 
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this all-encompassing economic framework, and in the absence of the strict hierarchies 
of estate society which preceded it, an increasingly diverse and vast portion of the 
population was displaced beyond the limits of society. This non-group included serfs, 
peasant farmers, tradesmen, criminals, children, the old, the infirm, soldiers, fallen 
nobility, widows, ethnic minorities and many other, utterly unique cases. Collectively they 
had no shared identity, had no collective sense of consciousness, or even a way in 
which to imagine a shared commonality. In other words, together they represented a 
radically non-identical Many, a vast othered population, linked only through their 
collective exclusion.  
Chapter two, “Lenz, Social Physicist,” examines the influence exerted by the 
present-absence of a ​conceptual ​non-identical Many on the works of Jakob Michael 
Reinhold Lenz. Theater as a medium functions simultaneously as a representation of 
society and also as a point of contact with a diverse cross section of society, making it 
doubly illuminating to a study of multitudes. Within the medium of plays, Lenz’s works 
are of particular interest: his plays were known for both the vivid, lifelike quality of their 
characters, as well as their disorienting formal structure. Lenz famously rejected the 
classical unities of the theater. These unities, originally formulated by Aristotle and then 
taken up again in the 17th century by French classical theater, dictated that a play 
should follow a single action, over the course of a single day, at a single location. By 
contrast, Lenz’s ​Der Hofmeister, ​spans years, and the progression of this time is 
stuttering and irregular; days and months disappear without comment, children are 
conceived and then already born in the span of pages or minutes. Instead of one 
location, scenes bounce frenetically from city to city, city to town, and town to country, a 
provocative unstageability which Lenz pushed to the extreme in ​Der neue Menoza​, for 
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which the stage directions are simply “Hie und Da.” Finally, instead of following the arc of 
a single action by the protagonist, the titular Hofmeister disappears for whole acts at a 
time, as the play busily follows a huge ensemble of characters. The reception of Lenz’s 
plays was predictably divisive, with some heralding him as Germany’s Shakespeare, but 
most dismissing his work as the tasteless, unnatural ramblings of arrogant youth. I argue 
that with the creation of his so-called “Komödie,” Lenz introduces a new actor and with it, 
a new unifying principle to his plays. Rather than a single acting individual, his plays are 
ordered by an emergent sense of the totality of society. Within these plays, the traditional 
form splinters in order to show the plight of disparate individuals, each one suffering a 
unique fate, but all falling victim to a new economically motivated social whole. It is a 
perceived negative-interrelatedness between all individuals, one which binds disparate 
people to the same destructive fate. The seemingly fractured and chaotic form of Lenz’s 
plays must therefore be read as a response to the pressure of a non-identical Many, a 
writing of a heterogeneous influence into the structure of the play itself. 
In the third chapter, “Reaching for the Many,” I examine the inaugural 1788 
edition of the ​Braunschweigisches Journal ​as a case study, representative of both the 
explosive growth of Enlightenment journals which occurred at the end of the 18th 
century, as well as a particular form of fragmentary, experiential writing linked to a 
non-identical Many. Like the theater, Enlightenment journals positioned themselves as a 
“popular” medium, that is, one intended for the greatest possible audience. While this 
goal of maximum readership is sometimes retroactively mocked as unrealistic, given the 
increasing, but nevertheless miniscule, reading populace at the end of the 18th century, I 
argue that the metric of literacy is both difficult to judge and more importantly, serves as 
a poor indicator of the potential influence of a publication. Reading in the late 18th 
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century was still very much a social activity; books, journals and letters were typically 
read aloud to a gathered audience, be it in a private home, a church or other public 
space. The authors and editors of the ​Braunschweigisches Journal ​were acutely aware 
of contemporary reading practices, and actively conformed the journalistic medium to 
these practices. At one point, the editors describe themselves as the cashiers of ideas, 
exchanging gold-bar concepts minted by the likes of Garve, Wieland and Kant into 
smaller denominations, coins which they hoped would find their way into the poorest 
houses of the nation and even eventually into the hats of beggars. In a related metaphor, 
the editor Joachim Campe posits the journal author as a spiritual doctor, who, like their 
physical counterpart, must conform to the demands of the patient, claiming provocatively 
that if the audience refused to read anything but  “Frachtzettel,” then the journal author 
adjust their writing accordingly. Time and again, the editors and authors of 
Enlightenment journals position their writing as a response to a new audience, a new 
public, one which they hoped would be as large and inclusive as possible. This is a 
public they are unable to describe, except in the negative, as a “nicht Gelehrten 
Publicum,” an audience which neither corresponded exactly with the an empirical 
non-identical Many, nor with traditional reading audiences. So while the editors remain 
unsure to whom they write, they nevertheless come to a similar conclusion as did Lenz: 
this new public demands fragmentary, iterative, experiential snapshots of the here and 
now, the everyday, half-formed thoughts which find their completion within the minds of 
the public itself.  
It is in this co-authorship of writing forms that the agency of a non-identical Many 
can first be imagined. But this is also a new understanding of what agency is and can 
mean. This agency cannot be understood as the singular will of a unified, internally 
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consistent actor known as the Crowd, Multitude, Proletariat, etc. Instead, it is the 
fundamental ​heterogeneity​, the very ​irreducibility ​of the non-identical Many and the 
subsequent inability to conceptualize this Many as a cohesive population or group, which 
produces the open, fragmentary and experiential writing forms which were prevalent in 
popular media at the end of the 18th century. As previously stated, it is a ​diffuse​, 
pervasive​ agency which is reflected in a new authorial awareness of the interrelation 
between all members of society, a new sense of totality which demands a radically new 
understanding of society, beyond the confines of the Gelehrten Republik or the public 
sphere. This is the agency of the present/absence of a non-identical Many, an agency 
whose social and conceptual pressure ​forces ​authors to forego the neat, closed 
symmetry of systematic, scientific works. And while the non-identical Many can be said 
to have existed in no time or place, its outline can be seen in the response of authors 
and writing forms at the end of the 18th century. I conclude the dissertation by looking 
forward, suggesting that the figure of the non-identical Many could be a useful lens for 
understanding the rapid media changes which occurred in the early 20th century, and 
potentially, could also deepen our understanding of the relationship which exists 
between social media and the Many in our own time. Now, more than ever, it is 
important to develop tools to recognize the agency of those individuals who find 
themselves outside of the borders of identity.  
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Chapter 1: The Specificity of the Premodern World 
This chapter follows the material-historical creation of a non-identical Many at the end of 
the 18th century. It begins by examining influential models of modernity which posit this 
time as a point of rupture between modern and traditional societies, before suggesting a 
model of “radical transition” which examines this “Sattelzeit” itself, not as a discrete 
historical epoch, but rather as a period of dissolution in which old systems of social order 
disappeared but were not immediately replaced. It then applies the intentionally 
anachronistic concepts of markets, labor and property to traditional society, in order to 
show the ways in which the specificity of the pre-modern world defied the fungible 
abstraction necessary to the functioning of modern society. It ends by showing how the 
dislocation of a heterogeneous group from the bonds of traditional society inevitably 
produced a non-identical Many, a fractured group which never existed in any one place 
and was defined only negatively through its mutual exclusion from the emerging idea of 
society. 
 
I. The late 18th Century: Theories of Rupture, Transition 
For the creators of grand historical narratives, the late 18th century has long been an 
object of fascination, due to its position as the last moment Before. Ideas about what, 
exactly, this period precedes and the degree of continuity after 1800 vary, but the view of 
this period as an irrevocable turning point remains constant. In ​The Great 
Transformation​, Karl Polanyi posits the time prior to 1795 as the last moment before the 
inversion in which society begins to function within markets instead of markets operating 
within society, a transformation which simultaneously signals the “discovery” of society, 
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that is, the complex network of biological and economic “laws” which are believed to 
determine all human behavior. For E.P. Thompson, the end of the 18th century marked 
the end of popular resistance against the establishment of capitalism, the moment at 
which the dissident peasant crowds were ultimately transformed into economic classes. 
With this transformation, the nature of popular resistance to the capitalist class likewise 
changed from an extra-capitalist attack on the profit motive made on the basis of 
Christian-patriarchal social values to intra-capitalist labor disputes between proletariats 
and factory owners. Michel Foucault marked the end of the 18th century as a moment of 
paradigm shift and rupture in two different theories with two different organizing 
principles; in ​The Order of Things: An Archaeology of the Human Sciences, ​it marks the 
end of the classical era of representation  and the beginning of modern academic 1
disciplines with their focus on humans as agents of historical change, while in ​Discipline 
and Punish​, Jeremy Bentham’s writings of the late 18th century are used to exemplify 
what Foucault sees as the transition from a centralized authority of physical violence 
towards more economical, psychic-violence directed at the individual, leading to a 
self-perpetuating, self-sustaining discipline inscribed within the individual’s very sense of 
self. Reinhart Koselleck referred to the period between 1750 and 1850 as the 
“Sattelzeit,” the moment in which the “Janusgesicht” of history first becomes clear, as it 
separated two distinct temporalities, namely the eschatological time of traditional society, 
a sense of time in which the present is non-existent, a meaningless blip crushed 
between resurrection and the end of days, and the modern sense of empty progressive 
time which serves as the basis for free will and the individual. The change in temporality 
1 And with it, grand classificatory systems which sought to represent the world as a whole, and 
significantly, a whole of which humans were only one component among many. 
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was so drastic that it destroyed mutual intelligibility across this threshold; in order to 
understand the meaning of words and concepts prior to the Sattelzeit, Koselleck felt 
compelled to invent the science of Begriffsgeschichte which recreates their original 
context and significance. 
The differences between these theories are significant, as together they 
represent some of the most important innovations in intellectual history. Nevertheless, 
they all indicate the end of the 18th century as a time of ​radical transition​, be it on a 
conceptual, temporal or socio-historical level. The goal of this chapter is to better 
understand the moment of transition itself, to trace those forces responsible, emphasize 
the importance of the rate of change and the lag between (apparently) stable eras, and 
finally to show how this period-between produced a non-identical Many, a 
heterogeneous group whose considerable influence will be traced through writing forms 
in the subsequent chapters. This argument therefore continues the tradition of 
conceptualizing the second half of the 18th century as a moment-in-between, rather than 
following the example of Reinhard Blänkner and others in asserting that instead it 
represents a discrete historical era, namely that of “neuständische Gesellschaft.” 
Blänkner argues that concepts such as “Sattelzeit” necessarily lead to a teleological 
understanding of history, one in which the future of the capitalist world economy and the 
Industrial Revolution are anachronistically written into a society which instead operated 
in accordance with its own laws and norms, laws which were distinct from those of both 
traditional estate and modern class-based society. This is an important concern, and one 
which demands a constant vigilance; for in presupposing the end, historical difference 
and possibility are subsumed into narratives of fate, nature, progress, etc. However, the 
argument presented in this chapter uses the idea of transition precisely in order to 
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preserve historical plasticity and specificity. This is transition not understood as a 
transition ​to​ a known end from the pretended omniscience of an atemporal future, but 
rather transition as transition ​from​, an attempt to understand the then-contemporary 
experience of the dissolution of a real and imagined present. The lens of ​transition from 
emphasizes both the uniqueness of the historical moment, granting an attention to detail 
impossible when every event and social structure is merely read as a sign of a future to 
come, while also avoiding the stability which terms like “neuständische Gesellschaft” 
would imply. The asymptotic approach of historical specificity through the introduction of 
ever smaller epochs seems unavoidably to produce deterministic calcification, 
exchanging the perils of teleology for those of stasis. It is also for this reason that the 
term ​radical transition ​has been chosen in lieu of ​rupture​: rupture by necessity 
establishes a dichotomy between a thing which was and a thing which now is, stabilizing 
both through juxtaposition. What is of interest to this work is the reaching-uncertainty 
presented by an unknown future, which, though ever present, attains a fever pitch during 
those times when people are confronted with a reality which consistently defies their 
expectations--to borrow terms from Heinz-Dieter Kittsteiner’s ​Naturabsicht Und 
Unsichtbare Hand: Zur Kritik Geschichtsphilosophischen Denkens​, when the collectively 
held ​Erfahrungsraum ​has almost no correlation to the ​Erwartungshorizont​. Critically, a 
radical transition from​ does not fully stabilize either that which precedes or that which 
follows, while still acknowledging the real advantages of knowing, not the ultimate goal 
of history, but the shape of institutions to come. It thereby aims to preserve the latent 
potential of imagined pasts and futures, while simultaneously employing productive 
anachronism to highlight historical change and difference. As detailed by Caroline 
Levine in ​Forms: Whole, Rhythm, Hierarchy, Network​, examining the past is not a matter 
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of determining the extent of continuity or rupture, but rather reading the way in which 
different societal forms overlap and interact with one another, with the goal of becoming 
a “canny manipulator” of points of intersection. We study the past because of the 
dialectical tension it creates with the present; it is both distinct and alien, while remaining 
familiar enough that it bears direct comparison to the present, and through this 
comparison “the contingency of our own ordering principles [becomes apparent] when 
we know that they have at other times been organized otherwise” (Levine XII). It is in this 
spirit that this chapter applies the modern concepts of markets, time and space to the 
world as it existed before 1800 in order to highlight the gap which was created both 
conceptually and within social institutions leading to the formation of a non-identical 
Many--not only to demonstrate the influence of a unique historical formation, but to 
conjure parallels to a similar formation in the present. 
 
II. The Disappearing World: Markets 
As made evident by the works of Karl Polanyi and E.P. Thompson, the study of market 
behavior in the pre-modern is essential to understanding differences in societal 
organization, bringing the shift from subsistence to profit, bread to cash, or Christian duty 
to entrepreneurial spirit into sharp relief. Polanyi characterizes this “great transformation” 
as an inversion in which the laws of market dynamics went from the carefully 
circumscribed rules of a minor societal institution to the foundational organizing principle 
of society itself. The current ubiquity of the profit motive clouds the significance of this 
claim; while the concept of ​homo-oeconomicus​ is now a constant object of critique, the 
“laws” of supply and demand have been naturalized to the extent that it is difficult to 
imagine them as historical concepts of relatively modern origin. It is therefore useful to 
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begin as Thompson does in “The Moral Economy of the English Crowd in the Eighteenth 
Century,” by examining the legislation and customs which the “natural laws” of the 
market circumvented and replaced. Contrary to every modern principle of trade, 
traditional laws forbade the practice of “forestalling,” that is, withholding of grain or flour 
until market prices are favorable, and instead insisted on as direct a channel of sale as 
possible, thereby effectively outlawing most middlemen. Traditional laws of commerce 
similarly controlled the time, place and acceptable prices of sale, and it was illegal for 
large buyers to purchase in bulk from farmers for resale, either directly or “by sample” at 
markets. In other words, the profit mechanism was legally blocked in grain markets; 
“buying low and selling high” is impossible when the seller is unable to dictate the time, 
amount or place at which a commodity will be sold. What this signifies is that within 
traditional society, grain was ​not​ a commodity, that is an object produced for profit, but 
rather a necessary service rendered for the good of the whole. It was for this reason that 
“millers and… bakers were considered as servants of the community, working not for a 
profit but for a fair allowance” (Thompson 83). Because the primary function of local 
markets was the subsistence needs of the community, and because the manner in which 
goods could circulate was tightly controlled, the farmers, millers and bakers peddling 
their wares at market were more comparable to a priest than a capitalist entrepreneur. 
And while Thompson indicates the gradual erosion of these precepts over the course of 
centuries, he demonstrates that they continued both to exert legal force and to inform 
expectations until the very end of the 18th century.   2
2 Indeed, the very fact that the modern reader is likely to imagine it “natural” for a farmer, miller, 
baker to expect maximum return on their possessions indicates an important break with 
traditional society. Thompson notes that prior to the onset of capitalism, there existed an 
accepted difference between “natural” and “civil” liberties. Quoting a “characteristic pamphlet” of 
the 1760s, Thompson writes “It cannot then be said to be the liberty of a citizen, or of one who 
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Where Thompson describes the historically and regionally specific trade of grain 
and bread prior to 1800, Karl Polanyi paints with characteristically broader strokes, 
claiming that ​all​ markets, in ​all ​societies, had ​always ​been carefully regulated 
micro-ecosystems operating in accordance with societal norms. He chastises historians, 
sociologists and economists for thereby ignoring the inconvenient truth of the 
anti-capitalist breadth of human history, and instead focusing on an extremely narrow 
band of the recent past. The works of Adam Smith, though prophetic/prescriptive 
towards the future and offering some clarity towards the present, are a huge 
misrepresentation of the past (45). This is not an argument for an idyllic communistic 
past of “primitive man;” Polanyi is quick to assert that the past was by and large a wildly 
inequitable place, one with slaves and kings, serfs and lords, citizens and noncitizens 
and sharp gender divisions. The key difference he seeks to make is that these were 
societal ​divisions, and not the functioning of market forces. How much tribute was made, 
what gift offered to a guest, how food was rationed to servants, all operated in 
accordance with economies, but these were individual economies of social status and 
not the result of a single unified economy based on the profit motive. Polanyi argues that 
this was just as true for the householding economies of Europe, long indicated as 
proto-capitalistic, as it was for “primitive” cultures. 
Which isn’t to say that profit motive as such didn’t exist. Polanyi divides markets 
into three categories, local, external and internal. Local markets, of the kind already 
lives under the protection of any community; it is rather the liberty of a savage; therefore he who 
avails himself thereof, deserves not that protection, the power of Society affords” (86). Part of the 
shift which occurred near the end of the 18th century was the gradual integration of civil society 
into the natural world. Humans, once believed to be of divine origin and separate from and 
superior to the animal kingdom, were made subject to biological determinants. The subjection of 
human society to laws of population and evolutionary theory and the transformation of the 
“natural” finds its origin in the extension of market dynamics across society, invisible laws 
“discovered” underneath the fabric of society, directing its course. 
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described by Thompson, were “limited to the goods of the region, [goods] which do ​not 
bear carrying because they are too heavy, bulky or perishable.” Local markets were a 
means of redistribution within a community, or regionally between town and country, and 
as such do not operate in accordance with a profit motive--instead they represent a 
reciprocal and mutually beneficial exchange. External trade operates sympathetically 
with local trade, supplying those goods not available locally, acting in concert with other 
communities--in other words, historically external trade is also a system based on the 
principle of redistribution rather than profit. Polanyi is therefore able to argue that it is 
only with the establishment of ​internal ​markets, that is, markets geared towards local or 
national competition, as opposed to redistribution, that capitalism can be said to emerge. 
Furthermore, he argues that internal markets were only created through the direct 
intervention of the newly emerging national states, and were ​not​ an inevitable 
consequence of the expansionary impulses of truck and barter, nor of external trade. 
Polanyi’s ultimate argument is that the creation of internal competitive markets 
was only achieved through the direct intervention of the state, and that it was this, in a 
sense, “unnatural” interference which caused the inversion of society to operate in 
accordance with market laws of profit. This assertion is unconvincing and undermines 
much of his own theory as previously detailed. Polanyi correctly asserts that the creation 
of colonies and the European “discovery” of the New World directly contributed to this 
inversion,  however, in his haste to assert the ​artificiality ​of the dominance of market 3
laws over society, he is forced to assert that external trade, though distinct from local 
trade, is not inherently competitive or expansionary, that, like internal trade, it is merely a 
3 The connection between the “primitive accumulation” which occurred in colonies and the 
establishment of capitalist system in the home nation had already been well documented by Karl 
Marx in ​Capital: Volume I​, as will be explored below. 
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system of redistribution, a collaborative exchange between communities. And yet, 
Polanyi also states that “External trade is, originally, more in the nature of adventure, 
exploration, hunting, piracy and war than of barter” (62). His intent in describing external 
trade as “piracy” is to distinguish it from the profit dynamic, but in doing so he 
inadvertently exposes the limitless, expansionary character of external trade. Local trade 
is a system of distribution geared towards communal subsistence and, to employ a 
modern economic concept, represents inelastic demands. While increases in production 
or availability can result in greater consumption, this increase is to a certain extent 
bounded; birth and death rates can increase/decrease to be sure, but the amount of 
grain required by a specific individual remains relatively constant. By comparison, just as 
the pre-industrial markets for wool seemed to be without limit, there is no point of 
saturation for pillage, since, like profit, the fundamental motivating force behind pillage is 
not utility. Polanyi claims that Aristotle presaged market economy by 2000 years by 
“denouncing the principle of production for gain as boundless and limitless… Aristotle 
was, in effect, aiming at the crucial point, namely the divorce of the economic motive 
from all concrete social relationships which would by their very nature set a limit to that 
motive” (57). Polanyi also indicates external markets as the point of origin at which 
production demands exceeded the bounds of the guild system, leading to the 
establishment of wage labor:  
On the local market, production was regulated according to the needs of the 
producers, thus restricting production to a remunerative level. This principle 
would naturally not apply to exports, where the interests of the producers set no 
limits to production. Consequently, while local trade was strictly regulated, 
production for export was only formally controlled by corporations of crafts. The 
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dominating export industry of the age, the cloth trade, was actually organized on 
the capitalistic basis of wage labor. (68) 
Here, by his own admission, we see a capitalistic, expansionary dynamic at play, as 
early as the 16th century, and occurring precisely as the result of external trade. There 
are, of course, saturation points to both external trade for profit and the direct pillaging of 
foreign cultures (and reaching these saturation points results in cataclysmic collapse), 
but it takes a long time to clothe the world in wool or to remove the last scrap of gold 
from the Aztec empire, giving the moment to moment operation of external trade a 
fundamentally different character than that of local trade. 
The reason Polanyi argues at cross purposes with himself against external trade 
as being inherently expansionary, is to underline the artificiality of organizing society in 
accordance with market principles. If the supremacy of the laws of the market over 
society is the result of state (i.e., human) intervention and not the product of a natural, 
progressive, evolutionary process occurring within society, market laws are robbed of 
their fated legitimacy. If artificial, market laws can no longer be posited as a cosmic order 
operating in accordance with a divine wisdom which escapes our limited, mortal reason. 
Instead, the brutal, exploitation of the profit mechanic is revealed, and its origin can be 
traced back to intentional manipulation of social structures. This is an important 
intervention, and one which creates a huge amount of space in which to imagine the 
constructedness of the world. However, it is possible to maintain that the subversion of 
society to economic laws was not an inevitable and in this sense, natural occurrence, 
while also recognizing that external trade had always been marked by certain 
expansionary, unrestricted dynamics--in fact to do so logically strengthens Polanyi’s 
assertion that societies had for millennia consciously, carefully guarded themselves 
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against the real dangers of profit-based production. Like Thompson, one of Polanyi’s 
chief concerns is to show that despite the expansion of markets under mercantilism, 
Europe remained fundamentally un-capitalist until the late 18th century, and that people 
did not understand or operate in accordance with the new “laws” until the 1830s.  
The paradox of 200 years of increasing market presence without a corresponding 
adoption of capitalist mentality or significant leakage of capitalist institutions into society 
at large can be understood through the proposed double function of the towns and cities 
which housed external markets. The walls of these mercantile centers were designed 
both to protect the town inhabitants and markets from outside incursion, as well as 
contain ​the market dynamics housed within. Cities and towns, acting in coordination with 
the guilds, maintained a vice-like grip over who produced what, in what amount, and at 
which price. Even within the cities, local and external markets were typically separated, 
because not only was the limitless nature of external trade understood, so too was its 
tendency towards monopolization (63, 69). Something which is often misunderstood by 
modern analyses of traditional European society is that the primary function of guilds 
was the protection of its members, not production. Through the careful control of 
membership and production, the needs of the guild (and secondarily, the community) 
were met, but not exceeded. This system is geared towards guild maintenance, and not 
expansion through the generation of profit on the basis of supply and demand. Supply 
and demand themselves, barring (frequent) unforeseen calamities, were held in balance 
through careful regulation. To invert this structure and place society at the whim of the 
markets was a madness of which even in ​Wealth of Nations​, originally published in 1776, 
Adam Smith could not conceive. According to Polanyi: 
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There is no intimation in his [Adam Smith’s] work that the economic interests of 
the capitalists laid down the law to society; no intimation that they were the 
secular spokesmen of the divine providence which governed the economic world 
as a separate entity. The economic sphere, with him, is not yet subject to laws of 
its own that provide us with a standard of good and evil. (116-117) 
At this juncture it is useful to reassert some aspects of markets as they operated before 
the change, in order to better understand both the reality of the pre-modern, 
pre-industrialized, pre-capitalized world and to establish the ​Erfahrungsraum ​and implicit 
Erwartungshorizont ​as they existed in the second half of the 18th century. First, local 
trade was organized on the principle of need and subsistence rather than profit. This 
was particularly closely regulated when it came to the sale of actual foodstuffs, but it 
extended to all forms of exchange within a community. This does not suggest an 
equitable distribution of goods, as there were those closer to or further from the line of 
starvation and exposure (although universally higher mortality rates also kept this 
threshold narrower than it is today), but it does mean that trade operated in accordance 
with laws wholly alien to modern markets, and that the profit motive was specifically 
blocked through legal restrictions and prohibitions placed on those very mechanisms 
central to the function of capitalist economy: withholding goods for a better price, selling 
in bulk, buying low and selling high, etc. Second, and indicated by the first aspect, 
markets were socially situated and controlled, and were not themselves the organizing 
principle of society--and indeed, market principles such as the profit motive were viewed 
as antithetical to the safe functioning of society. All economies, including the local sale of 
foodstuffs, the operation of guilds, trade with neighboring cities, operated in accordance 
with social relationships and hierarchies. This has implications far beyond regulation of 
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the market, and requires a total reimagining of not only the operation of the markets 
themselves, but also the society which surrounded them. Specifically, the institutions of 
property and labor are transformed in the absence of market laws. Property and labor, 
stripped of their fictive quality as commodities, are nothing more than human activity and 
the context of that activity. The point here is not to argue for the falsity of the concepts of 
property and labor. ​Within​ market based economies property and labor are 
unquestionably real, exerting influence over the lives of all who live inside it, whether 
they are merely reified concepts or no. But in order to understand the liminal state which 
existed between the total disappearance of estate society and the creation of capitalism, 
it is necessary to sketch the concepts of labor and property as they existed, and to the 
extent with which they existed, prior to the great transformation. 
  
III. The Disappearing World: Labor 
It is almost impossible to speak of labor prior to capitalism without slipping into 
anachronism. The concept of labor, as understood today, depends in turn on the 
concept of the free worker, that is, the idea of a self-determining individual choosing to 
sell their time/labor as a commodity on the market to employers in exchange for money. 
This is the foundational assumption of capitalism, and more, the relationship between 
employer and employee in a free market is the source of capital itself. It is only through 
the act of buying labor, through the relational disparity which it creates, that “the owners 
of money, means of production, means of subsistence” are able to valorize objects and 
create surplus value. The “freedom” of the worker is the precondition for the entire 
exchange and, as Karl Marx famously argued in ​Capital: Volume I​, it is a freedom in a 
double sense: 
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Free workers… neither form part of the means of production themselves, as 
would be the case with slaves, serfs, etc., nor do they own the means of 
production, as would be the case with self-employed peasant proprietors. The 
free workers are therefore free from, unencumbered by, any means of production 
of their own. (Marx​ ​874) 
To take the example of the serf, in order to become a free worker capable of selling their 
labor in the modern sense, they must be emancipated from both the restrictive caste 
system which fixed them and their families in place for generations, but also “freed” from 
any means of subsistence, be it in the form of privately held or communal land. The 
precise nature of the relationship of the poorer castes to the land, and the means 
through which they were expropriated will be explored in the following section; in terms 
of labor, it is only necessary to emphasize that these conditions did not yet fully exist in 
the second half of the 18th century. And because they did not exist, the “labor” which 
occurred was of another sort entirely. 
A common complaint leveled by historians at feudal economies is their relative 
inefficiency.  When compared with market economies, feudal economies require more 
people and more time to produce the same amount of grain, wool, manufactured goods, 
etc. More than just a difference in​ ​technological innovation (better farming equipment, 
steam engines, mining equipment, etc.), this is the product of social organization, the 
relations of production. Marx states that feudal production is characterized, ​“by division 
of the soil amongst the greatest possible number of sub-feudatories” (878). This is true 
from the ruling aristocracy down to the lowest serf. At every level, power, land and 
production are divided and subdivided into ever smaller, often overlapping units. In place 
of consolidated large farms or centralized manufacturing centers, streamlined to produce 
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the most material wealth with the smallest amount of human labor possible, production 
was sprawling and diffuse. Instead of an ironclad division of labor, members of society 
frequently participated in varying kinds of work within a day, season, year, and the vast 
majority were at least partially responsible for the production of their own means of 
subsistence. The serf that tilled the land of the great lord also had rights to common, and 
in some cases personal, land on which they farmed and tended to livestock for their own 
use (though of course still subject to taxation). The weavers of the putting out system 
likewise sustained themselves not through paid labor alone, but provided themselves 
with food for their tables, wood for their fires, and the maintenance of shelter. Poor 
servants worked for and with poor families, living under the same roof, eating at the 
same table and helping to rear children, children who themselves contributed to the daily 
work of survival as soon as they were able. Within this structure, labor as something 
separate, distinct from other aspects of life, was unthinkable. Working for oneself, for 
one’s lord, as a servant, all bled seamlessly from one into another, representing different 
facets of the same process, the work of life. Labor and human activity were 
indistinguishable. 
To view the premodern through the lens of “efficiency” therefore necessarily 
introduces anachronism. As James Sheehan notes in​ ​German History 1770-1866​, no 
one had the expectation of being happy, healthy or successful (80). People worked 
collectively in order to survive, a dynamic which Sheehan says produced a great fluidity 
between master and apprentice, servants and the families they served. Death and 
catastrophe pressed on social institutions from all sides. Families were particularly 
vulnerable, as the death of a father or mother could spell ruin and collapse, increasing 
interdependence between members of a household, regardless of blood relation. In​ A 
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Social History of Germany​, Eda Sagarra similarly​ ​stresses the strict corporative, 
communal nature of premodern Germany, bringing the lack of strict social boundaries 
into even sharper relief (142). It is therefore surprising when both scholars slip 
unreflectively into critiques of estate society on the basis of personal, egotistical 
motivation. Sheehan worries about the “emotional texture and psychological climate” of 
these households in which servants are forced to work tirelessly for children who are not 
their own biological offspring, to provide for homes which they do not own, all with the 
knowledge that they may never acquire the means to themselves marry and establish 
their own households (85).  Sagarra in turn bemoans the inefficiency of tenant farmers, 4
who she speculates surely suffered from a lack of motivation due to the fact they were 
not the direct benefactors of their own labor (143).  
The contradiction is clear; on the one hand, both Sheehan and Sagarra 
recognize that traditional estate societies and economies functioned on the basis of 
corporative survival. Like Polanyi and Thompson, they see that the goal of production 
was subsistence and not the result of an individualistic profit motive. On the other hand, 
by critiquing inefficiencies on the basis of a lack of incentive, they again slide into the 
modern prejudices. The incentive was first and foremost survival, of the collective and 
the individual. To suggest that servants were less motivated to tend to children who were 
4 As a partial proof to the misery and disenfranchisement of those in question, Sheehan turns to 
one of history’s most prolific complainers, the titular main character of Karl Philipp Moritz’s ​Anton 
Reiser​. It is not the fictional nature of the account itself which is problematic, but rather, that 
Anton Reiser ​is a poor bellwether as it portrays a society already in flux. Anton Reiser’s misery is 
precisely the product of his position on the fringes of society. He is an educated youth from a poor 
family, a new and at the time extremely rare phenomenon. He is not an apprentice to a trade, a 
member of the clergy, and has no connection to agrarian social networks. Anton has heard the 
clarion call of the Enlightenment for emancipation and individual worth, but finds himself unable to 
realize their potential, while also standing outside of traditional society. As such, Anton Reiser is 
indeed archetypal for a specific time and a particular kind of suffering; not of miseries and 
dissatisfactions inherent to estate society, but rather of those born of the ever more frequent 
experience of having no place in society. 
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not their own, or that that tenant farmers were only motivated by self-gain and therefore 
disinclined to work for their lords, incorrectly subverts the social to the economic. As 
demonstrated by Polanyi, the collective-oriented actions of individuals in non-capitalistic 
societies are not due to the absence of selfish motivations, but rather because acting 
against the precepts of the community meant expulsion and almost certain death (49). 
Sheehan himself states that “In the traditional social order, communal power was 
affirmed at every stage in the life of an individual and his family. Birth, marriage and 
death were all marked by public rituals that brought people together to express their 
dependence upon one another” (85). This is the source of the fluidity which existed 
within household economies. The inhabitants of the “traditional social order” 
fundamentally understood that each depended on all, and were daily confronted with the 
fatal realities against which social institutions were the only bulwark. 
 It is insufficient to say that the economic was submerged in the social. In reality, 
there existed only social economies. A king was not king because he was rich, but rather 
rich because he was king. To be a king is to be divinely appointed, or phrased secularly, 
to be marked by social institutions as being divinely appointed. Conversely, a serf is not 
a serf because they work in the service of their lord, collecting grain, raising livestock. It 
is not the activity which determines the social status, but rather social status which 
determines activity. A serf is a serf because of social, hierarchical structures which have 
enveloped their family for generation after generation. In other words, an individual’s 
place in society was neither coterminous with, nor determined by, their position within 
the production process, but rather social status dictated position within production. This 
is also what accounts for the famous rigidity of traditional estate society: a serf can 
collect as much grain as they want, they are not going to better their social standing. To 
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use an example even closer to and, for this reason, more alien from our modern 
understanding; to advance from apprentice to journeyman to master was not exclusively 
or even primarily a function of production, i.e. number of pigs butchered, hides tanned, 
pieces of furniture built. This is because, again, production itself was socially determined 
and not a function of market derived supply and demand. What was to be produced, 
how, how many, and by whom, were all decisions of the guild leadership, whose ultimate 
goal was the preservation and longevity of the guild itself. As a result, the internal 
regulation of the guild was focused on stability and not expansion, profit margins, or 
“efficiency” in the modern sense, stability which was to be achieved through maintaining 
consistent numbers of members and level of production. Membership was a function of 
familial heritage and social position. While it was possible for the children of members of 
one guild to apply for another guild, it was infinitely more difficult for someone external to 
the community to gain admittance, a process which was a function of both much higher 
fees and more prohibitively, the acceptance of the guild leadership, with the fees 
representing more the reluctance of guilds to accept outsiders at any price more than it 
did a commodity for sale. Advancement within the guild depended both on years of 
service and the approval of guild leadership.  
To accuse guilds, or estate society as a whole, of inefficiency is therefore to 
misunderstand the intended purpose of these institutions, namely the self-preservation 
of the institutions themselves and those who belonged to them. Once systems of 
production were placed under the control of market dynamics, they unquestionably 
became more “efficient” in the sense that both absolute as well as per capita production 
increased: more produced, by fewer people, in less time. However, this efficiency in 
terms of material production came at a steep cost: instead of gearing production to the 
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needs of the community served and producing organization, the stability and security of 
production vanished. With the loosening of regulation, anyone could and did produce, 
and in whatever quantity, limited only by raw materials, availability of “free labor”  and 
market demand. By removing or circumventing the social organization of production, the 
“natural laws” of competitive markets are unleashed. Production becomes solely a 
function of supply and demand and profit margins, introducing dynamics such as over 
and under production, fluctuating prices, boom and bust cycles. New concepts and 
social realities creep into society such as “employment,” “unemployment,” and the even 
more perplexing “underemployment.” Just as “labor” within traditional society is a term 
without a clear referent (beyond indicating human activity as such, the labor of life), 
“employment” cannot be applied to estate society. An individual was not employed or 
unemployed. One was either within the protective mesh of society or stood outside of it. 
A craftsman or serf, worked when work was allocated to them, and ate the food which 
either they themselves provided or which their station guaranteed. The individual was 
still often exposed to the vicissitudes of nature in the form of drought, famine, plague, but 
social institutions functioned to offer protection to those who belonged to them wherever 
possible.  
As will become more apparent in the following discussion of land, all ​members of 
society​ had rights to the means of subsistence. Even in those relatively rare instances in 
which people earned wages in traditional society, these wages still had a different 
character than those of wage labor. First, in the case of guilds, they were again 
determined socially and not by market forces (Polanyi 73). Second, in the case of 
putting-out systems, typical for wool production and limited selection of other trades, in 
which the rate of compensation was partially based on what would today be described 
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as market forces, these wages formed only one part of household income, and were not 
the sole source of subsistence. This is a critical distinction, because as Marx noted, the 
modern concept of wage-labor can only function in isolation and without alternative: “So 
long… as the worker can accumulate for himself… capitalist accumulation and the 
capitalist mode of production are impossible” (933). As a demonstration of this truth, 
Marx, with his usual acerbic wit, points to the colonies in which the workers have been 
known to be so “simple” and “mischievous” as to exploit the capitalist instead of 
vice-versa, abandoning their job the moment compensation had been received (937). 
Wage labor requires the existential pressure of starvation to function, and without it, 
workers simply refuse to work for a wage, demand “unfair” (i.e., fair, non-value 
generating) compensation for their labor, and “today’s wage-labourer is tomorrow’s 
independent peasant or artisan,” working once again for themselves and for their own 
gain (936). What this demonstrates is that even once the “laws” of the market have been 
established, they are not automatically universal, but rather must be extended at great 
effort and cost.  It is therefore necessary to destroy all alternative means of subsistence 5
5 A latourian idea of networks is useful to understand what is meant here by the effort involved in 
creating, maintaining and expanding the “natural laws” of the market. In his essay “On the Partial 
Existence of Existing and Nonexisting Objects,” Bruno Latour shows the great cost involved in 
extending even those networks which have been almost entirely naturalized, i.e. those of the 
natural sciences. The central example is Louis Pasteur’s initial failure to demonstrate his theory of 
bacteria over and against the then prevalent theory of spontaneous generation, that is, that life 
could spring into existence out of nothing. By creating sterile, airtight samples, Pasteur hoped to 
demonstrate his “uncovering” of the natural laws of microbiology. The only problem was that his 
samples kept showing up to critics already contaminated, seemingly validating the theory of 
spontaneous generation instead. It was only once pasteurian methodology had been adopted by 
other labs that the “truth” of microbiology became possible and more or less universal. Latour’s 
provocation is to undermine the absolute universality of the natural sciences. In other words, the 
point is not to question the validity of microbiology, but rather to show how microbiology, like all 
“natural” laws, depends on the careful creation and maintenance of an environment which ​makes 
them true. Similarly, Marx’s intent is not to question the active force of market laws, but instead, 
like Latour, to show that these laws have a prehistory, that the environment in which they were 
created was (in this case) violently created, in order that they may be true. 
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in order for the modern concepts of labor, employment, unemployment, to spring into 
being. This, again, is the “double freedom” of the modern worker: the theoretical social 
mobility offered to the newly emancipated serf or peasant is purchased at the cost of all 
self-sufficiency and social support. One is only free to work for an employer once the old 
understanding of work as life, work as means of subsistence has been eradicated. As 
long as there still exists an outside to market dynamics, as was the case in traditional 
society, the intended proletariat would continue to operate within old “inefficient” systems 
ordered around communal survival. The next section explores how the old networks of 
social production were dissolved, specifically how the means of production were stripped 
from the future working class, and the intermediary effects this dissolution produced.  
 
IV. The Disappearing World: Property 
Just as speaking of “labor” in the pre-modern leads inevitably to anachronism, 
surprisingly, the modern understanding of “land” proves equally problematic. A central 
difficulty to understanding the societal position of land in traditional society is the 
significant shift which has occurred in the meaning of “property” since the end of the 18th 
century. In ​German Home Towns​, Mack Walker highlights this problem by detailing the 
multivalence of “Eigentum” as used by 18th century jurist and social theorist Justus 
Möser: 
Eigentum ​means property, of course, and so when Möser spoke of it as 
something held in common within the native German community he seemed to 
be describing a kind of primitive communism; and so, sometimes, he was. 
Eigentum ​means property; and so, when Möser spoke of it as a prerequisite for 
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full membership in a community he seemed to be describing a personal property 
qualification for citizenship, and sometimes he meant that too. (3) 
Certainly there appears to be an element of the modern understanding of property as 
defined by Möser; in order to be a citizen, it was necessary for a person to have an 
individual legal and customary claim to property. But property also meant specific, 
socially determined rights to land, rights which simultaneously recognized manifold 
communal claims. There is no contradiction between the two senses because “Eigentum 
is a social quality and only derivatively an economic one.” Just as the economies of 
markets and labor (or what would then more accurately have been described as human 
activity) were submerged in ​social ​economies, that is, economies in which economic 
value is determined by law and custom instead of market value, “property” was 
significant primarily for the social relations it described: “Even when [Möser] used the 
term conventionally to mean economic good and facilities, what interested him was what 
conferred property and what property conferred.” For this reason, “property” understood 
as ​personal​ or ​private​ ownership is a poor descriptor for land relations as they existed in 
estate society, and “land rights” proves more accurate. This is an important distinction, 
because as Sheehan notes, “land was the basis of wealth, the primary source of 
employment, and the means of subsistence” with over 80 percent of German population 
living in rural communities during the 18th century (90, 93). It is possible for the modern 
observer to understand the primacy of land in feudal society and still fundamentally 
misinterpret this significance. It is not the raw economic productive potential of the 
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duke’s land which makes him powerful, but rather the social systems which granted him 
a specific kind of (privileged) access to that land.   6
It is therefore somewhat misleading for Walker to suggest that citizenship was 
contingent upon property. As he himself states, “[s]trangers and outsiders by definition 
cannot have this propriety and identity. Nobody can who is free of communal bonds and 
perquisites” (4). Again, it is useful to return briefly to the rules surrounding guild 
membership: while it was technically possible for “outsiders” (people whose families had 
no connection to the guild system) to petition for membership, albeit at significantly 
greater cost, these petitions could be (and in most cases were) denied for purely social 
grounds, be it the result of “bad character,” being a “foreigner” (i.e. not a citizen of the 
local township), or simply as an attempt to limit total membership. In reality, the higher 
fee required of outsiders distracts from the basic truth: guild membership was not 
something which could be purchased at any cost, as it was not primarily an economic 
position. Similarly, citizenship was not something attained through land acquisition, but 
rather as a member of a town, a family, a house, one enjoyed certain privileges to the 
surrounding land. In other words, land rights were not a function of a market economy, 
6 This may seem like moot distinction, as one could similarly argue that even modern property is 
“socially” conferred in this sense. Personal property is a function of legal agreements, or in other 
words, socially sanctioned contracts granted by societal institutions of power. These personal 
property rights permit certain actions while forbidding others, and as such could also be described 
as “land rights” conferring a specific kind of access to the property in question. And, indeed, 
property ​is​ still a social institution, and to conceive of it in this manner is particularly fruitful in 
uncovering systemic inequality and particularity in what is purportedly a universal and egalitarian 
function of market dynamics. However, over-stressing the social nature of personal property 
neglects the very real inversion which took place; land is understood now first and foremost in its 
economic function and only secondarily as a social belonging. The incumbent rights of the 
modern proprietor in many regards outstrip those of a feudal king: they may often unilaterally sell, 
buy, build, deforest, farm, drill, all through the initial conference of ​ownership​. Indeed, ownership, 
as will be shown, are land rights defined through the specific exclusion of other claims, absolute 
and binary in their function. 
 
34 
but rather the product of social relations with profound economic consequences. To say 
that land was the foundation of power in feudal society is not the same as to argue that 
property rights determined social function, as these rights were themselves the product 
of the social order and not vice versa. As Polanyi writes: 
Under feudalism and the guild system land and labor formed part of the social 
organization itself… Land, the pivotal element in the feudal order, was the basis 
of the military, judicial, administrative, and political system; ​its status and function 
were determined by legal and customary rule​. Whether its possession was 
transferable or not, and if so, to whom and under what restrictions; what the 
rights of property entailed, to what uses some types of land might be put--​all 
these questions were removed from the organization of buying and selling, and 
subjected to an entirely different set of institutional regulations​. (72, emphasis 
added) 
This situation is a source of great unease for modern scholars. Land, which Sheehan 
deems an “apparently so solid and visible a commodity” as property, disappears into an 
overlapping and interdependent web of “property rights, privileges, and obligations” (93). 
Instead of a single owner of an “apparent” commodity, multiple parties of varying social 
strata exercise differing degrees of legal and customary rights. When confronted with the 
unquestionably significant holdings of the aristocracy, church and crown, it is therefore 
necessary to remember that these possessions did not represent absolute control. Marx 
brings this reality into sharp relief when he states that not only did the Silesian serf in this 
sense “own” the piece of land attached to their house, they were additionally the 
“co-proprietor of the common land” and that more significantly, this legal and customary 
claim was of precisely the same character as that of the feudal lord (877). Obviously the 
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rights of a lord vs. those of a serf were wildly different in terms of the access and 
privileges which they granted, but neither was more binding than the other, meaning that 
a serf’s right to procure subsistence was protected by the same system of social bonds 
which granted the lord the right of the hunt, the ability to demand a percentage of 
harvest, etc. (878). 
What this produced was a multi-layering of different kinds of propriety in regards 
to the same physical space; on the bureaucratic side, it meant in some cases that the 
same piece of land would be subject to taxation from as many as four different sources 
(Sagarra 147). In an essay cataloguing land relations in the late 18th century, Johann 
von Justi discovered that there were “no less than eight different types of tenancy, each 
of which might be held by one of five different kinds of farmer--and neither the type of his 
tenancy nor his status was an infallible indicator of a peasant’s economic position” 
(Sheehan 94). The multiple claims which could be made of any particular space also 
complicated practices such as inheritance. Whether partible or impartible (that is, 
bequeathed in its entirety to the eldest male heir or divided between all male children), 
the land which was passed on necessarily carried with it the web of privileges and 
obligations it had had in the previous generation. “Ownership” in the sense of the ability 
to bequeath land to subsequent generations did not dissolve the rights others may 
possess to till the land or to husband animals on it. It was therefore not so much the ​land 
which was inherited, but a specific kind of access to it. Sheehan, with an eye to the 
future, characterizes these webs as backwards obstacles to progress, “The sheer 
complexity and impenetrable interdependence of traditional rural society retarded 
innovation” (101). What this teleological view of history overlooks is the protection this 
“web of values and institutions” surrounding land rights provided to all members of 
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society, from the lord to the serf. What retroactively is portrayed by Sheehan, Sagarra 
and, to a lesser extent, Walker, as the suffocating, stagnant reality of daily life in estate 
society, was for the contemporary citizen or subject a guarantee of stability and social 
protection. For rural Germany, land rights, the means of subsistence and position within 
society were all different aspects of an indivisible whole. Similar to the difference 
previously indicated between the modern understanding of work as labor/employment 
and the premodern conception of work as life/belonging, to have land rights was to have 
both a symbolic as well as ​physical ​place in society. The literal quality of this physical 
belonging is highlighted when one looks at contemporary terms used to describe those 
on the fringes of society; for example, in Austria, those outside of society were referred 
to as Schubpersonen, which as Sagarra notes, indicates both their position outside of 
society as well as their forced transiency (163). It is therefore not surprising that 
moments of instability or overpopulation were marked by increases in the laws governing 
vagrancy; premodern society could only function so long as it was able to control and 
organize its members; everyone needed work, and everyone needed a specific 
circumscribed attachment to the land. Just as guilds were organized on the principle of 
providing stable employment to guild members through limiting production and 
membership (as opposed to the potentially limitless production of capitalist 
organizations), it was critical to feudal townships to guard membership (and thereby land 
allocation) jealously, as this was also the primary mechanism through which the security 
of its citizens was assured. So while the laws against vagrancy themselves were of little 
effect (and indeed would prove disastrous once population growth became universal and 
sustained in the second half of the 18th century), they nevertheless once again indicate 
the indivisible link between access to land and place in society. 
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The manifold claims and obligations existing simultaneously also point to an 
additional quality of the social perception of land within traditional society, a quality which 
has been described alternatively as its non-contiguous, locally-specific, or centripetal 
nature. In order to understand how land was globally perceived in premodern society, or 
indeed, how, in significant ways, a global perspective was absent, it is useful to delineate 
the modern understanding of land as ​territory​, which Benedict Anderson describes in 
Imagined Communities ​as:  “In the modern conception, state sovereignty is fully, flatly, 
and evenly operative over each square centimetre of a legally demarcated territory” (19).
 Although here Anderson is speaking of conceptions of state sovereignty, “territory” 7
understood as a full, flat and evenly distributed legally demarcated space is equally 
applicable to modern conceptions of property. When one imagines geographical spaces 
today, one imagines a bird’s eye perspective of the land, neatly divided into colorful 
blocks indicating countries, states, counties, properties, etc. The owner of property 
imagines a continuous field flowing unbroken to the edges of the domain. Borders are 
absolute: something either belongs completely to the property, or stands outside of it. 
Without too much distortion, it is therefore possible to claim that the modern 
understanding of property and state sovereignty operates by and large as a binary 
system, owned/not owned, under/outside the jurisdiction thereof.  
Interestingly, this empty, continuous, all-filling spatial conception is a direct 
corollary to the previously mentioned modern conception of temporality as empty, 
7 It is in itself significant that the modern conception of territory is in ​squares​. A square is a perfect 
geometrical construct, the contours of which are in no way affected by natural or human-made 
formations. The binary nature of modern borders means that, the house, the rock, the river are 
either contained, excluded, or even potentially bifurcated by them. An empty idea of space 
precedes the materiality of land, thereby qualitatively homogenizing it. Within a property, the 
relative value of land may vary, but not the degree of ownership. 
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progressive and all-pervasive. This is not by chance; as will be explored later in greater 
detail, the creation of homogeneous space (and populations) relies on a specific 
understanding of time, namely an abstract idea of simultaneity, now-ness, from which 
individual apperception has been removed and each minute is interchangeable for the 
one which preceded it and the one which will follow. Reciprocally, in order to think 
something like abstract time moving forwards evenly in all spaces, differences between 
these spaces must likewise be conceptually leveled. In order to operate as generic 
properties of existence, time and space must be emptied of all variation of experience 
and reality.  It is precisely these concepts of empty, homogeneous time and space upon 8
which Sheehan’s “solid and obvious” commodity of land necessarily depends, for as 
Polanyi states (in accordance with Marx) “labor and land are no other than the human 
beings themselves of which every society consists and the natural surroundings in which 
it exists,” (76). But Polanyi’s formulation can be pushed further in order to highlight the 
modern assumptions necessary for its function; labor is nothing more than time and land 
is nothing more than space. The expression “time is money” is familiar to modern ears. 
But one could just as confidently assert that “space is money.” The commodification of 
land means that every space, no matter how remote, unused, or seemingly productively 
worthless, must be registered within a theoretical global network of ownership. 
Ownership is absolute precisely because it deals with potentialities, and not with actual 
use; it is possible to own land which has never been seen or traversed in recorded 
8 This is, in part, the inversion argued by Kant in ​Kritik der Reinen Vernunft​: by making space and 
time ​a priori​ to human perception, that is, the conditions of possibility for experience, as opposed 
to qualities ​of ​experience, they are emptied of all imaginable content. They become instead 
mathematical abstractions; time is not the time of seasons, birth, death, ancestral epics, but 
rather an empty line racing forwards, against which human and natural history must be 
measured. Similarly, space is not a quality of an opening in a forest, rolling fields or the endless 
expanse of the ocean, but rather a vacuum, an all-pervasive grid which is necessarily imagined 
as filling not only the distance between objects but the space within those objects themselves.  
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history. The promise of property is that all current and future as-of-yet-unimagined uses 
are granted to the proprietor ​to the exclusion of all others​. “Ownership” in the modern 
sense is therefore by its very nature conceptual and speculative, and fundamentally 
breaks the link between land and usage in two ways, through futurity and exclusivity. 
Futurity dictates that it is not the usage of today, but rather the potential use tomorrow 
which grants value. For a simple agrarian example, it is not the crops harvested last 
season, but the anticipated crops of all seasons to come which modern ownership 
denotes. But ownership of this kind is more radical than simply extending current usage 
into the future. The rupture with usage is described specifically by the absolute, 
universal, blanketing quality of ownership. Ownership extends down into the earth, up 
into the sky, and infinitely forward into an imagined future. Land as commodity 
accommodates all as of yet unimagined uses just as surely as it does the continuation of 
current or previous use. Crude oil, rare-earth metals required for batteries and circuitry, 
the presence of wind, sun, water as sources of energy or waste management, all belong 
to the owner of this commodity of space as surely as do their clothes, farm animals, 
house. This is because the second aspect of ownership, exclusivity, further decouples 
land and ownership from actual usage. The owner of land is imagined to be in direct 
possession of all portions of this homogeneous space equally and simultaneously, to the 
exclusion of all other claims. To own is precisely to deny competing claims, on every flat 
square inch, in every conceivable, empty, uniform minute moving forward. The difference 
between the ownership of a lord and a proprietor, is that a tenant of the modern 
proprietor only has recourse to the initial legal compact, because ultimately, the land is 
the proprietor’s and no one else’s. 
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What is described here is obviously the ideal case of ownership within capitalism. 
In most cases, other societal mechanisms infringe upon the absolute autonomy of the 
proprietor, in the form of renters’ rights, zoning laws, environmental legislation, etc. 
However, even granting the existence of such institutions, they have proved remarkably 
flimsy when compared against both the strength of property with which they directly 
compete in the modern world, or against the customary and legal limits imposed by 
traditional society which they replaced. In most instances, when encountered, these 
modern social protections are swiftly and easily circumvented, as the sanctity and 
inalienability of individual property is the sacred foundational myth upon which modern 
citizenship is built, indistinguishable from the individual “rights” which governmental 
agencies are sworn to protect. This has the somewhat counter-intuitive effect that the 
only serious threats to the integrity of ownership come from within the system of property 
itself rather than through external social limitations; while theoretically every claim of 
ownership is equal and legally binding (hence the link in democracies to universal 
suffrage), in reality properties of scale exert undue influence on their smaller kin, either 
through subverting market dynamics or extra-legal pressure, with the general tendency 
for ever greater consolidation at the expense of the absolute inalienability of individual 
property claims.  Under the modern understanding of property, ownership and profit 9
generation have become indistinguishable, that is to say, the commodity aspect of land 
9 Of course, there are other social factors beyond mere scale which can further weaken an 
individual’s absolute right to property, most obviously race and gender. Even as it becomes 
possible for women or non-white people to possess property, this ownership is long viewed (or in 
some cases, in perpetuity) as contingent and transitory. The woman proprietor owns the land ​only 
until​ she can be married or produce a male child. Likewise, agreements with non-white 
proprietors are always implicitly or explicitly bracketed; you may own this land ​until​ it is needed for 
white ranchers, ​until​ it is necessary to build an interstate or railroad, or even ​as ​the land is made 
uninhabitable or unusable. While such instances seem to suggest the possibility of social 
structures superseding capitalist imperatives, these inequities often work in tandem with and not 
against the tendency of property to consolidate into ever fewer hands.  
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has supplanted all other conceptualizations to the extent that in the quest for profit 
maximization, the theoretical productive potential of a given space tends to supersede 
the individual claim to ownership. Sheehan’s frustration with the inefficiency of traditional 
society is an expression of the modern understanding of land as progressive, 
expansionary: it is ​natural​ for land to find its optimum usage through consolidation and 
repurposing, just as it is wrong-headed to an equal degree for a single individual to 
attempt to resist market forces and cling to a merely-legal right to property, a folly made 
visible in the modern example of the single family home engulfed on all sides by office 
buildings. Land as property, land as commodity, land as empty potential thereby 
eventually tends to subvert the absolute character of ownership. The true value and 
meaning of a space exist in its future, not precedents set by the legal and social 
structures which determined its past.  
Where land understood as property tends towards ever greater consolidation and 
the removal of restrictions to productive potential due to its basis in futurity and 
exclusivity, ownership within traditional society was instead defined by carefully 
circumscribed specific use cases for the various “owning” parties.  In this sense, the 10
land to which the serf, the lord, the cotter, the tradespeople all laid claim, even if the 
same “space” in the modern sense, were for each party a fundamentally different 
location. For the lord it could mean hunting rights and a percentage of agricultural 
produce, as well as innumerable other taxations and privileges. For the serf it could 
mean a hut passed from generation to generation, along with rights to a small plot for 
10 Therefore tending towards ever greater fragmentation and layering of claims as populations 
increased. 
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subsistence farming and use of the communal land for narrowly defined purposes.  11
Instead of the aforementioned neat, colorful blocks dividing the countryside into different 
territories/properties, it is perhaps more accurate to imagine something akin to the 
tiresome ​Family Circus ​cartoons in which little Billy’s daily adventures are depicted as a 
tangle of overlapping dashed lines. Land rights are inseparably linked to land use; they 
are concrete and directly linked to the lives and livelihood of those who possess them. 
The right to grow food, to husband animals, or to gather wood were not abstract claims 
on future profits, but rather represent an individual’s traditional function within society, 
one based on custom and historical precedent stretching back for generations. Land 
rights make degrees of ownership thinkable; land which “belongs” to the crown, church 
or state could simultaneously belong to many other parties without contradiction, or 
rather, exist mutually in non-exclusive tension. Land rights and privileges were a 
constant source of debate, but this very friction marked land rights as critical points of 
connection between the various members of society, connections for which the land 
itself was the nexus. It is in this sense that land rights can be said to determine 
citizenship; not in the sense that it would later carry of an individual buying their place in 
society, but rather in that an individual’s connection or lack of connection to the land 
determined who they were and what they did. 
11  Understanding this difference helps explain the severe punishments associated with the crime 
of poaching. Poaching was not a question of property in the modern sense, i.e. the poacher was 
not maimed, hanged, branded, cast out as a result of trespassing an imagined border, of being in 
the wrong physical space. The problem was rather a question of what the poacher did in that 
space, namely killing animals which were protected by the rights of the lord. A poacher could well 
have had claims to the land in which they wrongfully hunted, be it the right to harvest berries, to 
collect firewood, etc. The problem was instead that by attacking the animals, they were in effect 
assaulting the person of the aristocratic possessor themself, and it was this crime against the 
noble person which was then recreated on their own flesh. 
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This conception of land extended to the macro scale, to the conception of state 
boundaries and the rule of sovereigns. Anderson writes that in absence of the modern 
concept of territory, “in the older imagining, where states were defined by centres, 
borders were porous and indistinct, and sovereignties faded imperceptibly into one 
another” (19). This difference in the conceptualization of space, or rather, the absence of 
an abstraction of space, had diverse and far reaching effects on the organization of 
society. According to Anderson, it is this organization which explains “the ease with 
which pre-modern empires and kingdoms were able to sustain their rule of immensely 
heterogeneous and often not even contiguous, populations for long periods of time.” In 
other words, the rule of these “immensely heterogeneous” populations was possible 
precisely because no attempt at homogenization was made. The King of France, the 
Queen of England, were not the sovereigns of nations or territories but rather the rulers 
of staggeringly long and complex lists of individual provinces and towns, the result of 
generations of interfamilial negotiations, a fact reflected by titles which often were 
several pages in length. The aristocracy, like the peasants they ruled, were regionally 
bound, albeit at an entirely different scale. Indeed, for this reason it is dangerous to refer 
to ​the​ aristocracy, to imagine an abstract, internally coherent group: “To the question 
‘Who is the Comte de X’ the normal answer would have been, not ‘a member of the 
aristocracy,’ but ‘the lord of X,’ the uncle of the Baronne de Y,’ or ‘a client of the Duc de 
Z.’” (Anderson 7). Sheehan also addresses this phenomenon, noting that not only had 
“land remained the most acceptable source of an aristocrat’s wealth and the most secure 
foundation for his family’s honour” in the 18th century, but that the specific, regionally 
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bounded nature of the German aristocracy was already indicated by the use of ​von ​as 
an honorific, a preposition which directly ties individual influence to a place (129).   12
Individual connection to the land remained strong throughout the 18th century, as 
the German populace continued to be overwhelmingly rural: Sheehan estimates that 
80% of the population lived in rural communities (90). As to the remaining 20%, Sheehan 
is quick to emphasize that the dichotomy of city/country must be rejected. The 
manufacture of the city, and the production of the immediate countryside where in most 
cases wholly symbiotic and represented a closed loop. The city produced finished goods 
and the countryside provided raw materials intended exclusively for the local market, 
leading to the sphere of influence which in most cases was inscribed by a single day’s 
walk (107). Even in the rare exceptions of interregional or even international trading 
hubs, it is important to remember that these only ever represented the trade between 
individual cities. Sheehan writes “A map of central European commerce… would show 
regional and international connections; there would be nothing ‘German’ about it” (112). 
Clearly, to use the word “international” here is inaccurate, since the point is to establish 
the lack of inter-national trade--the clear absence of anything like a nation state, or 
national territory having been demonstrated by Anderson and Polanyi, and indeed this is 
the point Sheehan seeks to make as well. And of course, compared with contemporary 
regions such as England and France, the German speaking provinces were fractured 
and lacking cohesion to an even higher degree, even more bound to regional specificity.
12 Relatedly, Sheehan notes that the very idea of ​Herrschaft​ binds the source of power to the 
body of the individual, the ​Herr​ (127). Power was thereby in many cases doubly local; ​von 
indicates a specific region as the source of power, while ​Herrschaft​ indicates a specific person. 
Power, person and place formed an indivisible whole, one which did not rely on abstractions or 
external reference beyond the divine sanction of this unity. To have power was to be lord of ​this 
land containing ​these​ people and granting ​these ​privileges. 
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 Collectively what this means is that as the bonds between individuals, and individuals 13
to regions were dissolved and replaced with the speculative, fungible emptiness 
demanded by capitalist endeavours, there existed no mechanisms, social or even 
conceptually, by which to reintegrate those who were displaced, no universal identities or 
roles to rely on once the old situating webs were destroyed. The reorganization of the 
relations of production did not produce “unemployed Germans,” but rather a “Haufen” of 
non-persons who shared nothing beyond their exclusion from society, as will be explored 
in the final section. 
 
V. The Creation of a Non-identical Many 
Nearly every attempt at a cohesive history of premodern “Germany” begins with 
the same non-statement, some version of “variation was the one constant.” On the one 
hand, variation-as-constant can be read as a boilerplate apology, one issued by 
historians before they invariably draw generalizing conclusions all the same. But what 
makes this gesture interesting to the current work is that it represents a perfectly 
crystallized attempt at a positive description of absence. As has been shown, the 
“Janusgesicht” of cultural terms like markets, labor and land makes itself sharply felt 
when crossing from the relatively modern foundations of the 19th century into the 18th 
century and earlier. The problem in all instances is a presumed level of generalization 
and abstraction which is wholly absent in traditional society. Land never existed as a 
theoretical space, but rather was always already ​this ​aristocratic family’s holding to 
13 As a particularly vivid example of regional difference, Sheehan writes that after Goethe’s move 
from Frankfurt to Leipzig in 1765 to study law,”his clothes, speech, and manners marked him as a 
foreigner; some female companions told him, none too gently, that he looked as if he had 
‘dropped down out of another world’’ (72). 
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which ​these​ people had such and such claims.  There were markets and, in some 14
isolated instances, people even received wages based on market production and prices. 
However, there was no ​one​ market, no abstraction of an all-encompassing 
clearinghouse, one which included not only all members of society, but also all time and 
space, now and in the future (and as has been shown, one which also erroneously tries 
to lay claim to the entirety of human history). Instead, all trade was “local” in the sense 
that it remained the isolated exchange between specific individuals, or at the largest 
scale, cities. One therefore wasn’t employed, unemployed, or any grey area in between, 
one had a social place (and physical place as well, since in most instances work was 
inextricably bound to a location) within society, or one stood outside, left with no 
recourse but the few itinerant professions, begging or crime. It was societal position 
which determined where one worked, for whom, for how long, and for what 
compensation, not market laws. 
The fact that social and work relations were the result of an inflexible hierarchy 
between individuals, and not an abstraction based on the perceived market value of the 
labor performed, resulted in two related truths of traditional society. The first is the 
inalienability of rights and privileges. Sheehan, in an attempt to highlight the extreme 
inequity which existed prior to the “emancipation” of humankind, notes that, in the 
absence of any form of meritocracy, the linking of birth and privilege meant that the 
rights of the aristocracy were inviolably connected to their person (125). To reiterate a 
point made earlier, standing was not a function of wealth, but rather wealth often (but not 
14 One can already imagine the difficulties presented by the “discovery” of the New World. For the 
first time, European traditional society experienced seemingly limitless ​space​, since the concrete 
claims and connections of the local inhabitants to the land were either invisible or considered 
invalid, forcing new perspectives on the meaning and possibilities of land. 
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always) corresponded to social standing. Indeed, even the exceptional cases are 
illuminating; the individuals which comprised the group which is retroactively termed ​the 
aristocracy in actuality described a huge range of social privileges and material 
circumstances, from land barons of staggering holdings to spinsters with nothing to their 
name save their title. In rare instances, therefore, even within the premodern world, it 
was possible for a wealthy peasant’s properties to exceed those of an impoverished 
noble.  This, however, did not change the social standing between the two individuals. 15
Social customs and laws prevented the wealthy peasant from simply adopting the guise 
of nobility: these laws dictated which positions the peasant could hold in government, 
whom they could hire to work for them, all the way down to the clothes they could legally 
wear, where they sat in church and of course, whom they could marry. What Sheehan 
misses in his rush to the emancipation of humankind (overlooking for the moment the 
overwhelming continuation of generational wealth and privilege within “meritocratic” 
society) is that this same inviolability of rights applied to the lower estates. For the lower 
strata, too, were born into a specific network of social relations, a constellation which 
carried with it certain rights, privileges and obligations. This is a fact which can be easily 
overlooked when confronted with the extreme inequity of the traditional world. It is 
certainly the case that the privileges enjoyed by the nobility bore almost no resemblance 
to those of a peasant or a serf. Nevertheless, these rights and obligations are of the 
same ​character​; precisely because social position was not earned and could not be 
15 Social aberrations of this kind occurred with ever greater frequency as the 18th century 
continued, though even so the wealthy peasant remained a rarity. It was also sometimes possible 
for these individuals to purchase a title and thereby enter the nobility; however, this should not be 
confused with nobility being merely a function of wealth. Indeed, the continued necessity of the 
wealthy to buy titles throughout the 18th century indicates the continued supremacy of the social 
over the economic. Even the newly wealthy thought of themselves not as proto-capitalists, but 
rather continued to try and place themselves within the security of the traditional order. 
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bought, it could not be taken away. A serf was born a serf, with obligations to a certain 
lord, into a particular hut, with access to a common land, all of which would also be the 
birthright of all generations to follow, for good and ill.  
The conditions of the lower strata were often conditions of extreme hardship, and 
times of scarcity impacted these populations with the greatest force--drought, spoilage, 
pests could all lead to huge increases in mortality. Even in instances of great hardship, 
however, the difference between the lot of the rich and the poor was one of degrees; 
though less​ ​affected by famine, the elite remained vulnerable to disease and other 
sources of human misery. The expectations of the traditional world, again, were never 
those of happiness or self-fulfillment, but rather collective survival. The extreme degree 
of interdependence within premodern society is visible even in the nature of the 
privileges and obligations granted to nobles; privileges were always mutually 
constituting, only given meaning through concrete, strictly prescribed interrelation. In 
fact, privileges ​were​ interrelation: a lord was guaranteed X percentage of produce or 
number of days of service per year, by Y person working on Z land.  East of the Elbe, 16
there existed a set of labor relations which to modern economic laws seem paradoxical; 
a shortage of labor was accompanied by the extreme unfreedom of the working 
populace. Far from enjoying higher wages or greater mobility as would be expected in a 
market economy, serfdom continued to flourish in Prussia, Silesia, Pomerania and 
elsewhere into the 17th and even 18th century, long after it had disappeared in western 
German provinces. In part this has been explained by the colonial nature of these 
territories, with the populations ruled more like a conquered populace than subjects of 
16 ​ ​In the case of the hunt, service even took on a theatrical character in which both parties were 
required to dress in specific, antiquated attire in order to make the relational hierarchy more 
visible than it would have already been under normal circumstances. 
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the crown. But what it also indicates was the need of the ruling to strengthen the bonds 
to the ruled as a matter of survival; for without the guaranteed presence of a peasant 
and serf population, they would be lords of nothing, lacking both the material and 
symbolic connections which were the essence of their privilege. In ​Die 
Feudalgesellschaft,​ Marc Bloch details the process of vassal payment within the early 
first period of feudal society, which is describes a system of payment external to a wage 
system. Due to what Bloch attributes to a scarcity and inconsistency of minted coins, the 
aristocracy could not rely on the function of currency in order to bind others in service to 
them. Instead, the powerful had two options: first, they could directly house and clothe 
those who served them. Second, they could offer lands to those sworn to them, thereby 
indirectly providing the necessary means of survival. However, Bloch notes that in both 
cases, these forms of payment serve to build connections “die von den Abhängigkeit des 
Lohnsystems sehr verschieden waren” although in “entgegengesetztem Sinn” (106). In 
the first case, the direct housing and clothing of subjects resulted in bonds which created 
great interdependence and mutual reliance, bringing the individuals closer symbolically 
as well as physically. In the second instance, however, the granting of land access has 
both centripetal as well as centrifugal effects: it binds the subject to the Herrschaft in that 
it is a relationship predicated on the recognition of the superior claims of the Herr. At the 
same time, land rights grant a degree of autonomy foreign to the wage labor of the 
market economy, namely degrees of self-sufficiency, as discussed above.  
Again, it is the specificity of these bonds which distinguish the pre-modern from 
the modern. Within a market economy, the employer requires work to be completed and 
offers monetary compensation in exchange for this work. Who does this work is 
irrelevant so long as they are capable of completing the task. From the employee side, 
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they are free to work for anyone, anywhere, at any time, and are expected to sell their 
labor as advantageously as possible. Theoretically, either party can terminate the 
relationship at any moment, as the only link between them is created and dissolved 
within the moment of payment.  Interchangeability and mobility are the face of the 17
modern world, and money is the ultimate expression of this universal abstraction. Money 
functions independent of any individual person, act or thing, and instead functions as a 
representation of pure relational value. As such, the obviating of physical currency within 
a market economy is inevitable; it is not the material coin which contains value, but 
rather its function as a signifier. Since the signified is precisely not a thing, but rather an 
abstraction of a difference, it achieves its ultimate representation in the equally abstract, 
be it the electronic ledgers of the stock exchange or more recently, in the randomly 
generated encrypted keys of engineered scarcity in the form of blockchain currencies. In 
other words, as was recognized by Marx, value doesn’t rest in the things produced, nor 
in the rarity of gold, silver (or today, prime-numbers), but rather in the relational 
difference between people, of which the former are merely a manifestation or 
representation respectively.  
As a result, the economic links connecting members of modern society are both 
looser and less clearly defined, while paradoxically bringing all members closer together. 
The bonds are looser in the sense that individual economic connections are transient 
and infinitely replaceable. The form of compensation is entirely symbolic and bereft of 
particularity, and the work performed is characterless, in the sense that it is not an 
17 Of course, this is not to say that the positions are equal: where the employee works for 
subsistence, the employer seeks surplus value. This discrepancy produces the recognized 
imbalance in the bargaining potential of each party, with the employee frequently forced to work 
under desperate circumstances in order to achieve basic sustenance. 
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obligation required of a certain person, or a symbolic enacting of social differentiation. 
This is not to say that the modern workplace is not riddled with symbolic acts of 
dominance and subjection, but rather that this is not the primary form of compensation. 
“Loyalty” of the employee to the employer or of the employer to the employee can exist 
contractually through ancillary privileges or direct compensation, but the relationship 
remains fundamentally anonymous and fungible. However, this very interchangeability 
and lack of specificity results in a general drawing together as it loosens the individual 
connections. This is because the lack of specificity as to who should perform what for 
whom means that anyone and everyone is included within the societal calculus of 
employment.  Those without jobs, land, homes, are integrated as part of the 
“unemployed” into an expanded concept of social relations known as Society. 
Collectively the unemployed represent labor potential, a resource which although 
currently untapped, ​could​ be utilized in the future. They thereby serve two important 
functions: on the one hand, they constitute a labor reserve for an economic system 
which demands limitless resources both in raw materials and in labor. And second, even 
while seemingly inactive, their very existence exerts influence on the labor conditions of 
those in society who are actively employed; the more the ranks of the unemployed swell, 
the more employers can push wages down, as the expendability of the individual 
employee becomes ever more evident. As mentioned earlier, an inversion has occurred: 
in the traditional world, one needed a physical place and a specific social position in 
order to be considered a part of society. By contrast, in accordance with the idea of the 
double freedom of the worker, within the modern world it is precisely the lack of specific 
connections or claims which marks an individual as part of a potential workforce.  
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This inversion has several important implications: first, the expansive, 
impersonal, fungible concept of labor eliminates the conceptual possibility of an “outside” 
to society. No matter how dejected or miserable the individual, no matter how excluded 
from social systems of care and support, they are still tabulated in the columns of 
potential labor, with their very dejection further marking them as potentially “motivated” 
workers.  Second, beyond its conceptual ability to accommodate the disenfranchised, a 18
society based on the principles of a market economy is also more readily able to adjust 
to drastic social change in the form of population growth. Because of the fungibility of 
workers, and the fluidity which exists between the various stages of employment, 
because individuals are no longer bound to a specific profession or place, an increase in 
population is registered as a growth of the potential labor pool and thereby affects labor 
prices, but does nothing to the fundamental organization of society or the assumptions 
upon which it is based.  This is not to say that such changes necessarily occur without 19
hardship to the populations in question (and thereby serve as a potential source of social 
unrest), but rather that it has no larger implications for the character of society, since 
society itself is no longer defined by specific bonds between specific people working and 
living generationally in a particular area.  
18 This is in part an effect of the new naturalistic understanding of society which accompanied the 
establishment of market society. Instead of society understood as the work of the divine/mankind, 
human interactions are submerged into the animal world. This represents a shift away from even 
the various “invisible hand” theories circulating in the second half of the 18th century, which still 
maintained a separate, human realm guided by divine providence, towards an understanding of 
society which is governed by hidden physical laws. Within this new understanding, the plight of 
the poor was slowly recast from a tragedy and societal failing to the necessary function of natural 
economic systems.  
19 A shrinking or static population, on the other hand, is a real danger for a society based on 
market economies. Because it depends on unlimited resources, labor and markets, a market 
economy is forced into crisis any time that one of the three elements stagnates or diminishes. 
This leads to drastic “correctives” such as inflation, famine and war. 
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The situation was clearly other in the premodern world. Because of its intricate 
specificity, the functioning of the premodern world was predicated on a degree of stability 
and calculability. The guild, the town, the organization of peasant farmers, land rights 
(including inheritance and communal land access), nearly all social systems assumed a 
population which neither moved nor changed rapidly. This indicates the second truth of 
the traditional world, which in some ways is merely the inverse of the inviolability of the 
rights of those who belonged; namely the absolute exclusion of those with no 
connections or claims to the established social order. In the premodern, there 
unquestionably ​was​ an outside of society, people “who did not fit into the traditional 
social groups, who had no corporate existence and therefore no legal status,” people 
such as “the Jews, the gypsies, pedlars and beggars, the victims of wars and natural 
catastrophes… lastly there were those cast out from society on the charge of being in 
league with the powers of darkness” (Sagarra 156). These peoples, though certainly not 
treated equally, all represented the same kind of problem to the corporative social order. 
The problem they posed was of a radically different nature to the previously described 
market pressure provided by the poor, unemployed or homeless in a market organized 
society. Within the modern conception of society, all individuals are considered part of 
the greater whole, regardless of their current position within society.   In a market 20
economy society, when the poor or homeless are viewed as a problem (and not as a 
20 A possible (and troubling) exception to the tabulation of society is represented by illegal 
immigrants and asylum seekers. As noted by Hannah Arendt in ​The Origins of Totalitarianism​, 
within a global system in which rights and belonging are a function of national citizenship, the 
stateless are in a uniquely vulnerable position. Similar to the excluded groups in traditional 
society, they find themselves without legal status or recognition, as was tragically the case for the 
expatriated Jews of central Europe, and continues to haunt dislocated populations. Even so, 
these non-civic members of society are still typically included in calculations of the labor 
market--and when they are excluded/murdered, their loss is often tacitly expressed in terms of a 
“wasted resource.” 
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natural, necessary and indeed beneficial mechanism stabilizing economic “laws,”) the 
solutions focus on heightened social integration, through employment, public works 
projects, or indirectly, prison. The problem of the disenfranchised in traditional, 
corporative society, by contrast, was one of finding effective means of exclusion. Again, 
the manner in which these groups were treated varied greatly: the “worthy poor” were a 
source of concern for whom localized systems of Christian almsgiving existed. The 
undeserving poor, on the other hand, were the subject of frequent anti-vagrancy 
legislation which sought to drive them to other regions, and the once frequent highway 
robbers were more or less exterminated through centuries of capital punishment. Finally, 
ethnic minorities were exploited where necessary, as was famously the case with Jewish 
lenders, and excluded as a matter of course; Sagarra writes that as of 1750, “neither the 
state authorities nor individuals thought to question their right to treat Jews differently 
from other human beings” (160).  
Despite the huge range of interactions with the disenfranchised, ranging from 
charitable alms to forceful removal to hangings, one thing common to the treatment of all 
groups outside of the corporative order was the unquestioned continued exclusion of 
these groups. The same specificity of interpersonal relations which guaranteed the 
inviolability of individual rights, privileges and obligations, conversely made the 
introduction of new members nearly impossible, no matter how “deserving.” To return 
briefly to the example of an external petition for guild membership; not only were the 
dues required of a magnitude greater than those required from local (i.e., other citizens 
of the town of the appropriate estate), but they were often nonetheless rejected. 
Similarly, gaining citizenship to a town was not a function of money, but rather a closely 
guarded social privilege. These cases furthermore assume an applicant ​who is already a 
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member of the body social​. What they represent is primarily the difficulty experienced in 
attempting to move laterally, to change physical location, within estate structures, from 
one town’s guild to another, from a member of the rural population to a citizen of a town. 
What this again indicates is the fixity and specificity of social standing. Moving vertically 
within estate society was another magnitude of difficulty greater, but did occur in rare 
instances and at great cost, as in the case of already wealthy peasants or traders 
purchasing aristocratic titles, with the incumbent rights and privileges. But to move from 
the negative space surrounding society to a position within it was, up to and largely 
including the second half of the 18th century, unthinkable. Sheehan refers to the gap 
between those “who had a place and those who did not” as the “deepest and clearest 
division in the traditional order.” He continues: 
Greater than the difference between aristocrat and commoner, townsman and 
peasant, freeman and serf, perhaps even greater than the difference between 
men and women, this gap divided the population into two distinct groups. To be 
outside the confines of a household, a trade, or a community was to be in the 
ranks of those without somewhere to go, a last resort, a final source of 
sustenance. (86) 
It was therefore paramount to remain within the established network of relations, 
whatever the cost, as the alternative was not an alternative but rather a shadowy 
non-existence of exclusion, deprivation and, frequently, death. It is this pressure to cling 
to one’s position, however demeaned, which leads historians like Sheehan and Walker 
to describe the traditional order as claustrophobic and oppressive--and it was 
unquestionably a system of grotesque inequity and hardship. But to characterize the 
majority of the population as eagerly awaiting its own “emancipation” is to misconstrue 
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reality; despite the inequity, despite the hardship, traditional society offered the best and 
only known protection against the brutal vicissitudes of life as it then existed. Sheehan 
uses the chasm separating those within society and those without in order to explain why 
a servant, for example, an individual in a social position lacking realistic hope of ever 
establishing their own household with their own family would nevertheless choose to 
submit to the potentially tyrannical rule of a ​Hausvater​. Ignoring for the moment the 
suspiciously modern dream to which servants secretly aspired,  it is also inaccurate to 21
imagine staying within society, and in one’s position within society, as a choice. Not only 
did the outside of society represent a merely negative space, an exclusion from and not 
an alternative to, but the inviolability of rights further signifies stability and the promise of 
social support. In other words, the inviolability of rights can be viewed as the positive 
aspect of the chasm separating those who did and those who did not belong. While 
great misfortune could and did force individuals or families over the precipice, the 
almost-static character of society, and the specificity of the bonds formed, indicates the 
degree of security was provided.  
The security and stability of traditional society are realities which the narrative of 
emancipation overlooks. Furthermore, by taking an implicitly or explicitly progressive 
viewpoint of history, the emancipation narrative either glosses over periods of social 
disruption and disorder, or recasts them as moments of upheaval necessary to the 
21 Sagarra, for example, indicates that a sharp division between household members based on 
biological or class grounds was itself, ironically, a byproduct of the “Enlightenment and economic 
pressures;” in their drive to emancipate the individual on the basis of legal vs. customary rights, 
“they undermined the sense of corporate solidarity which, though open to abuse, had generally 
been a positive feature of the farming household” (142). So while estate and familial distinctions 
had unquestionably existed, prior to the 18th century servants and even farm hands had typically 
eaten and lived with those they served on a ​per du​ basis. Sheehan echoes this assertion, stating 
“but in many trades and most rural areas, the relationship between master and dependent was 
ill-defined and fluid” (84). 
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improved conditions which were to follow. The present is always the telos towards which 
history inexorably grinds, the unknown but imminent fate of all of those who inhabit the 
past. Because the material condition of the lower classes would eventually improve, 
because efficiency of production, the freedom of a worker to choose employment and 
employer to choose employees, the meritocratic promise of a casteless society, the right 
of each individual to establish a nuclear family, and indeed, the creation of the individual 
as such, are all values of the current moment, any social change which seems to 
indicate a movement towards these ideals is reflexively deemed good and desirable to 
those in the past, even while experiencing the fall out of cataclysmic societal shifts. But 
the future was not known to those inhabiting the past, nor was this current future the only 
conceivable outcome. When major historical engines of change such as the vital 
revolution, the expansion of international trade, the completion of the process of 
enclosure in central Europe, accelerated the destruction of the fabric of traditional 
society in the second half of the 18th century, ever increasing numbers found 
themselves excluded from the only system of social security and support in existence. 
The fact that these changes are now read as necessary steps towards the capitalist 
mode of production had no meaning to those experiencing the changes. Furthermore, 
the capitalist mechanisms which would eventually re-incorporate the disenfranchised 
largely did not yet exist.  
As a result, an ever growing number of people were pushed out of the only 
conceivable and extant social system, across the chasm to the nebulous non-place of 
society. As this group grew from an extreme minority existing at the liminal spaces of 
society to an ever-expanding population of the recently disenfranchised, the pressure it 
exerted on society grew commensurately. It included displaced serfs, peasant farmers, 
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tradesmen, criminals, children, the old, the infirm, soldiers, fallen nobility, widows, ethnic 
minorities and any other person who found themselves closed out of the metaphorical 
and in some cases still literal walls of society. This fundamentally heterogeneous group 
had no shared identity, no collective sense of consciousness, or even a way in which to 
imagine a shared commonality. This group was not the unemployed, not the homeless, 
not the lower class. It gathered in no place, and was therefore unlike the “crowds” of the 
civically minded peasant farmers of the English Bread Riots, or the “masses” which 
would congregate slowly in cities over the course of the 19th century and become a 
critical object of study and politics in the early 20th century. This Many defied direct 
representational strategies; it was radically “non-identical.”  But whereas Theodore 
Adorno uses the term non-identical in ​Negative Dialektik ​to describe that which is 
inevitably excluded in the act of conceptualization, the unique and defining remainder 
which is stripped away in processes of classification, the “non-identical Many” which was 
created in the wake of the dissolution of the specific bonds of traditional society and 
existed until it was eventually written into economic class structures through material and 
intellectual processes was entirely negative. The non-identical Many is that excess which 
formed through the creation of a single temporality, a single space, a single Society. But 
while the non-identical Many confounded direct representation, it nevertheless exerted a 
huge, unseen but felt influence on writing forms. The following two chapters will be an 
exploration of the changes created by this non-Identical Many in theatrical and 
journalistic writing forms at the end of the 18th century, suggesting that we must 
consider this group as a collective co-author of popular-oriented forms of expression.  
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Chapter 2: Lenz, Social Physicist 
This chapter explores the theoretical and theatrical works of Jakob Michael Reinhold 
Lenz as evidence of the shifting temporality and social structures, of the influence of a 
newly formed, heterogeneous disenfranchised Many. Beyond theater’s well-documented 
position as a medium for the multitudes, featuring the physical gathering of a 
heterogeneous audience, Lenz’s works are uniquely suited to study the influence of the 
Many. From their first publication, Lenz’s writing has confused and unsettled reading and 
theatrical audiences, due to its untraditional, fractured form and vivid depictions of 
human suffering. The chapter begins by examining contemporary reception, before 
exploring Lenz’s attempt to create a theory of theater based on a combination of material 
determinism fused with a theory of free will. This attempt would ultimately fail, resulting in 
the remarkable form of Lenz’s “Komödie,” a unique genre of play unto itself, 
“Mischspiele” which are neither particularly funny nor exclusively interested in the 
“common,” but rather serve as laboratories of society, giving voice to the diversity and 
discontinuities of its audience, reflecting the unfreedom characteristic for the emerging 
social body of Society. 
 
I. Theatrical Reception: Chaotic, Unnatural, Disturbed 
There was one aspect upon which JMR Lenz’s advocates and detractors could agree: 
both his theoretical and theatrical works were representatives of a new ​Schreibart​. This 
writing form is characterized by rupture and ellipsis: Lenz’s essays are bizarrely 
punctuated, with self-described rhapsodic outbursts trailing off into dashes, question 
marks, thoughts interrupting one another, disintegrating metaphors, frequent appeals to 
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a real or imagined audience (many of his works were performed for the Straßburger 
Sozietät), and a cacophony of quotations. His plays are even more famously fractured. 
Despite almost universal criticism of what was perceived as French theater’s slavish 
devotion to them, the wisdom of the day still advocated the three unities proposed by 
Aristotle’s ​Poetics ​(although they were not codified as such until later). These unities 
were as follows: the unity of time demanded that a play should occur within a single 
24-hour period. The unity of space required that the play take place within a single 
location. Finally, the unity of plot demanded that the play follow a single action from 
beginning to conclusion. Despite these “natural” laws, Lenz’s first major play, ​Der 
Hofmeister, ​spans years, and the progression of this time is stuttering and irregular; 
days, months disappear without comment, children are conceived and then already born 
in the span of pages or minutes. Instead of one location, scenes bounce frenetically from 
city to city, city to town, and town to country. The locations themselves are only vaguely 
characterized and often wholly fictitious (a trend Lenz pushed to its limit in his second 
major play, ​Der Neue Menoza, ​by describing the location as “Hie und da” in the stage 
directions). Instead of following a single action and its consequences, multiple narrative 
arcs spin closer and further from one another, crisscrossing in a bewildering tangle of 
cause and effect. Characters are functionally duplicated and disappear without 
comment. Hidden, improbable lineages are revealed but fail to contribute meaningfully. 
Time and space are traveled in the blink of an eye, shattering the classical unities and 
demanding upwards of 35 scene changes to be staged as written (Leidner and Wurst 
10). It was the form of Lenz’s plays which excited and annoyed his contemporaries by 
turn: an anonymous review, presumably written by Johann Joachim Eschenburg, of ​Der 
Hofmeister​ in the ​Allgemeine deutsche Bibliothek​, begins “Dieß Schauspiel verräth 
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durchgehends einen Mann, der zu getreuer Schilderung und Darstellung der Natur eine 
grosse Anlage hat; und wäre vielleicht, wenn der Verf. nicht die Hülfe der Kunst recht 
muthwillig verschmäht hätte, ein schönes, meisterhaftes Ganzes geworden” (“Rez.: 
Lenz, J.M.R.: Der Hofmeister” 369-370). The complement catches in the Eschenburg’s 
throat; he is baffled by Lenz’s ​intentional​ disregard for the “Vorschriften der Kunst-- 
wovon doch die wichtigern nichts anders sind, als Vorschriften der Natur,” a disregard 
which reduces his otherwise insightful piece into “bloß eine Reihe einzelner Gemählde, 
und die Hinreissung von einem Gegestande zum andern, von einer Scene, einer 
Gruppe, einer Handlung, einen Ort und Jahr zum andern, thut schon selbst dieser 
Gewalt an; denn zur Vorstellung wird dieß Stück aus mehrern Ursachen, doch wohl nie 
gelangen.” Instead of the “masterful whole” for which the Eschenburg hoped, the reader 
is left holding a confusing jumble of scenes with no discernable connection, no unifying 
plot to stitch the disparate elements together. One nevertheless glimpses flashes of 
brilliance in the mess, be it the “Wahrheit der Natur… welche so manche Charactere, 
Handlungen und Reden auf die treffendste Art belebt, und das Stück selbst in mancher 
Absicht lehrreich macht,” but sadly “alles ist nur hingeworfen, alles bricht ab, ehe es vor 
dem Zuschauer rechte Wirkung thun kann.” There is something worth salvaging at the 
core of ​Der Hofmeister​, an important lesson on humanity and nature, but whatever it is, it 
has been rendered unintelligible by the form of its presentation and bogged down by the 
inexplicable addition of “platte, alltägliche, nichtsbedeutende” scenes. It is the clear 
intentionality of the confusion which makes the reviewer despair of Lenz’s reformation, 
although he does end with the hope that the then 25 year old would look back on this 
work in half a decade and redden with shame (“Rez.: Lenz, J.M.R.: Der Hofmeister” 
370). 
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Imagine, then, Eschenburg’s annoyance to discover that, far from an isolated 
incident, the disorder of ​Hofmeister​ was emblematic for all of Lenz’s future projects. In a 
review of ​Der neue Menoza​ some pages later, Eschenburg notes with dismay that in this 
play one immediately recognizes the hand of the author of ​Hofmeister​, continuing: 
...eben die regellose, abentheuerliche Zusammensetzung, eben die gewaltsame 
Fortreissung des Lesers von einer Scene zur andern, eben die gewagten Züge 
der rohen wilden Natur, die aller Kunst trotzt, und oft durch diesen Trotzt selbst 
unnatürlich und ausschweifend wird; aber auch auf der andern Seite eben die 
Menschenkenntniß, eben den Zweck, die Herabwürdigung der männlichen 
Tugend und das Verderbniß unserer gesellschaftlichen Sitten zu bestrafen, eben 
die characteristische Wahrheit und das Feuer in manchen Stellen des Dialogs. 
(“Rez.: Lenz, J.M.R.: Der neue Menoza” 374) 
In the second review, the critique has grown more focused: it is specifically the “violent” 
ripping of the reader from one scene to another, a wild nature which reads unnaturally. 
The play still can claim the same “Menschenkenntniß,” but once again these flashes of 
brilliance are marred through presentation: “Soll Ordnung und stufenweise Darstellung 
eines Characters oder einer Handlung, nichts, eine plumpe Zusammenstellung 
extravaganter Charactere, hingeworfne unausgeführte characteristische Züge, 
unzusammenhängende Scenen, die, wie Schattenspielgemählde, nur hintereinander in 
die Laterne gesteckt werden, alles sein?”  22
22 That Eschenburg is forced to reach for another media in order to describe Lenz’s plays, and 
specifically which media he thinks appropriate, is telling. Modern critics of Lenz frequently 
describe the “filmic” quality of his writings in order to express the way his writing seems to exceed 
the bounds of theatre, suggest something new. In this way, Lenz’s plays can be read as pointing 
to future media forms in the sense similar to that described by Walther Benjamin in “Das 
Kunstwerk im Zeitalter seiner technischen Reproduzierbarkeit,” responding to an impatience of 
the Many (see concluding chapter).  
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Menoza is the same random jumble, the same “hingeworfne” mess of scenes, a disorder 
of a degree that Eschenburg is forced to reach for another media form entirely to 
describe the experience. The changes come so frequently and rapidly and are difficult 
enough to read that Eschenburg poses the rhetorical question if the play was even 
intended for the stage at all, “Oder hat der Verf. sein Stück wirklich für die Bühne 
bestimmt? Soll der Theatermeister die Scene so unzählichemal, und oft um einer Rede 
von anderhalb oder drittehalb Zeilen willen… zauberlich verändern?” The implied 
answer, of course, is that Lenz cannot realistically have imagined that this could or would 
ever be staged. Eschenburg then lists half a dozen, to his mind, unstageable scenes as 
proof; two carriages passing one another for a brief exchange between occupants, a 
fleeting feast of beggars and other riff raff, as well as those scenes unsuitable for the 
stage due to their scandalous or slanderous nature. These commonsense-statements 
would unfortunately be substantiated: of Lenz’s three central works, ​Der Hofmeister, Der 
neue Menoza ​and ​Die Soldaten​, only ​Der Hofmeister ​would be performed, and then only 
in Berlin in 1778. There is still the same regret “daß so manche glückliche, wahre und 
lehrreiche Scenen dieses Stücks durch die theatralische Vorstellung nicht noch mehr 
belebt, noch eindringender und wirksamer gemacht werden können,” but Eschenburg 
suspects that this is simply a problem of misguided hubris “Gehört etwan ein so großes 
Genie dazu, ausschweifende Dinge zu machen? Es scheinen dieses einige Leute jetzt 
so gewiß zu glauben, daß sie, wo sie nur etwas ausschweifendes erblicken, ausrufen: 
Welch ein Genie! welches Gefühl! welcher Wurf! welche Darstellung!” 
These reviews are representative of the critical reception of Lenz’s work as a 
whole. All but the most eviscerating conceded Lenz’s ability to portray the “nature” of 
people, dialogue, social relations and feelings. And even the most glowing reviews 
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tended to touch in some form on three sources of irritation, all inter-related, and all 
concerning form--form understood here in the traditional sense, that is the artistic style of 
Lenz’s writing, its syntax, structure, word choice, etc. (see the discussion of form as 
understood by Caroline Levine in the Introduction). The reviews contended first, that the 
sequence and selection of scenes seems wholly arbitrary. Second, that this arbitrariness 
itself was (mistakenly) intended by the author as a direct expression of “genius,” both in 
the model advocated by the likes of Edward Young and Herder, and of which 
Shakespeare’s writings were believed to be an example. Finally, because the scene 
selection is so seemingly random, many of the most bizarre or divergent scenes can and 
indeed ​should​ be cut in order to increase emotional impact, economy and 
comprehensibility. Christian Heinrich Schmid writes of ​Der Hofmeister​ “Die 
außerwesentlichen Unregelmäßigkeiten nicht zu rechnen, bezeugt dies die große 
Kenntniß von der Natur der Leidenschaften…”, and wishes only that the “vortrefflichen 
Ganzen” had “etwas mehr Einheit des Interesse, würde manche überflüßige Person 
weggestrichen,” while still wholeheartedly recommending the play, concluding “dem dies 
Stück noch unbekannt sein sollte ein, hier Nahrung des Geistes zu geniessen, wie er in 
hundert Erziehungsbüchern und tausend Schauspielen vergebens suchen wird” (“Der 
Hofmeister” 42). Schmid is less charitable in his assessment of ​Der Neue Menoza​, 
saying in comparison to ​Hofmeister​ “ein gutes Ganze kann man dieses Stück noch viel 
weniger nennen,” that the number of “dissentirenden und abentheuerlichen Stellen” has 
increased markedly and as a result, “Das interesse ist hier noch weniger durchgeführt 
und erhalten” (“Der neue Menoza” 43). He ends with the damning conclusion that “selbst 
die Pläne der Engländer sind gegen die seinigen regelmäßig.” “Engländer” here is code 
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for the English style of playwriting, particularly that of Shakespeare, which famously 
operated outside of the Aristotelian model. 
The same split between the assessment of the content and form can be seen in 
an anonymous review of ​Die Soldaten​, published in 1776 in the ​Hallische Gelehrte 
Zeitung​. The reviewer thrilled at the visceral, horrifying depiction of mankind’s fallen 
state, which one cannot argue “daß sie im geringsten übertrieben wären,” and that in 
general the whole piece is dominated “überaus viel Wahrheit und Darstellung lebendiger 
Natur (wärs doch nicht Natur!)” (“Leipzig” 411). In general, the reviewer sees the bucking 
of tradition as an emancipatory gesture: “Uebrigens ist es ganz wieder in dem mit Macht 
Mode werdenden Ton von Theatersachen einer gewissen Schule, die Fesseln der Regel 
abgeworfen hat, und denen freylich bis zur Pedanterey gemißbrauchten Einheiten Trotz 
geboten hat.” The “gewissen Schule” indicated here is clearly the Sturm und Drang 
group centered in Strasbourg, and the unities which had been driven to “pedantic 
extremes” are the Aristotelian unities of time, location and action which had been 
adopted by French classical theatre, producing a feeling of acceleration “Alles geschieht 
in unglaublicher und unmöglicher Geschwindigkeit...”  The change is not entirely for the 
better, however, as the reviewer notes that this style is also suspiciously easier to 
construct “So ists z.B. ungleich leichter ein Schauspiel in 5 Aufzügen zu schreiben, in 
welchem zwey bis drey Begebenheiten zur eigentlichen Sache nicht gehören, und des 
Plans unbeschadet... weggestrichen werden könnten, --als alles so zu verbinden, daß 
keine einzige Scene entbehrlich in dem Ganzen sey...” The reviewer then continues in 
the subjunctive “Aber man sagt uns das sey Shakespearisch-- und Schakespear soll 
doch ein grosser Mann gewesen sey,” indicating the Sturm und Drang hero with healthy 
skepticism. 
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Other reviews similarly make reference to the emancipatory gesture of shattering 
the Aristotelian ideals; an anonymous review published in the ​Frankfurter gelehrte 
Anzeigen​, the more or less official organ of Sturm und Drang, described ​Hofmeister​ in 
predictably glowing terms; after describing the play as a real-page turner (and likely to 
cause far fewer yawns than its French counterparts) , the reviewer writes  “Aber ein 23
Dichter muß auch hinreissen, der frey ist von dem Aengstlichen, dem Gepräge derer, 
welche schwitzen und arbeiten unter einem harten drückenden Joch, unter einer 
Sklaverey, die Herz und Brust enge macht, das Gefühl endlich gar tödtet und die Wurzel 
des Geistes”  (“Der Hofmeister oder Vortheile” 490). The reviewer suggests that “der 24
beleyrne Masstab Aristotelis und seiner ihn noch mehr erschwerenden Anbeter” has 
deadened the senses of playwrights who would follow their example. By contrast, Lenz, 
free from the “Zentnerlast” of Aristotle’s unities, “[läßt] sich nicht schrecken… wenn der 
Strom seines Genies überströmt,” grasping into the “in die mannigfaltige Natur” which he 
represents such that “wir ihren Vertrauten beym ersten Blick erkennen! Und dann den 
Menschen in seinem wahren Wesen, in allen seinen Lagen uns so giebt, daß wir innigst 
mit ihm fühlen und laut sagen: Er ist uns unser Bruder!” (489, 490). For the reviewer of 
the ​Frankfurter gelehrte Anzeigen​, the rhapsodic, emotional outbursts of the genius and 
his ability to convey nature and the nature of mankind, are synonymous. This allows the 
reviewer to jump with Lenz from scene to scene without worrying about how all the 
disparate pieces fit together, “Was kümmerts uns andre, die wir der Natur huldigen?” In 
23 It is worth noting that even this positive review describes the play in terms of ​reading​ and not 
viewing​: even its staunchest advocates perceived it as a literary work, and not a play. 
24 The formulation of the yoke of the Aristotelian form is interesting because it was used almost 
verbatim in Schmid’s review of Goethe’s ​Clavigo ​“Als ein Meister, dem jede Form gleich gilt, hat 
sich Herr Göthe hier unter das Joch der Regelmässigkeit geschmiegt, ohne daß man ängstlichen 
Zwang bemerkte.” This will be of continued relevance in the discussion of the distinction Lenz 
created between comedy and tragedy. 
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all the figures of the play, and in all of their situations, the reviewer sees only the truth 
reflected, the same truth seen by the author “Dies sah der Verfasser, und stellte es 
seinen Mitbrudern zum Gemälde dar, worinnen sie sich gewiß erkennen werden -- 
Menschen und Weltkenntnis ist durchs ganze Stück verbreitet” (491). The fact “Daß es 
oft so geht und gehen wird,” coupled with the emotional truth of the genius outburst 
thereby neatly sidesteps the problem of internal coherence altogether: the truth is to be 
found in the fragment and not in the whole. 
Christoph Martin Wieland is much less forgiving in his assessment. He begins by 
stating “Unsre Dramenschreiber haben das Romantische schon zu sehr in unsre 
Schauspiele gebracht, als daß wir nöthig hätten, unsre Lustspiele so unwahrscheinlich 
zu machen, als wir das Trauerspiel wahrscheinlich zu machen suchen” (“Der neue 
Menoza” 241). The subject of the genre classification of Lenz’s plays will be discussed at 
length below in the section “The Comedy of the Everyday;” of interest now is Wieland’s 
criticism of what he describes as the “improbability”  of the play, something he attributes 25
to the adverse influence of Shakespeare “Was Schakespearn auch in seinen Komödien 
aus den Novellen anklebt, sollte nicht nachgeahmt werden, wie es hier geschehen ist.” 
What Wieland is addressing in those passages others had referred to as “abentheurlich,” 
“dissenterienden,” “unnatürlich” or “abschweifend:” “Der Verfasser hat seine Abentheuer 
ganz selbst erfunden,” something Wieland contends is not as laudable as it was in 
Shakespeare’s day. Even the enthusiastic reviewer from the ​Frankfurter gelehrte 
25 The maintenance of illusion and with it the “Wahrscheinlichkeit” of a play was still considered by 
many to be the highest ideal of play writing. The centrality of the classical “unities” of the play 
were also linked to this standard--plays had traditionally been staged outdoors, at night, and 
some of the limitations imposed on the form were an attempt to respect the material setting of the 
play. 
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Anzeigen ​was forced to voice his disquiet over one particular innovation, namely the 
castration scene in ​Hofmeister​:  
Wir sehen nicht ab, warum sich der Mensch so ganz ohne Noth und Erwartung 
kombabisirt. Freylich sagt ihm Wenzeslaus… wie gut es sey, der Liebe nicht zu 
pflegen, Auch giebts zwischen ihm und der Lise zu einer guten Scene Anlaß. 
Aber doch sehen wir den Menschen lieber unverstümmelt, vornehmlich an so 
wesentlichen Theilen. ...vielleicht dachte der Verf. an den Grundsatz, man müste 
an dem Glied, gestraft werden, womit man gesündigt hat. (“Der Hofmeister” 492)  
The anonymous reviewer here expresses very similar concerns to Wieland: the 
castration (beyond being rather unpleasant) seems both improbable and poorly 
supported within the context of the play. Because the plays of Lenz were not perceived 
as unified wholes, internally coherent such that “keine einzige Scene entbehrlich in dem 
Ganzen sey,” each scene can be judged individually, and if deemed offensive, unnatural, 
improbable, discarded, leading to Wieland’s peculiar but telling recommendation: 
Ich glaube seinen Lesern den besten Rath zu geben, wenn ich sie bitte, nur eine 
Scene auf einmal, und nie das Ganze zu lesen. Für einige bizarre und 
unnatürliche werden sie dann desto mehrere finden, wobey ihr Verstand, ihr 
Herz, und ihr Zwerchfell den heilsamen Anstoß erhalten, der zu neuen 
Bemerkungen in der moralischen Welt, zu grösserer Empfindsamkeit, und zu 
besserer Laune geneigt macht. 
Hofmeister​ is a powerful medicine, good for the heart and mind, known to improve 
“Empfindsamkeit und Laune,” but not without “bizzare und unnatürliche” side effects, and 
as such, should only be taken as prescribed, namely one scene at a time. Wieland’s 
suggested reading regimen serves as an index for contemporary reception of Lenz’s 
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works as a whole; whether one believed the form augmented or hindered the realistic 
and detailed characters portrayed within, Lenz’s plays were viewed as a loose collection 
of thought, either haphazard reflections or outbursts of true genius, a bouquet arranged 
in no particular order and from which one could pick and choose those elements 
deemed informative or insightful, while leaving behind those which unsettle due to their 
poor taste, strangeness, banality, or violence. By adhering, either explicitly or implicitly, 
to the belief that form and content were distinct from one another, the reviewers failed to 
recognize that the very verisimilitude for which they praised the human figures in his 
plays were the direct result of the fractured form. It is only within the chaotic, breaking, 
ruptured form that the reality of the disenfranchised subjects of the plays could find 
expression, and as such the form was responding to the demands of the diverse 
populace it sought to represent, as will be explored below. 
 
 
II. Theoretical Reception: Rhapsodic or Incomprehensible “Rothwelsch?” 
This, however, was explicitly contrary to Lenz’s intent and expectations. Lenz was so 
dismayed by the reception of his plays in general, and Wieland’s review of ​Menoza​ in 
particular (who he refers to angrily as the “gewöhnlicher” or “nirgends autorisierter 
Richter”) , that he put himself in the “awkward” position of writing his own review, 
“Rezension des Neuen Menoza; von dem Verfasser selbst auf gesetzt.” He begins by 
defending himself from what he perceives as an accusation of “Unmündigkeit,” which he 
describes as: 
Ich nenne einen Menschen unmündig, der von seinen Handlungen nicht 
Rechnschaft zu geben im Stande ist, und da andre mit ihrem Selbst zu sehr 
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beschäftigt sind, mir diesen doch nicht unverdienten Dienst zu erweisen, so muß 
ich freilich selber hinter dem Vorhang hervorgehn, und meinem deutschen 
Vaterlande dartun, daß ich mit andern unberufnen Schmierern ihm wenigstens 
nicht beschwerlich worden bin. (Rezension 699) 
One difficulty which emerges in reading Lenz’s theoretical writings is the double meaning 
of “Handlung” in German as either “action” or “plot.” In this case interpretation is 
simplified since they are one and the same; a justification of Lenz’s actions is 
simultaneously a justification of the organizing logic of his plays. The definition of 
immaturity provided here is a person who is unable to give account for their 
actions--which in Lenz’s case are the actions portrayed on stage--forcing him to go 
“behind the curtain” (of both his mind and play) and reveal his internal rationale. His 
specific concern is to disabuse “neuauftretende Dramenschreiber,” in both the “Welt und 
Nachwelt,” of the notion that “ich habe mich von den Einflüssen eines glücklichen oder 
unglücklichen Ohngefährs blindlings regieren lassen, nieder zu schreiben was mir in die 
Feder kam” (699-700). The majority of Lenz’s defense in “Rezension” stays at the 
thematic level, answering Wieland and others’ accusation that the events and characters 
portrayed were “improbable.” And while Lenz does address at length Wieland’s derisive 
classification of ​Menoza​ as a “Mischspiel,” and not a comedy (See below “Society as 
Comedy of the Unfree”), he says little about the unusual structure of the play, with one 
exception: “Deutlicher hätt ich in der Erzählung der Umstände sein können… wenn ich 
nicht überhaupt alle Erzählungen auf dem Theater haßte…. Ich möchte immer gern der 
geschwungnen Phantasei des Zuschauers auch was zu tun und zu vermuten übrig 
lassen, und ihm nicht alles erst vorkäuen.” (702-703) This passage hints at an organizing 
principle hiding behind the apparent chaos, but stops short of explaining what that 
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principle could be. Lenz assures the public that, contrary to Wieland’s assertion, ​Menoza 
is not “ganz selbst erfunden,” or in Lenz’s words “aus der Luft gegriffen.” Lenz describes 
his process as positioning the hero, Prinz Tandi, “Ein Mensch, der alles, was ihm 
vorkommt, ohne Absichten schätzt” against “gewöhnliche Menschen meines 
Jahrhunderts abstechen,” ordinary people to whom he merely applies “eine Verstärkung 
eine Erhöhung” in order to make their “Alltagscharakter” interesting for the stage. That 
during Tandi’s search in Germany for “Wahrheit, Größe und Güte,” he finds little of value 
is therefore not an invention of Lenz, but rather an uncomfortable reflection of the current 
state of Germany--something Lenz is confident the audience would have realized, 
“sobald das Publikum sich nur Zeit nimmt, oder ihm Zeit gelassen wird darüber 
nachzudenken,” with the clear implication that this time for reflection had at least in part 
been stymied by the overly hasty critical condemnation (700, 701).  “Ich kann dafür 
nichts, wenn andre im Grafen Camäleon einen unnatürlichen Bösewicht zu finden 
glauben, da wir doch Dichtungen dieser Art in der neusten Geschichte unsrer Tage 
überall… durch die Erfahrung häufig bestätigt finden. Glaubt man etwa, ich habe aus der 
Luft gegriffen, was bei mir halbe Authentizität eines Geschichtschreibers ist? (701)” 
Ideally, the experience offered by ​Menoza​ and his other plays would not function as a 
“Verzückungen in willkürliche Träume” for those who find waking life troubling, but rather 
confrontation with “Dichtungen” not of Lenz, but of ​current events​, allowing Lenz to 
position himself as possessing the “halbe Authentizität eines Geschichtschreibers.”  
But what about the other half, that is, the half which had not been lifted from 
newspaper headlines? That is, even if one allows that the characters and events are 
merely artful exaggerations of reality designed to hold audience interest, this still does 
nothing to explain the overarching form of the play which was the primary source of 
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consternation. What was preventing Lenz from telling a traditional story, one which 
adhered to the classical ideals of unity of time, place and action? Lenz directly 
references Wieland’s accusation that, in comparison with ​Menoza​, “selbst die Pläne der 
Engländer sind gegen die seinigen regelmäßig,” but his explanation is somewhat cryptic, 
suggesting that “In einem Stück, wo der Hauptheld höchst romantisch ist, muß alles 
übrige mit ihm nicht zu sehr absetzen, oder die Ganze Harmonie schreit” (702). In other 
words, something about the nature of the hero must necessarily bend the surrounding 
reality--and more strangely still, Lenz argues that this, too, is not a purely artistic 
invention, but rather a phenomenon which at least has a corollary in reality “Wir finden 
sogar in dem natürlichen Lauf der Dinge eine gewisse Übereinstimmung, einen 
Zusammenstoß seltsamer und außerorderlicher Begebenheiten, das auch das 
Sprichwort veranlaßt hat: kein Unglück kommt je allein.” While here Lenz is once again 
more concerned with the “Wahrscheinlichkeit” of the events themselves, be it individually 
or in concert, than he is in explaining their arrangement or his hatred of “Erzählungen,” 
the suggestion that a harmony necessarily exists between the character and the 
“Begebenheiten” is important, and suggests a connection to Lenz’s most famous 
theoretical work, “Anmerkung übers Theater,” a piece published in 1774 as a 
supplement to Lenz’s translation of Shakespeare’s “Love’s Labour’s Lost.”  As will soon 
be explored in greater detail, one of the central tenets of “Anmerkung” was that the 
structure of a theatrical piece must bend to the unity of the central acting character, and 
the proximity of the argument presented in “Rezension des Neuen Menoza” is 
unsurprising, since “Rezension” was written to defend both ​Menoza ​and “Anmerkung” 
from the ire of Wieland’s quill. For while Wieland’s critique of ​Menoza​ had been sharp, 
his review of “Anmerkung” was eviscerating, to the extent that it provoked Goethe to 
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state in a letter to Johanna Fahlmer “​Wieland ist und bleibt ein Sch – kerl ​vid. pag. 96​, 
Beygehenden Merkurii.​”​ After all, Wieland still recommended ​Menoza​ to the reading 
public, albeit in altered form, making his review more charitable than that of Schmid. By 
contrast, Wieland could not heap enough derision on “Anmerkung.”  
Before examining Wieland’s critique, it is necessary to provide context of what 
was an ongoing discussion of “Anmerkung” within the ​Teutsche Merkur.​ “Anmerkung” 
was first mentioned by Schmid in 1774, in an overview of the German “Parnasses” in 
which he detailed the latest and best publications and attributed them to various 
“schools.”  Within this context, “Anmerkung” is described extremely briefly and neutrally; 26
as was common with Lenz’s early publications, all of which were published anonymously 
by Weygand, Schmid attributed the work to Goethe and described it as “Sein 
dramatisches Glaubensbekenntniß… worin er alle Regeln der Bühne darauf reducirt… 
auf die Darstellung des Menschen” (182). Schmid then uses the recently published ​Die 
Leiden des jungen Werthers​ as an illuminating example of this principle, despite not 
being a theater piece , stating “Werther redet darinnen immer selbst, und alle Scenen 27
seines Lebens sind uns so täuschend vor Augen gestellt, als es je auf der Bühne 
geschehen kann. Selten ist in der That ein Charakter nach allen seinen Nuancen so 
ausgemahlt, selten in einem Romane die Rührung so weit getrieben wordern.”  28
Following his brief but positive review of ​Werther​, Schmid turns to Lenz, who has been 
26 Schmid simultaneously questioned the reality of these factions within the German literary 
public, attributing them instead primarily to “die Rotten der Journalisten” (168). 
27 Schmid thereby tacitly recognizes a fluidity between media forms, a fluidity which authors like 
Goethe and Lenz would push to and perhaps beyond their limits. 
28 The passage continues “Solche Arbeiten sind unstreitig verdienstlicher, als Einfälle von der Art, 
wie Hr. Göthe in einer splenetischen Stunde hatte, ​Götter, Helden und Wieland​ zu kontrastieren; 
worüber der Merkur bereits das Nöthige gesagt hat,” referencing the ongoing feud between 
members of the Straßburger Sozietät and the ​Teutsche Merkur ​. 
74 
busily supporting “Göthens dramat. Grundsätze mit Beyspielen,” specifically mentioning 
both ​Hofmeister ​and ​Menoza​, thereby connecting “Anmerkung” and Lenz’s theatrical 
works even despite the mistaken identity, and recognizing that they represented a 
substantiation of the theory presented within. These plays are reviewed in a manner 
which should now be familiar: “Bey vielen einzelnen vortreflichen Scenen und Zügen 
vermißt man in beyden eine gute Anlage des Ganzen” (183). In general, however, the 
impression is quite positive and Schmid compares Lenz favorably with Goethe, although 
not entirely without ambivalence, writing:  
Mit gleich großer Lebhaftigkeit gebohren, mit gleich starken oder fast noch 
stärkern Hange zum Sonderbaren, mit gleich emsigen Beobachtungsgeiste, mit 
gleich fleißiger Lectüre der Briten, mit wenigerer Natur im Audruck der 
Leidenschaften und Ausbildung der Charactere, aber mit reicherem Humor im 
Komischen, hat er das Lustspiel auf eben die Art reformirt, wie Göthe das 
Trauerspiel. 
Again, Lenz’s talents for observation and successful aping of Shakespeare are lauded, 
while at the same time gently chastising the works for their unnaturalness and propensity 
for the bizarre. Schmid ends by noting that imitators of the two are rare, “unstreitig, weil 
man in ihrer Manier ohne ihre Talente unmöglich Glück machen kann,” implying an 
identity between their genius and the form of their artistic productions. 
Schmid would write once more about “Anmerkung” in ​Teutsche Merkur​ the 
following year in a formal review. This time he correctly attributes the work to Lenz, but 
the tone has cooled: Schmid argues that it is “sehr zu wunschen... daß sie von unsern 
dramatischen Dichtern beherzigt werden mögen” before continuing “wenn der Verfasser 
gleich nicht der erste ist, der sie ihnen ans Herz legt” (“Anmerkung übers Theater” 94). 
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As before, Schmid commends the renewed focus on the character of the protagonist 
within the play, but this time characterizes Lenz as merely one of many “Bildstürmer” 
who have chosen to attack French theater after Lessing’s letter on the subject, published 
already in 1759 in ​Briefe die Neueste Litteratur betreffend​. How accurate this accusation 
is will be explored in greater detail below: for now it is important to note that, according to 
Schmid, the only “innovation” Lenz is responsible for is the essay’s form, a form which 
renders it almost incomprehensible: 
Zu grösserer Gemeinnützigkeit dieser Anmerkungen wäre zu wünschen, daß der 
Verfasser nicht mit der täglich überhand nehmenden Sucht behaftet wäre, eine 
Schreibart zu affectiren, die mit dem Styl der besten Autoren aller Zeiten und 
Völker den widrigsten Absatz macht, und den meisten Lesern, die man doch 
belehren will, entweder ganz unverständlich ist, oder nur verworrene, 
schwankende und schielende Vorstellungen giebt, woraus sie nicht klug werden 
können.  
Not only did “Anmerkung” not advocate anything new that Lessing had not already 
proposed over a decade prior, the annoying abundance of “mißlungenen Bonmots und 
sonderbaren neuen Wörtern” and the bizarre “Schreibart” are bound to make the piece 
incomprehensible to those for whom it is presumably intended.  
It is the thread of incomprehensibility that Wieland picks up with even greater 
vehemence in his famously-vicious “Zusatz des Herausgebers” which immediately 
followed Schmid’s review. “Zusatz” itself is not so much a review as it is an angry (and, 
as Lenz points out, unsolicited) outburst over the perceived arrogance of the young 
theoretician: “Der Verfasser der A.ü.Th. mag heißen wie er will, traun: der Kerl ist ‘n 
Genie, und hat blos für Genien, wie er ist, geschrieben, wiewohl Genien nichts solches 
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nöthig haben. Soll ihm dies aber nicht erlaubt gewesen seyn? Durft er doch schreiben, 
was gar niemand, was er selbst nicht verstunde!” (96). As indicated by this initial 
passage, Wieland picks up Schmid’s implicit question, for whom is “Anmerkung” 
intended? and provides a resounding answer: no one. Geniuses could possibly 
understand it (even if Lenz himself does not), but they have no need for the information, 
and “Fürs Publikum ist so was freylich nicht. Denn was soll dies damit machen? Wie soll 
es dem Genie seine Räthsel errathen? oder ergänzen, was der geheimnißreiche Mann 
nur halb sagt? oder ihm in seinen Geniesprüngen von Klippe zu Klippe nachsetzen?” 
Just as in Lenz’s plays, the problem fragmentation arises once again: things are left half 
said, his writing is likened to a riddle, one which jumps precipitously from cliff to cliff. 
Wieland, like Schmid, ascribes this to mere affectation, a posture and a particular tone 
artificially created by Lenz “Sein Ton ist ein so fremder Ton, seine Sprache ein so 
wunderbares Rothwelsch… Sein Ton ist nicht der Ton der Welt; es ist auch nicht der 
Ton der Untersuchung; Schulton ist’s auch nicht; Kenner haben sonst auch noch nie so 
gesprochen. Was ist’s den? Es ist der Ton eines Sehers, der Gesichte sieht.” As a 
staunch advocate of the Enlightenment and rationality, to compare Lenz’s writing with 
the dark mutterings of a prophet is the greatest slight Wieland could have offered. As 
such, Lenz has been found guilty of actively working against the good of humankind by 
intentionally  obfuscating his own of a lack of knowledge with mystical language. In order 
to make this “Büchlein” intelligible, Wieland argues it would be necessary to write 
another, much longer book, “[um] verständlich zu machen, zu prüfen, das Korn von der 
Spreu zu scheiden, und zu zeigen, was darinn gesunde Kritik, und was eitel schaales 
Persiflage ist, was würklich neugedacht, und was nur durch die Affectation seltsamer 
Wendungen, Wortfiguren und Nothzüchtigung der Sprache den Schein einer unerhörten 
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Entdeckung bekommen hat.” But Wieland asks who would write such a work? And once 
written, who would read it, given “Andre das lange vorher kürzer, deuthlicher und 
richtiger gesagt haben,” before directing his readers to an article published a full year 
before “Anmerkung” by an author who already knew the value of Shakespeare’s writing 
and extolled it in a much shorter and more accessible piece, “Der Geist von 
Shakespeare” (the author of that article is, by chance, Wieland himself). 
The anonymous reviewer of “Anmerkung” in the ​Allgemeine Deutsche Bibliothek 
brings the untraditional form of “Anmerkung” into even sharper focus: 
Der Verf. dieser Anmerkungen giebt sie selbst für nichts weiter als Rhapsodien 
aus; dieß entschuldigt einigermassen den Mangel ihres Zusammenhangs, wenn 
dieser Mangel sich nur nicht auch auf die einzelnen Gedanken, auf die Sätze und 
Meinungen, und sogar auf die Einkleidung erstreckte, die wir noch in keiner 
Schrift so seltsam, und beynahe närrisch, gefunden haben. (“XX. Anmerkungen 
über Theater” 377) 
What Lenz characterizes as “rhapsodic,” the reviewer sees as unfinished, insufficiently 
contemplated ramblings, leading to a bizarre essay which borders on foolish. The history 
of theater which Lenz provides at the beginning is “mehr spöttisch als wahr” and his 
critique of Aristotle is rejected wholesale before even addressing the individual elements, 
as Lenz “Sagt… doch selbst, daß er ihn noch nicht ganz durchgelesen hat!” (378).  Lenz 
claims that Aristotle cites two sources of poetry, but only provides “Nachahmung,” 
keeping the other hidden behind his beard, demonstrating that he “nicht einmal das 
vierte Kapitel… ganz durchgelesen hat,” in which rhythm and harmony are revealed as 
the second source. Instead Lenz preposterously suggests that the second source is the 
ability to take concepts apart “[sie] durchzuschauen, sie anschaulich und gegenwärtig zu 
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machen,” which the review claims is merely another way of describing mimesis. 
Similarly, Lenz’s contention that Aristotle, by placing the plot as the highest good, 
necessarily sacrifices the agency of his characters (as will be explored further below), is 
waved away as mere sophistic wordplay. Throughout, the reviewer is trapped between 
the urge to dismiss Lenz’s essay out of hand, and the need to rectify the slights done to 
Aristotle and others. Beginning “Ohne uns hier darauf näher einzulassen,” the reviewer 
cites several passages from Aristotle’s poetics intended to show the true relationship 
between character and plot, concluding “Die Natur hat freylich nicht den Aristoteles um 
Rath gefragt, wenn sie ein Genie schaffen wollte; aber Aristoteles fragte die Natur um 
Rath, als er seine Regeln schuf; und so wurden sie, nach Pope’s Ausdruck, ​methodisirte 
Natur​” (381). As such, the unities of time and space, the singular plot arch continued to 
be followed, “nicht, weil es Aristoteles so wollte,​ ​sondern weil die Natur der Sache es so 
will, die er auch hier zu Rathe zog.” The reviewer is forced to admit that when it comes to 
Lenz’s derision of French theater, he was “naseweis genug” to get some of it right, 
although everything has been said before and better, with Lenz’s critique bordering on 
cruelty. The reviewer, like Schmid and Wieland, is baffled as to why this work is attached 
to a translation of Shakespeare’s ​Love’s Labour’s Lost​: while Shakespeare is recognized 
here, too, as shorthand for a-classical genius, but why ​this​ play, which experts (Wieland) 
have deemed to be one of Shakespeare’s worst? How does this demonstrate his 
theory? But throughout, it is the form of the work which most irritates:  
Soll es Neuheit, oder Sonderbarkeit, oder Originalität seyn, oder ist es vorsetzlich 
Flüchtigkeit und Ungedult, wenn der Verf. sich oft nicht Zeit läßt, seine Gedanken 
ganz heraus zu sagen, oft kaum den Voedersatz einer Periode ganz hinschreibt, 
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und den Nachsatz, oder doch einen Theil desselben, mit einem blossen Strich 
andeutet, und es dem Leser überläßt, sich denselben hinzuzudenken? (377) 
The reviewer is convinced that it is clearly the result of “Flüchtigkeit und Dreistigkeit,” 
which must necessarily produce “ungeduld” on the side of the “Publicum,” who will 
undoubtedly grow “unwillig” with Lenz’s bizarre writing style, particularly when this style 
seems to purely be a result of the “Verworrenheit, die in dem Gehirn eines solchen 
Schriftstellers geherrscht zu haben scheint.” As an example of this confusion, the review 
quotes one of Lenz’s most remarkable outbursts in “Anmerkung:” “Alles übrige halb 
verdaute Geschwätz des Verf. über diese Sache beyseite gesetzt, welches er mit den 
Worten schließt: ‘Wollte sage -- was wolt ich doch sagen?’ -- -- Möcht’ hinzusetzt 
Verfasserchen! wustest’s wohl nicht!” The parallel critiques of Lenz’s theoretical and 
theatrical writings is apparent. In both cases, reviewers perceive what they hold to be 
natural truths buried under a form which seems utterly arbitrary. Though if anything, the 
ire of the contemporary critique had increased, as people were more able to concede 
what they saw as artistic license in creative works--what possible reason, other than 
arrogance and a misguided understanding of genius, could there be for the same 
rupture, fragment and confusion in a purely explanatory work? Why not impart the 
information simply, directly? The following section will explore the theoretical foundations 
for Lenz’s chosen writing form, linking it to a perceived tension between the free-will of 
the individual and impositions from the external material, social world.  
 
III. Towards a Theory of Theatre: Unity of Person, Unity of Idea 
So what was “Anmerkung”? Was it, as Wieland and Schmid suggested, merely a 
commonsensical plea for a heightened focus on the person of the protagonist cloaked in 
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mystical flimflam? Was it the jumbled ramblings of a young pretender, someone who 
didn’t have the faintest understanding of Aristotle or the nature of theater? Even Heinrich 
Leopold Wagner’s glowing review of “Anmerkung” in the ​Frankfurter Gelehrte Anzeigen 
does little to dissuade from this interpretation, as it apes the grammatical style of 
“Anmerkung” while remaining substantively empty: “Ein sehr vollwichtiger Beytrag zur 
Dramaturige!-- tiefdurchdachte Einsichten in die Kunst! ächtes warmes Gefühl des 
Schönen! anschauend dargestellt! in jedem Zuge die Hand eines Meister kennbar!--” 
(Wagner 796). Seemingly every sentence ends in an exclamation mark or a dash and 
the review is rife with overblown metaphors comparing Lenz to a colossus among mental 
midgets, while never describing ​how​ Lenz achieves this feat, or ​what​, exactly, the overall 
effect is. In fact, the anonymous reviewer leaves the odious task of creating an 
“allgemeines Raisonnement” or a collection of “einzelne schöne Stellen” to the likes of 
Wieland, referencing the 1773 essay “Der Geist Shakespeares” in which Wieland 
attempts to summarize Shakespeare’s genius, to which was attached a sort of 
greatest-hits of quotes from Shakespeare’s plays.  Instead, the reviewer contents 29
themself with the imperative “--Willst noch näher mit dem Werkchen bekannt werden? 
gut! geh und lies es selbst​,​ es wird dich warlich nicht reuen...” I argue, however, that 
despite all of this and even Lenz’s own positioning of the text as “rhapsodienweis” 
“ungehemmte Räsonnement” (and himself as an “unparteiischen Dilettanten”) that in 
reading with and against “Anmerkung,” along with a few other key essays, it is possible 
29 Already in 1773 Wieland was the much-beleaguered original translator of Shakespeare into 
German, for which this essay was to serve as a partial defense. People from all sides had 
attacked both the quality of his translations, as well as his accompanying commentaries, which 
often dismissed large portions of Shakespeare’s work as low, poorly written, or too regionally 
specific to bear translation. Even the most charitable reviews tended to damn with faint praise, 
noting that Wieland had at least done his country a great service by making these works available 
at all. 
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to uncover a unified theory of theater specifically, and writing in general, a theory which 
through its fragmentation of form, allowed for new experiences and new voices of society 
to be made visible.  
At the heart of “Anmerkung” lies a disarmingly simple question: what are plays 
about? “Es kommt itzt darauf an, was beim Schauspiel eigentlich der Hauptgegenstand 
der Nachahmung: der Mensch? oder​ ​das Schicksal des Menschen?” (“Anmerkungen” 
650). As suggested already by the critique, Lenz assigns two representatives to the two 
different potential answers, the “Franzosen (sollen wir Griechen sagen?),” specifically 
Voltaire, Aristotle, Sophocles  on the one side and the “ältere Engländer… aller ältern 30
nordischen Nationen” meaning Shakespeare and a later fleeting reference to Hans 
Sachs. Lenz then begins reconstructing Aristotle’s conception of a tragedy in order to 
shine light on an apparent contradiction in its definition: on the one hand, Aristotle 
defines a tragedy as  “Es ist also das Trauerspiel die Nachahmung einer Handlung, einer 
guten, vollkommenen und großen Handlung, in einer angenehmen Unterredung, nach 
der besondern Beschaffenheit der handelnden Personen abgeändert.” A tragedy is the 
imitation of an entire action, one which has been shaped by the “besondern 
Beschaffenheit” of the acting individual, a Beschaffenheit which itself is the combination 
of the individual’s “Gesinnungen und die Sitten.” Lenz collapses this definition into the 
modern term “Charakter,” and follows Aristotle to the argument’s logical conclusion: 
“[Aristotles] fordert also, daß wir die Fabel des Stücks nach den Charakteren der 
30 It is necessary to point out how fast and loose German theorists played with French theater: 
Corneille and Voltaire are consistently referred to in the same breath, despite their separation by 
an entire century and the fundamentally different character and goals of their works. Of course, 
this elision pales in comparison to the constant lumping of French playwrights of the 17th and 
18th century together with Sophocles--what becomes clear through this conceptual shorthand is 
that the German critics are far less interested in the reality of French or ancient Greek theater 
than they are in constructing a theoretical strawman against which to define an emergent, 
proto-nationalist sense of “German” theater.  
82 
handelnden Personen einrichten… ‘der Dichter solle Begebenheiten nicht vorstellen, wie 
sie geschehen sind, sondern geschehen sollten’” (651). In other words, the events of the 
play must be shaped to match the idealized results of the protagonist’s Charakter 
coming into contact with the described circumstances. This would seem to suggest that 
the answer for Aristotle to the question “what are plays about?” should be that they are 
about “der Mensch” rather than the “Schicksal” of the individual.  
This, however, is not the case: “Nachdem er nun selbst zugestanden, daß der 
Charakter der handelnden Person den Grund ihrer Handlungen, und also auch der 
Fabel des Stücks enthalte: sollte es uns fast wundern, daß er… fortführt: ‘Das Wichtigste 
unter allen ist die Zusammensetzung der Begebenheiten. Denn das Trauerspiel ist nicht 
eine Nachahmung des Menschen, sondern der Handlungen, des Lebens, des Glücks 
oder Unglücks, denn die Glückseligkeit ist in den Handlungen gegründet, und der 
Endzweck des Trauerspiels ist eine Handlung, nicht eine Beschaffenheit.’” Aristotle 
makes a seemingly unintelligible distinction between a play being about the actions of an 
individual vs. being about the nature of the individual acting. “Er sondert immer die 
Handlung von der handelnden Hauptperson ab, die ​bongré malgré ​in die gegebene 
Fabel hineinpassen muß, wie ein Schiffstau in ein Nadelöhr” (655). Lenz exclaims in 
feigned consternation “Als ob die Beschaffenheit eines Menschen überhaupt vorgestellt 
werden könne, ohne ihn in Handlung zu setzen. Er ist dies und das, woran weiß ich es, 
lieber Freund, woran weißt du es, hast du ihn handeln sehen?” To think of the character 
of an individual existing outside of their actions is a contradiction of terms to the modern 
mind: after all, the road to hell is paved with good intentions, it is in the ​doing​ that a 
person’s true nature is believed to be revealed. How, then, to explain this split? “Die 
Erfahrung ist die ewige Atmosphäre des strengen Philosophen, sein Räsonnement kann 
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und darf sich keinen Nagelbreit drüber erheben, so wenig als eine Bombe außer ihrem 
berechneten Kreise fliegen kann” (652). The specific metaphor here is of note: in order 
to convey an unalterable fate, Lenz turns to physics. Just as it is impossible for a 
“Bombe” to alter its own trajectory once it has been launched, it was likewise unthinkable 
for a Greek hero to change the course of destiny. Lenz recognizes that within the context 
of ancient tragedies, to act and be acted upon were synonymous. Because the 
individual’s character is merely the summation of their “Gesinnung und Sitten,” the 
question as to ​why​ they acted in the way that they did was an uninteresting one to 
audiences of ancient Greece: they acted in the only way they could. The only questions 
which remained therefore were ​what​ were the circumstances which produced this action, 
and ​how​ did the person act--character is irrelevant or, to return to the physics metaphor, 
individual character is a constant, the circumstances surrounding that individual are the 
variables. “Da ein eisernes Schicksal die Handlungen der Alten bestimmte und regierte, 
so konnten sie als solche interessieren, ohne davon den Grund in der menschlichen 
Seele aufzusuchen und sichtbar zu machen.” The source of the action is not to be found 
within the individual, but in the “eisernes Schicksal” itself; fate, the will of the gods, ​is​ the 
main character, the “handelnde” force, and consequently it is the unfolding of this fate 
which interests, not the inconsequential internal musings of the protagonists.  
Lenz pushes this line of argumentation further, claiming that not only was it 
uninteresting to show the inner workings of the decision (as these were nothing but 
almost mechanical processes), to do so was impious; citing the religious origins of the 
play, Lenz noted “sie glaubten eine Ruchlosigkeit zu begehen, wenn sie Begebenheiten 
aus den Charakteren berechneten, sie bebten vor dem Gedanken zurück. Es war 
Gottesdienst, die furchtbare Gewalt des Schicksals anzuerkennen, vor seinem blinden 
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Despotismus hinzuzittern” (667). If the purpose of the play was to show the might of the 
gods, how could a demonstration of the will of humankind be deemed anything but 
heretical? Lenz also sees this as the necessary breaking point between ancient and 
modern theater: the German populace no longer believes in a pantheon of gods 
controlling all aspects of destiny, but rather in individuals reasoning, choosing and 
acting, creating their own paths, their own fate. What once was heresy has become the 
norm, and as a result, the fabric of theatrical works must change accordingly:  
[B]ei den alten Griechen war’s die Handlung, die sich das Volk zu sehen 
versammlete. Bei uns ist’s die Reihe von Handlungen, die wie Donnerschläge auf 
einander folgen, eine die andere stützen und heben, in ein großes Ganze 
zusammenfließen müssen, das hernach nichts mehr und nichts minder ausmacht 
als die Hauptperson, wie sie in der ganzen Gruppe ihrer Mithändler hervorsticht. 
(656) 
Again, in ancient Greece, it was the Action, that is, the “Fabel” of destiny manifesting 
itself in the plot of the play which the people gathered to see. The plot described the 
inevitable downfall of the hero, destroyed by a predetermined interaction between 
individual character and external circumstances. For the modern audience this 
necessarily shifts: instead of showing the fate of an individual through a crucial event 
and accompanying action, it is necessary to show a ​series ​of actions, that is, the 
important choices made by the individual, which, building one upon the other, collectively 
reveal​ the nature of that individual’s character, pushing them into stark relief over and 
against those of their peers. Character now matters because it has become the unifying 
element of the play, something which is made and remade in the moment to moment 
decisions of the protagonist, and not as a stable constant upon which the plot acts. Lenz 
85 
highlights this shift by completely inverting Aristotle’s statement “​Fabula autem est una, 
non ut aliqui putant, si circa unum sit​,” “the plot is not, as some believe, unified because 
it revolves around a person,” to “​fabula est una si circa unum sit​,” “the plot is unified, if it 
revolves around a person.”  “Was können wir dafür, daß wir an abgerissenen 
Handlungen kein Vergnügen mehr finden, sondern alt genug worden sind, ein Ganzes 
zu wünschen? daß wir den Menschen sehen wollen, wo jene nur das unwandelbare 
Schicksal und seine geheimen Einflüsse sahen. Oder scheuen Sie sich, meine Herren! 
einen Menschen zu sehen?” (652). In typical fashion, Lenz formulates the societal 
transformation he claims has occurred in the form of a challenge: surely now we are 
mature enough to face the world in its entirety? To see the whole, acting person, not an 
arbitrarily isolated moment? To see the whole person, acting, is therefore something 
which is simultaneously demanded ​by ​and ​of ​the audience. The (perceived) general 
dissatisfaction with French/Greek tragedies was an expression of this popular will of the 
Many, who demanded a more realistic and fully realized protagonist. Because the 
audience is privy to not just one, but many actions, organized not in accordance with an 
immutable fate but around the plastic Charakter of the protagonist, they recognize 
themselves in the play, as individuals shaped by the decisions they have made and will 
make. But there is also a clear pedagogical thrust to the argumentation: it is not just a 
matter of showing the audience how people do act, but also how they could and should 
act. As will be discussed in Lenz’s assessment of Goethe’s ​Götz von Berlichingen ​below​, 
the potential of tragedies is to show the realm of the possible for the freely acting, 
self-determining individual, to provide a model for a different kind of human existence.  
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Shifting the focus from the single action revealing fate to a series of actions 
building a Charakter has profound implications for Aristotle’s “three unities,”  or as Lenz 31
lovingly referred to them, “die so erschröckliche jämmerlichberühmte Bulle” (654). 
Interestingly, despite his playfully mocking tone (and the vehemence of the defence 
mustered on Aristotle’s behalf by Wieland and others), Lenz never implies that Aristotle 
was wrong, but that these unities have simply lost their meaning, or at the very least, 
their meaning has changed drastically within the modern context. The three unities were 
merely a natural and necessary consequence of the fact that plot-as-fate was the 
fulcrum of ancient tragedies. They followed one “action”  by definition, not an action of a 
single person, but a single sequence of events representing the “eisernes Schicksal.” 
Put differently, it was not the action of the individual, but that of the gods acting upon the 
individual, which was of interest. Because they followed one series of events, the play 
was necessarily tied to one location. Lenz further notes that “Einheit des Orts -- oder 
möchten lieber sagen, Einheit des Chors, denn was war es anders? Kommen doch auf 
dem griechischen Theater die Leute wie gerufen und gebetn herbei, und kein Mensch 
stößt daran” (656). Location and fate are woven together in the body of the chorus: they 
are a reassuring presence, the audience knows through them that the people who are 
called to the location are meant to be there. In terms of the unity of time within tragedies, 
this was largely defined in distinction to historical epics: both were, quoting Aristotle, the 
“Nachahmung edler Handlungen mittelst einer Rede,” with the distinction that a tragedy 
in the ideal case should occur within the course of a single day and night. Lenz notes 
that already in ancient theater this distinction seems rather arbitrary, and that from a 
31 It is worth noting that while the “three unities” were postulated by Aristotle in his ​Poetics​, they 
were not codified into a specific benchmark of theater until the neoclassical era. 
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certain perspective, the 10 years which ​The Iliad​ spanned could also be described as 
detailing a “single event.”  32
By suggesting that Aristotle’s ​Poetics ​were a product of their time and not 
immutable, eternal laws, Lenz closely parallels the theory laid out by Johann Gottfried 
Herder in the 1773 essay “Shakespeare,” published in ​Von Deutscher Art und Kunst​.  In 33
“Shakespeare,” Herder argues that the problem with the dramatic “rules” taken from 
Aristotle is the result of a fundamental misunderstanding:  
[D]as künstliche ihrer Regeln war -- keine Kunst! war Natur! -- Einheit der Fabel -- 
war Einheit der Handlung, die vor ihnen lag; die nach ihren Zeit, Vaterlands, 
Religions, Sittenumständen, nicht anders als solch ein Eins seyn konnte. Einheit 
des Orts war Einheit des Orts; denn die Eine, kurze feierliche Handlung ging nur 
an Einem Ort, im Tempel, Pallast, gleichsam auf einem Markt des Vaterlandes 
vor. (Herder 77) 
The rules which Aristotle derived from the plays of his time were nothing more than the 
dictates of nature imposing its will on mimetic production. The unity of plot, the unity of 
time, the unity of place all found their origins not in artificial precepts, but in playwrights 
attempting to mirror the reality which confronted them. “Alle das zeigt, daß der grosse 
Mann [Aristotle], auch im grossen Sinn seiner Zeit philosophirte:” that the rules no longer 
32 This is an interesting assertion, as when viewed in this light, the ​Iliad ​differs from ​Agamemnon 
in scale rather than in quality: it is the unfolding tragedy of an entire people, as well as many 
specific individuals caught in the wake of the Trojan War. This act of scaling is ever present, with 
the point of focus constantly shifting between armies of thousands, crashing against each other 
like waves of the ocean, to surreally quiet moments in which two heroes meet their fate in the 
midst of the roiling chaos of battle, or in the litany of ships vs. Achilles’ lamentations by the sea. A 
History is therefore not the record of the will and action of a single God, but of the interaction of 
many and the inevitable fallout this creates. In this, it is also possible to see why this distinction 
would be considered “natural,” as the tragedy of multiple nations could be considered an event of 
a scale impossible to depict on the stage. 
33 Although published a year earlier, it is likely that Lenz conceived and wrote “Anmerkung” in 
1770 before having access to “Shakespeare.” 
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fit, and should not be made to fit modern theatrical productions, is not a failing of 
Aristotle, but rather a function of temporal transience (81): 
Wie sich Alles in der Welt ändert: so muste sich auch die Natur ändern, die 
eigentlich das griechische Drama schuf. Weltverfassungen, Sitten, Stand der 
Republicken, Tradition der Heldenzeit, Glaube, selbst Musik, Ausdruck, Maas der 
Illusion wandelte und natürlich schwand auch Stoff zu Fabeln, Gelegenheit zu 
der Bearbeitung, Anlaß zu dem Zweck. (81-82) 
The nature of Nature has changed: every aspect of society, every tradition, moral norm, 
mode of expression. And while it is possible to export the foreign rules of a different time 
and people onto modern creative endeavors, as the “new Athenians” (the French 
playwrights) do, this inevitably will not reproduce the essence of Greek theater, “weil im 
innern nichts von ihm Dasselbe mit Jenem ist, nicht Handlung, Sitten, Sprache, Zweck, 
nichts” (84). The results are “Gemälde der Empfindung von dritter fremder Hand,” 
nothing like the “ersten ungeschminkten Regungen” which were, after all, the “natural” 
expression of the world as it once existed.  
What a modern playwright should strive for instead, is to create a new theater, 
one which establishes the same ​kind​ of connection to the world that existed in the great 
Greek plays, but  instead follows “seiner Geschichte, nach Zeitgeist, Sitten, Meinungen, 
Sprache, Nationalvorurtheile, Traditionen und Liebhabereyen, wenn auch aus 
Fastnachts- und Marionettenspiel (eben, wie die delen Griechen aus dem Chor) erfinden 
-- und das Erfundne wird Drama seyn bey diesem Volk dramatischen Zweck erreicht” 
(88). It is important to note the range of the elements included by Herder, ranging from 
the classical ideals such as history (the stories of the great, of heroes) down to 
“Liebhabereyen,” as well as “low” forms of culture such as “Fastnachts- und 
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Marionettenspiel.” Herder argues that it is this, Shakespeare’s ability to fuse all elements 
of his world into a new dramatic form, which describes his genius: 
[Shakespeare] fand keinen so einfachen Volks- und Vaterlandscharakter, 
sondern ein Vielfaches von Ständen, Lebensarten, Gesinnungen, Völkern und 
Spracharte… er dichtete also Stände und Menschen, Völker und Spracharten, 
König und Narren, Narren und König zu dem herrlichen Ganzen! Er fand keinen 
so einfachen Geist der Geschichte, der Fabel, der Handlung: er nahm 
Geschichte, wie er sie fand, und setzte mit Schöpfergeist das 
Verschiedenartigste Zeug zu einem Wunderganzen zusammen, was wir, wenn 
nicht Handlung im griechischen Verstande, so Aktion im Sinne der mittlern, oder 
in der Sprache der neuern Zeiten Begebenheit grosses Eräugnis nennen wollen.
 34
Herder believes it is therefore Shakespeare, not Voltaire, whom Aristotle would have 
embraced as the new Sophocles, ​because​ he does not follow ancient precepts designed 
for another time, but rather creates new, naturalistic laws which better accommodate his 
new reality. Because society had grown vastly more complex since Sophocles’ time, 
Shakespeare was forced to write of both kings and fools, lords and peasants. Within this 
context, the old rules, in particular the three unities, not only no longer described the 
world as it existed, if maintained nonetheless out of a sense of pious integrity, would act 
as a barrier to realistic/naturalistic depictions of society, producing instead stilted artifice 
with no resonance to the modern viewer.  35
34 This description of a play’s ability to capture all levels of society finds particular resonance with 
Garve’s theory of novels, see Chapter 3: The Journalistic Form seeps into Books. 
35 The flaw in this line of reasoning is that it assumes a progressive model of society which is 
constantly growing in complexity from more primitive simplicity. There ​were,​ of course, 
classes/estates/slaves in ancient Greece, a social heterogeneity which also existed within the 
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Like Lenz, Herder offers a new foundation for the unity tragedy, but instead of the 
acting character of the protagonist, Herder suggests a more direct substitution; in place 
of the will of the Gods, i.e. fate, manifesting in a single unified event, it is the 
genius-author who brings order to the temporal and spatial chaos of modern existence. It 
is the author who is able to take the “einzelne Gepräge der Völker, Stände, Seelen! die 
alle die verschiedenartigsten und abgetrenntest​ ​handelnden Maschinen, alle -- was wir 
in der Hand des Weltschöpfers sind--unwissende, blinde Werkzeuge zum Ganzen Eines 
theatralischen Bildes, Einer Grösse habenden Begebenheit, die nur der Dichter 
überschauet” (94). Agency is, as in the ancient Greek tragedies, displaced from the 
figures on the stage, who are nothing but “handelnden Maschinen.” It is Shakespeare 
himself “Der hundert Auftritte einer Weltbegebenheit mit dem Arm umfaßt, mit dem Blick 
ordnet, mit der Einen durchhäuchenden, Alles belebenden Seele erfüllet;” in place of the 
“strengsten Regel” of Aristotle and a story which marches “von Einem Anfang zu Einem 
Ende,” the audience is presented with “welch ein Wechsel von Zeiten, Umständen, 
Stürmen, Wetter, Zeitläuften!... tritt näher, und fühle den Menschengeist, der auch jede 
Person und Alter und Charakter und Nebending in das Gemälde ordnete.” (96, 94). The 
language used is telling: it is the author’s arms, the author’s breathe, the author’s eyes 
which order, animate and control the created world. This world is inseparable from the 
person of the author, and is “so groß und tief wie die Natur:” “die ganze Welt ist zu 
audience of the tragedy to a certain extent, even if it found no representation on the stage. This is 
not to argue that society has remained unchanged throughout history and that it was only the 
representation which has changed. The social makeup of society and nature of social 
stratification had unquestionably shifted drastically in the intervening millenia between 
Shakespeare and Sophocles, and Herder’s assertion of temporal contingency of all things 
remains an important intervention. But social change in and of itself, specifically an absolute 
increase in societal complexity, is not enough to explain the change in the perception of what a 
thing like “society” was and who comprised it, as reflected in the new shape of theatrical 
production. 
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diesem grossen Geiste allein Körper: alle Auftritte der Natur an diesem Körper Glieder, 
wie alle Charaktere und Denkarten zu diesem Geiste Züge -- und das Ganze mag jener 
Riesengott des Spinosa ‘Pan! Universum!’ heissen.” (96, 103). 
The identity between the genius author and the natural universe which is their 
body indicates an interesting slippage which qualifies the artist’s position as an 
omnipotent and omniscient god of creation. The artist is a creator only insofar as they 
are a “Diener der Natur,” that is, to that extent to which they successfully mimic the 
divine creation of God (98). Yes, the author breathes life into the dramatic world, but they 
do so as a medium, “Aus Scenen und Zeitlaufen aller Welt findet sich, wie durch ein 
Gesetz der Fatalität, eben die hieher, die dem Gefühl der Handlung, die kräftigste, die 
idealste ist; wo die sonderbarsten, kühnsten Umstände am meisten den Trug der 
Wahrheit unterstützen, wo Zeit und Ortswechsel, über die der Dichter schaltet, am 
lautesten rufen: ‘hier ist kein Dichter! ist Schöpfer! ist Geschichte der Welt!’” It is 
precisely in those moments where the creative license of the author appears at its 
greatest the “fatalistic” power of nature is strongest (98). The genius of the author is not 
a freedom from, but rather a connection to nature, a slavish devotion to its accurate 
depiction. The agency to be found within a play lies therefore neither in the characters 
themselves, nor in the author, but rather in the order of the natural world.  In his 
discussion of Othello, Herder describes the incredible richness of the work, as all of the 
individual pieces come together like gears to create a miraculous whole. Shakespeare’s 
relationship to this whole is described as “Wenn ein Engel der Vorsehung menschliche 
Leidenschaften gegen einander abwog, und Seelen und Charakterer gruppirte, und ihne 
Anlässe, wo Jedes im Wahn des Freyen handelt, zuführt, und er sie alle mit diesem 
Wahne, als mit der Kette des Schicksals zu seiner Idee leitet -- so war der menschliche 
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Geist, der hier entwarf, sann, zeichnete, lenkte” (97). Shakespeare functions as an 
invisible hand,  not directly controlling the individual decisions of the characters on 36
stage, but rather using his understanding of human nature to build constellations in 
which the characters, through exercising their “free will,” act unwittingly in concert to 
create his “Idee,” as if once again bound to an unalterable fate. In this analogy, neither 
the characters on the stage, nor Shakespeare, can be described as truly free: the 
figures, despite acting “im Wahn des Freyen,” are completely predictable, merely 
following that course prescribed by their “menschliche Leidenschaften” and “Seelen.” It is 
the predictability of human nature, and not artifice of the theatrical form, which allows 
Shakespeare to shape the course of the play, to create a work of striking verisimilitude. 
But this also shows the limits within Shakespeare operated; according to Herder’s 
theory, the “Idee” which was revealed over the course of the play, and to which the 
individual fates of the characters were bound, could only be one already found in the 
world as it existed outside of the play. An author is a creator in that they are ​like​ God; 
they only create, or more accurately, re-create that which God had already made.  37
Despite the many parallels and apparent collaboration of Herder and Lenz during 
this period, the issue of agency would seem to mark a sharp dividing line between the 
two theories, as Herder’s theory leaves no space for the free-acting character, the 
organizing principle of Lenz’s theory of tragedy. Instead, Aristotle’s “eisernes Schicksal” 
has crept back in under the guise of Nature, God’s creation. The gods may no longer 
dictate the fate of humankind, and although they appear to act exclusively within the 
36 For an examination of the figure of the “invisible hand” and its connection to temporality, see 
the discussion of Kittsteiner in Chapter 3: A new Temporality: Universal, Relative, Reflexive. 
37 This also potentially helps illuminate why Lenz was so adamant that his own plays were not 
arbitrary inventions but rather reflected the world as it actually existed.  
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“Wahn” of free will, humans collectively and individually are machines operating along 
predetermined parameters, not all that dissimilar from Lenz’s characterization of the 
characters of ancient tragedies acting in accordance with a combination of 
“Gesinnungen und die Sitten.” The figures on stage, as people, are predictable, and the 
genius playwright reveals this predictability to the audience as a truth of the inner life of 
humanity. 
By contrast, in his theory of tragedy Lenz advocates an entirely different idea of 
free will, and with it, a new species of human. Lenz still posits a similar theory of genius,
 namely someone who is able to describe the world with enough clarity to be able to 38
recreate an image of it “mit allen seinen Verhältnissen, Licht, Schatten, Kolorit dazu” 
(“Anmerkung” 648). Like Herder, Lenz draws parallels between the creative act of 
generating the theatrical universe and divine creation: “der Schöpfer sieht auf ihn hinab 
wie auf die kleinen Götter, die mit seinem Funken in der Brust auf den Thronen der Erde 
sitzen und seinem Beispiel gemäß eine kleine Welt erhalten.” And once again, it is the 
genius’ heavenly perspective which the audience then shares, something which Lenz 
expresses in his impatience with the complaints about transgressions of time and space: 
[W]elche Wohltat des Genies, Sie auf die Höhe zu führen, wo Sie einer Schlacht 
mit all ihrem Getümmel, Jammern und Grauen zusehen können, ohne Ihr eigen 
Leben, Gemütsruhe, und Behagen hineinzuflechten… was sollen wir mehr tun, 
daß ihr selig werdet? wie kann man’s euch bequemer Machen? Nur zuschauen, 
ruhen und zuschauen, mehr fordern wir nicht, warum wollt ihr denn nicht auf 
diesem Stern stehen bleiben, und in die Welt ‘nabgucken, aus kindischer Furcht 
den Hals zu brechen. (655) 
38 And indeed, most likely partially derives his theory of genius from Herder’s earlier texts. 
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But despite these similarities, it is not the genius, or even Nature through the medium of 
the genius, that Lenz advocates as the organizing principle of the tragic drama, but 
rather the character of the protagonist, a character which is revealed and formed through 
the active choices the protagonist makes on stage. Lenz is therefore shifting the focus of 
the tragedy, from the cosmic to the human, as well as advocating for a specific ​kind​ of 
protagonist, one whose character is defined by their free will, the creative force of their 
decisions: “Es ist hier nicht die Rede von hingekleckten Charakteren… es ist die Rede 
von Charakteren, die sich ihre Begebenheiten erschaffen, die selbstständig und 
unveränderlich die ganze großen Maschine selbst drehen, ohne die Gottheiten in den 
Wolken anders nötig zu haben, als wenn sie wollen zu Zuschauschern” (653). The 
distance to what Lenz characterizes as Aristotle’s pious observation of the will of the 
gods could not be greater; it is not by chance that Lenz pushes the gods into the role of 
passive observers. But this also indicates a significant gulf between Herder and Lenz; 
rather than merely appearing to act in accordance with their own free will, all the while 
secretly acting as “kleine Maschine” or “Räder” within the giant clockwork of Nature, 
Lenz inverts the cosmic order, placing the human actor in the center and allowing them 
to shape the natural world around them.  
It is this inversion, not a vague "Gesetz der Fatalität” coalescing different times 
and places in the somnambulic visions of the genius, which demands a new 
organizational principle of the tragedy and the rejection of the three unities. Contrary to 
the previously cited accusations of Wieland and others, Lenz did not confuse rupture of 
form with genius. In his essay “Von Shakespeares Hamlet,” Lenz calls out those “junge 
Dichter” who believe that the beauty of Shakespeare’s writing lies in his 
“Unregelmäßigkeit,” comparing them to purveyors of bad wine who seek to convince 
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their customers that it is the room and not their head which is spinning (739). 
Shakespeare, he argues, recognized the value of the “Einheiten der Zeit und Orts,” and 
as such, deviations existed in his works only “als Ausnahme…  immer nur höheren 
Vorteilen aufgeopfert und daß je größer die dadurch erhaltenen Vorteile waren, desto 
mehr Freiheit man in dem Stück dem Dichter gestatten mußte und zu gestatten kein 
Bedenken trug.” Through maintaining the unity of time and space, Lenz believes that the 
author simultaneously preserves the highest good of playwriting, audience interest. 
Without some level of consistency, “die Stube dreht sich,” and the task of both the actors 
in portraying and the audience in comprehending are made needlessly more difficult. 
However, it is not exclusively or even primarily through the preservation of the unities 
that the modern audience’s interest is awakened; again it is no longer the unity of the 
plot, inexorable unfurling of destiny which excites, but “Menschen” that the audience 
demands to see, “nicht… Bildern, nicht Marionettenpuppen, … Menschen” 
(“Anmerkungen” 653). And if the characterization of the protagonists demands 
“unausbleiblich und unumgänglich Veränderung der Zeit und des Orts - so kann und 
muß ihm [dem Interesse] Zeit und Ort aufgeopfert werden” (“Von Shakespeare” 739). 
And as it happens, the characterization of an active protagonist requires just this 
sacrifice, and often. This is because the character of the acting individual is not the result 
of a single climactic event occurring in a single time and place, but rather can be found 
“In jeder ihrer kleinsten Handlungen, Schicksalswechsel und Lebenstößen... In ihrer 
immer regen Gegenwürkung und Geistesgröße…” (“Anmerkungen” 669). For the 
self-determining person, every decision contributes to the whole of their character, and if 
the play as a medium hopes to capture this it is necessary to represent these moments, 
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no matter how distant from one another these moments may be in regards to time or 
space. 
To return to the earlier quote, when Lenz complains about “abgerissenen 
Handlungen” in which the modern audience finds no satisfaction, he is suggesting that it 
is not his plays or those of other Sturm und Drangers, such as Goethe, which suffer from 
fragmentation and incomprehensibility, but rather those modern dramas which continue 
to adhere to the classical unities even though the nature of the world and people has 
changed. These plays are “abgerissen” in the sense that by arbitrarily limiting the scope 
of the action to a single day, a single location, and a single primary act, they have ripped 
the acting character from all context. The audience sees an action, but doesn’t know 
why, has no sense of the thousands of other smaller actions which have led to this 
moment, leading to dissatisfaction “Wir... hassen solche Handlungen, von denen wir die 
Ursache nicht einsehen, und nehmen keinen Teil dran” (“Anmerkung” 652).” So long as 
the acting person is anchoring the events portrayed, the audience has no difficulties 
following a skipping, twisting narrative; in fact, it is first then that a play becomes 
comprehensible. As a negative example, Lenz has sharp words for the recent play, 
L'Honnête Criminel​ by Fenouillot de Falbaire, criticizing the strict adherence to the 
unities of time and place at the cost of intelligibility: “Ich sehe die Sache vor mir, aber ich 
begreife nicht wie sie zugegangen ist... lauter Konklusionen ohne Prämissen” (“Von 
Shakespeares” 742). Lenz is convinced that, like him, the modern audience would 
“zehnmal lieber Zeit und Ort aufgeopfert [sehen]” rather than sacrifice “meine 
Sinnlichkeit auf Unkosten meines gänzlichen Verstandes” (742). Lenz’s argument at its 
core rests upon audience expectations and demands, both of which he contends have 
shifted radically since the time of Aristotle. The modern audience has matured in some 
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significant way, they are “alt genug” that the nature of their interests as well as their 
perceptive abilities have changed. “Woher das Zutrauen zu der Einbildungskraft seines 
Publikums? Weil er sicher war, daß sie sich aus der nämlichen Absicht dort versammlet 
hatten, aus der er aufgetreten war, ihnen einen Menschen zu zeigen, nicht eine 
Viertelstunde” (“Anmerkungen” 669). Strangely, Lenz is referring here to Hans Sachs, 
not Shakespeare, as part of an ill-advised attempt to bolster an imagined dichotomy 
between classicist France and the “nördliche Ländern.” In the end, neither Shakespeare 
nor Sachs matter to Lenz’s theory except as a cipher. They are presented as the key to 
understanding an alternative, emergent history, a history centered on a new 
self-creating, self-determining person.  
Lenz’s theoretical challenge to the world (and, inevitably, himself) is to create 
plays worthy of this new person, that is, plays ordered around an acting individual 
creating their own circumstances and destiny, and not the machinations of an inevitable 
fate as in Aristotle, or Nature hiding in the guise of the genius playwright as Herder 
would have it. And just as importantly, this new form of tragedy is not the arbitrary 
creation of an avant-garde playwright. Lenz places the changes in the form of theater 
external to the theater itself, and certainly beyond the genius creator. Theater is 
changing because something has changed in the world around it: not simply in the 
nature of nature, but specifically in the imagined audiences filling the halls. It is this 
audience which has grown weary of convention based on piety towards the gods and 
fate. It is this audience, unseen but felt, which has become unstuck in time and place. 
And finally, it is this audience who seeks a new center, a new grounding, in the 
self-making person. Lenz’s proposed tragic form seeks both to respond to this demand, 
and to shape it. And by the time “Anmerkung” was published in 1774, Lenz believed that 
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an example of such a work existed in Goethe’s ​Götz von Berlichingen​. In a brief 
introduction added to what was originally a talk presented to the Straßburger Sozietät, 
Lenz dates the talk as originating “zwei Jahre vor Erscheinung der Deutschen Art und 
Kunst und des Götz von Berlichingen” (641). On the one hand, this can be read as 
assertion of originality over and against his colleague Herder, as this places 
“Anmerkung” before “Von Shakespeare.” But in the case of ​Götz ​this temporal location 
has a different resonance. As a play, ​Götz​ represents not a competing theoretical text, 
but the substantiation of the theory proposed, and its mention here is not by way of 
friendly competition, but rather the establishment of a new calendar, marking 1773 as 
anno Götz.  
 In 1775, Lenz would write the essay “Über Götz von Berlichingen,” in order to 
commemorate the literary achievement the play represented. What initially seems odd 
about this essay is Lenz never mentions the form of Goethe’s tragedy, even though ​Götz 
perfectly models every central feature advocated for in “Anmerkung.” In ​Götz​,​ ​Goethe 
sacrifices the traditional unities in favor of the unity of the character Götz. The 
Begebenheiten bend temporally and spatially around the acting protagonist Götz, 
resulting in scene changes which rival the dizzying rapidity of Lenz’s own plays. Rather 
than an oversight, this neglect merely serves to support Lenz’s claim that the change in 
structure is not in and of itself the final cause of the new tragic form. All that interests 
Lenz in ​Götz​ is the character of Götz himself and the effect Lenz believes he can 
produce.  Lenz writes that a play’s worth, its “​cui bono,​” is synonymous with its “Wirkung” 
on the general public, just as the size of a stone can be measured by the waves it 
creates when dropped into water (639). Returning to his comfortable straw man, Lenz 
states that this is precisely where French theater fails, as it is like a fine bottle of 
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champagne, pleasant in the moment but forgotten the next day (excluding a suggested 
hangover). For Lenz this represents squandered opportunity; Lenz is convinced of the 
pedagogical force of the play as a medium, a force which, if correctly harnessed, can 
reshape the entire nation.  ​Götz​ recognizes this potential, and contains “prometheische 39
Funken” which steal unnoticed into the innermost regions of the viewer’s soul; it teaches 
the audience a different way to be in the world, a different way to act. Much as Wieland 
describes the recommended dosage of Lenz’s plays (limited, cautious, a-sequential), 
Lenz prescribes a rigorous program of consumption; “laßt uns dies Buch nicht gleich 
nach der ersten Lesung ungebraucht aus der Hand legen, laßt uns den Charakter… uns 
eigen machen,” “Samt und sonders ahmt Götzen erst nach, lernt erst wieder denken, 
empfinden, handeln” (640, 639). ​Götz​ is not a piece of entertainment, something to be 
passively consumed and forgotten. ​Götz​ is a window into a better world, a world where 
individuals are no longer “Stumme Personen auf dem großen Theater der Welt” whose 
“Hände und Füße [jetzt noch] gebunden sind,” and through reading, watching, but most 
importantly acting out ​Götz​, Lenz believes it is possible to learn a different mode of 
being; “Durchs Nachahmen durchs Agieren drückt sich der Charakter tiefer ein” (640, 
641). To emphasize how serious a proposition this is, Lenz ends the essay with a 
practical discussion of how they, his friends and members of the Straßburger Sozietät, 
could stage ​Götz​, what they would and wouldn’t need for fixtures, who could provide 
music for the scene transitions, how often they should practice before performing.  
39 The positive potential of plays to shape society will be explored in the final section, but it is also 
worth mentioning their destructive potential; in ​Die Soldaten​, Marie’s moral corruption is linked in 
the first instance to attending a comedy of loose morals. It is a play, not the villain Desportes, 
which teaches Marie to forego her bourgeois codex, and it is therefore a play which is responsible 
for her fall. 
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What is curious about Lenz’s theory of theater is, despite devoting nearly all of 
his theoretical energy to defining a new tragic form, despite perceiving a popular 
demand for a new kind of acting character, despite the indication of ​Götz​ as a shining 
example of the potential of the new form, Lenz never wrote a tragedy, never created his 
own Götz. At the same time that Lenz theorized about tragedies, he was exclusively 
writing “Komödie,” but not Komödie in the traditional sense of the word: his plays were 
neither primarily ​funny​ (in the dozens of reviews of his work, only one or two mention 
Lenz’s gift for “humor,” whereas the majority note with irritation his propensity for the 
macabre and bizarre), nor did they deal exclusively or even primarily with the lower 
estates: ​Die Soldaten ​focuses on the fall of a merchant’s daughter, ​Der Hofmeister​ on 
the son of a priest, and ​Der neue Menoza ​on a “foreign” prince. The plays are certainly 
not without comedic elements: they often mimic Shakespearen comedic characters, 
contain physical gags (for example, a naked man in a wolf pelt fleeing from a pack of 
feral dogs) and wordplay. But this comedy exists in uneasy tension with suicide, genital 
mutilation, incest, murder and rape, all of which are handled with an unblinking 
earnestness, causing the moments of laughter to catch in the throat. In this context, 
Wieland’s peevish description of the plays as “Mischspiele” is understandable: they 
seem to haphazardly combine elements of the tragic and comedic genres at random, 
creating unsettling tonal shifts, as unlike the “Champagner” of the French playwrights as 
possibly imaginable. 
But the larger problem which arises as the result of Lenz writing exclusively 
“Komödie” is it removes the justification so carefully laid out in his essays for their 
unusual, fractured form; there is no figure even remotely comparable to Götz in Lenz’s 
plays, no one whose character can be seen as creating themself and the world around 
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them and in so doing, creating a new anchor point for the unity of the play. The central 
figures in Lenz’s plays are often dramaturgically condemned for their choices, but 
thematically it is the tragedy of the circumstances which are foregrounded and not the 
(necessary) reaction which they produced in the protagonist. Nor can it be said that the 
rapid shifts in time and space are exclusively interconnected through showing the 
circumstances of the main character, thereby at least situating their non-voluntary 
actions; Lenz’s Komödie share one feature with traditional comedies in that they are 
sprawling, ensemble affairs and less focused on the “protagonist,” who frequently falls 
out of view for whole scenes or acts at a time. The remainder of this chapter is dedicated 
to explaining the puzzle presented by the form of Lenz’s comedies: first by exploring 
Lenz’s theory of free will and how his urgent quest to reintroduce free will into a 
materially determined universe inevitably failed, and second, by showing how this failure 
led to the creation of a new generic form, one centered on a new actor. This new actor, 
the organizing principle of Lenz’s plays, cannot be described as the will of the gods, as 
in ancient tragedies, the genius author as medium for nature, as posited by Herder, nor 
as the self-making, deciding protagonist shaping the world with free will as suggested by 
Lenz’s theoretical works and modeled by Goethe’s ​Götz​. The invisible hand which 
guides the characters of Lenz’s Komödie (largely to their own doom) is an emergent 
sense of Society itself. These plays depict the fated destruction of the individual through 
the machinations of a supra-human system which is neither natural nor divine, a system 
both of humankind’s own collective making and, potentially, beyond its control. 
 
IV. Synthesizing Free Will and Material Determinism: A failed Resolution of 
Conflicting Enlightenment Ideals 
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Lenz’s continual emphasis on the importance of the ​acting character,​ again the kind of 
person who “sich ihre Begebenheiten erschaffen, die selbstständig und unveränderlich 
die ganze große Maschine selbst drehen, ohne die Gottheiten in den Wolken anders 
nötig zu haben, als wenn sie wollen zu Zuschauern” and the positioning of this figure as 
the unifying principle of tragic theater is no coincidence, but rather based on the nagging 
fear that free will may be an illusion. As Johannes Lehmann showed in his essay 
“Leidenschaft und Sexualität: Materialistische Anthropologie im Sturm und Drang. JR.M. 
Lenz’ ​Die Soldaten​ und Zerbin,” not only must representatives of Sturm und Drang such 
as Lenz be seen as part of the Enlightenment, as an immanent critique thereof instead 
of proto-romanticists, but further that this critique, despite its continual emphasis on 
Geist, Genie, Wille, was deeply influenced by French materialism in general, and the 
works of Baron D’holbach in particular (“Leidenschaft und Sexualität” 181). To greatly 
oversimplify, D’Holbach argues in ​The System of Nature​ that the universe is comprised 
exclusively of matter which is subject only to the laws of physics. This radical materialism 
by necessity disallows the existence of any form of metaphysics; there can be no spirit, 
no soul, no God. D’Holbach’s determinism has clear resonance with tenets central to the 
German Enlightenment of which Sturm und Drang was a part. Materialism offers a 
potent antidote to all forms of Aberglaube, Schwärmerei and religious obscurantism; the 
world is predictable, not through the dark musings of a prophet, but through the rational 
machinations of physical laws. Materialist determinism is also fundamentally egalitarian; 
if all individuals are merely the sum total of their lived experience, it becomes difficult to 
claim superiority on the basis of race, gender, class. Individuals are what they are 
because it is the only thing they could ever have become, and not as the result of sound 
judgement or divine favor. 
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However, D’holbach’s materialism also contained more troubling implications: 
since humans, too, are only matter, and their actions are merely the sum total of the 
external forces which have worked upon that matter, not only does this preclude the 
existence of a soul, but it also eliminates the possibility of free will. This poses a general 
problem to goals central to the Enlightenment project, not least of which, the moral and 
spiritual enlightenment of the general public. Without free will, morality and the idea of 
progress become untenable. Without choice, the question of morality loses all meaning, 
for how can an action be considered moral if it could not have occurred any other way? 
And without morality, progress likewise becomes an empty signifier; without the 
benchmark of morality, how can anything be said to get better if there is only neutral 
change? The possibility that free will is a fiction rings particularly harshly in Lenz’s ears 
(no doubt in part due to the permanent state of financial insecurity in which he lived his 
short life), and his writing is punctuated with the unease that, despite appearances, 
humans may not be masters of their own destinies. Nowhere is this more visible than in 
the introduction to “Über Götz von Berlichingen:” 
Wir werden geboren -- unsere Eltern geben uns Brot und Kleid -- unsere Lehrer 
drücken in unser Hirn Worte, Sprachen, Wissenschaften, -- irgend ein artiges 
Mädchen drückt in unser Herz den Wunsch es eigen zu besitzen, es in unsere 
Arme als unser Eigentum zu schließen, wenn sich nicht gar ein tierisch Bedürfnis 
mit hineinmischt -- es entsteht eine Lücke in der Republik wo wir hineinpassen -- 
unsere Freunde, Verwandte, Gönner setzen an und stoßen uns glücklich hinein 
-- wir drehen uns eine Zeitlang in diesem Platz herum wie die andern Räder und 
stoßen und treiben -- bis wir wenns noch so ordentlich geht abgestumpft sind und 
zuletzt wieder einem neuen Rade Platz machen müssen --- das ist… unsere 
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Biographie --und was bleibt nun der Mensch noch anders als eine 
vorzüglichkünstliche kleine Maschine, die in die große Maschine, die wir Welt, 
Weltbegebenheiten, Weltläufte nennen besser oder schlimmer hineinpaßt. 
What is remarkable in this passage is the extreme passivity of the individual, who exists 
only as the recipient of action from others: parents, teachers, friends, relatives, even the 
first love all put their stamp on the inert clay of the passive individual (and presumably 
are likewise also only the sum total of their societal imprinting). People are only small 
machines within the larger grinding machine, tiny gears which fit better or worse than 
their peers in life, and are quickly replaced after death. If this nightmare is true, then 
humans exist in a world bereft of choice, free will and meaning:  “Aber heißt das gelebt? 
Heißt das seine Existenz gefühlt, seine sebstständige Existenz, den Funken von Gott? 
Ha er muß in was Besserm stecken, der Reiz des Lebens: denn ein Ball anderer zu sein, 
ist ein trauriger nieder drückender Gedanke, eine ewige Sklaverei, eine nur künstlichere, 
eine vernünftige aber eben um dessentwillen desto elenderer Tierschaft.” This paradigm 
which Lenz believes ​Götz​ inverts; the character of Götz is the tiny gear who through 
force of will spins the heavens.  
But how, then, to reconcile the seemingly insurmountable tension which exists 
between a material, deterministic universe and the ideal of free will as represented by 
the figure of Götz, a person who has made himself into the gear which turns the 
universe, modeling a new way of existing in the world? In short, Lenz, like Kant, 
Mendelssohn and countless others, fails to do so convincingly, but in his attempt Lenz 
generates a hybrid model of the human, a being which is simultaneously subject to 
material laws and (theoretically) capable of self-determination, and it is this model which 
serves as the building block for his theatrical works. Lehmann argues that Lenz achieves 
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this hybridity by reintroducing the spirit to the material world, but subjecting this spirit to 
both its own internal (meta)physics, and, since it is housed in a body, to the external 
physics of the world. Humans, according to Lenz’s essay “Versuch über das erste 
Principium der Moral,” are “Hermaphroditen... gedoppelte​ ​Tiere” existing in both the 
physical as well as the spiritual realm (Principium 502). The somewhat flimsy proof he 
offers is two fold: first, all cultures and all peoples fear death--how to account for this if 
we are nothing but matter, just as the worms that eat us after our deaths? The second 
piece of evidence he gives is that there is something substantively different about the 
head vs. all other appendages, that we as beings recognize “Ja dort oben in der 
Zirbeldrüse sitzt etwas, das sagt: Ich bin, und wenn das Etwas fort ist, so hört das Ich bin 
auf.”  This “fremde Herr” is dictated by two separate but interrelated drives, the drive for 
Vollkommenheit, representing the internal source of motivation, and the drive for 
Glückseligkeit, representing the external situatedness of the acting spirit. 
Vollkommenheit is described as “Wir haben von Natur gewisse Kräfte und Fähigkeiten in 
uns, die wir fühlen… bewußt sind -- und jemehr sie sich entwickeln, desto deutlicher 
fühlen… bewußt werden” (503-504). These abilities are relative in that they are specific 
to the individual, but absolute in the sense that God made all people good in the sense 
that he made them perfectible: no matter what those abilities are, they are felt, and the 
individual longs to enhance them. Maintaining the physics parallel, Lenz argues that this 
means that, just as matter is never truly in stasis, the spirit, too, must be in constant 
motion, striving towards the never-achieved self-perfection. 
Lenz was quite literal in his interpolation of external physics into the internal 
realm, arguing that just as Newton had discovered that instead of just one source of 
motion, every reaction in the world produces an equal and opposite reaction, so to must 
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the motion of seeking self-perfection find an equal and opposite corollary, the source of 
which is to be found in the Leidenschaften in general, and Konkupiscenz in particular. 
Lehmann notes that, borrowing from theorists such as Helvétius, Lenz accepted these 
passions as a good and necessary part of the being, as it is in overcoming them and 
striving for perfectibility the soul is put into motion. In “Anmerkung,” Lenz notes that, 
instead of complaining about the needs of the body with the “Hypochondristen,” people 
need to recognize the “sichern Freund” that they have in their physical form, “Der 
Schöpfer hat unserer Seele einen Bleiklumpen angehängt, der wie die Penduln an der 
Uhr sie durch seine niederziehende Kraft in beständiger Bewegung erhält” (647). 
According to Lenz, it is therefore the moral responsibility of the individual to hold this 
motion of the physical form in constant tension with the drive towards Vollkommenheit, to 
enhance the equal and opposite force opposed to the gravity of sensual desire and 
thereby avoid stasis, and with it moral depravity and death. In this, one can draw 
parallels to Lenz’s one time professor, Immanuel Kant (although by most accounts, Lenz 
was a poor and infrequent student); Kant argued that it was only in those actions in 
which one chooses to act against natural inclination and in accordance with a universal 
law that free will becomes imaginable. For if one feels good in, for example, assisting the 
poor, how is it possible to know if this action was the result of choice and not the 
functioning of hidden, mechanical, biological needs? The difference for Lenz is that 
acting in tension with biological need is not only the circumstances under which free will 
becomes thinkable, these same biological needs create the motion within the soul which 
first makes free will possible.  
It is in the state of heightened motion towards the goal of self perfection, against 
the desires of the physical form, that the external experience of Glückseligkeit is first 
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possible. However, the external contingency of Glückseligkeit indicates that, while 
related to Vollkommenheit, Glückseligkeit is of an entirely different nature: “Die 
Vollkommenheit beruht auf uns selber, die Glückseligkeit nicht. Die Vollkommenheit ist 
eine Eigenschaft, die Glückseligkeit ist ein Zustand” (506). What this means in practice is 
that Vollkommenheit is internal to the individual, while Glückseligkeit requires “eine 
gewisse Lage, eine gewisse Relation unsers Selbst mit den Dingen außer uns” (507). 
Put differently, although Lenz refers to both as “drives,” only Vollkommenheit is an 
internal motivation, while the condition of Glückseligkeit is the sum total of the external 
factors upon which Vollkommenheit is contingent, those forces acting upon the body and 
thereby spirit of the individual. As a result, “Der höchste Zustand der Bewegung ist 
unserm Ich der angemessenste, das heißt derjenige Zustand, wo unsere äußern 
Umstände unsere Relationen und Situationen so zusammenlaufen, daß wir das 
größtmöglichste Feld vor uns haben, unsere Vollkommenheit zu erhöhen zu befödern” 
(507). The ideal external situation is that situation which gives the individual the greatest 
degree of freedom to act, with freedom again understood as the ability to hold our 
desires in check, creating energy to strive for our own perfectibility. Lenz describes this 
situation as:  
wir die Fähigkeiten unsers Verstandes, unsers Willens, unserer Empfindungen, 
unserer Phantasei, aller unser untern Seelenkräfte, hernach auch unserer 
Gliedmaßen und unsers Körpers immer mehr entwickeln, verfeinern und erhöhen 
können und zwar in einer gewissen Übereinstimmung der Teile zum Ganzen, in 
einer gewissen Harmonie und Ordnung, welche uns unserer Vernunft, die von 
allen Vorurteilen befreit ist und höchste Oberherrschaft über alle unsere übrigen 
Seelen vermögen erhalten hat, selbst lehren wird. (509) 
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The ideal state is therefore that in which an individual’s Vernunft is the governing force, 
organizing all aspects of the person, all abilities spiritual and physical, bringing them into 
a  “Harmonie und Ordnung.” Again, it is easy to draw parallels to Kant; the reason that 
an individual following the dictates of the categorical imperative is considered “free,” is 
because the categorical imperative itself is, according to Kant, nothing more than the law 
which the individual’s own reason dictates, namely that one act such that your actions 
could be universal law. Free will for Kant has nothing to do with free choice: the only 
choice ​is to choose to counteract animal nature and sensory input; anything else are 
simply the immoral actions of a biological machine. While Lenz’s version of free will is 
similar in that it is an active choice against the body’s natural inclination (in particular 
Konkupiszenz), it bears more similarity to the modern conception in that this 
counter-motion provides only the initial impulse and hopefully results in creative action, 
pursuing one’s own perfection. 
 Situating the deciding spirit within a material body subject to external 
circumstances, and making the possibility of exercising free will contingent on those 
external circumstances has drastic consequences; by granting the physical world ingress 
to the soul, Lenz allows for all manner of interference to an individual’s ability to lead a 
just and happy life. The fact that a person is poor, a woman, a soldier, a hired hand, etc. 
must all be taken into account when calculating the ​possibility​ of just action, and it is 
entirely thinkable for external circumstance to prevent an individual from stabilizing their 
internal economy, and therefore to be physically incapable of achieving anything like 
freedom of choice. Lenz recognizes the significance of this interference, and as a result, 
raises the necessity of generating the aforementioned “größtmöglichste Feld” for free 
action to a moral imperative: “Wir müssen suchen andere um uns herum glücklich zu 
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machen… nicht allein ihre Fähigkeiten zu entwickeln, sondern auch sie in solche 
Zustände zu setzen, worin sie ihre Fähigkeiten am besten entwickeln können. Wenn 
jeder diesen Vorsatz in sich zur Reife und zum Leben kommen läßt, so werden wir eine 
glückliche Welt haben” (510). Lenz fully admits that “diese Welt, ist keine solche Welt. 
Jeder sorgt nur für seinen eignen Zustand, für den Zustand seines Nachbaren aber 
schließt er die Augen zu,” with the result that many individuals simply are not free.  
Once again, it is easy to draw parallels to Kant. Writing some 14 years later, Kant 
argued in ​Metaphysik der Sitten,​ that, to be qualified for citizenship within a state, an 
individual must possess both civil equality and civil independence and should recognize 
no laws but those to which they have freely assented. In so doing, Kant also recognized 
the limitations placed on the individual by social structures, as these stipulations 
necessarily precluded large portions of the population from participation in the state, 
namely anyone who is “von anderen Individuen befehligt oder beschützt” (Kant 315) 
Kant provides a long litany of people thereby excluded from true citizenship, including 
specifically “der Unmündige,” “alles Frauenzimmer,” as well as “der Hauslehrer in 
Vergleichung mit dem Schulmann.” Perhaps the most significant feature of this list is that 
it universally bans individuals limited to the private sphere from civic participation; 
anyone who lives or works under a patriarch lacks both the equality and independence 
required to contribute to the state. This is because, for members of these groups, their 
lives and their decisions are not truly their own; they are under the immediate control of 
the Hausherr, a person who has the unquestioned authority to dictate their actions, be 
that person their husband, father or employer. However, Kant places much stricter limits 
on the range and scope of the effects the physical world can have on the individual spirit: 
for while Kant argues that their dependence necessarily bars them civic participation, he 
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distinguishes this from their ​fundamental ​equality and freedom as human beings. While 
this may seem hollow comfort to those bereft of all political agency, for Kant this is an 
important distinction, because it ensures that even the subservient members of society, 
so long as they are rational beings, are capable of following, regardless to external 
circumstances, the dictates of the categorical imperative. This is what makes the 
categorical imperative ​categorical​, that it applies to ​and can be successfully followed by 
all rational beings, regardless of class, gender and, theoretically, even species. The 
categorical imperative is derived of the rational mind itself; it is ​imperative ​because it is 
the law which the mind dictates for itself and would wish on all others.  
There is a stoic optimism and comfort in Kant’s philosophy which is noticeably 
absent from both Lenz’s theory and, more markedly, plays. For Kant, the possibility of 
free will is contingent on no external circumstances, and cannot be damaged by any 
degree of abuse or inequality; even the individual suffering torture can still chose to 
follow the categorical imperative, and, for example, chose not to lie in order to end their 
suffering. To bring this difference into sharper focus, as mentioned earlier, not only can 
external, physical influences not prevent the exercise of free will, it is in overcoming the 
obstacles presented in front of it that possibility of free will can be most clearly observed; 
how else to explain the person who refuses to break under torture, or who gives up their 
friend to the police despite personal sentiment?  In his attempt to fuse the metaphysics 40
of the soul with the material physics of D’Holbach, Lenz created instead a system which 
highlighted the fragility of the possibility of free will. Free will is the result of an internal 
40 Christoph Horn adds an interesting possibility to this standard reading of Kant in his 2016 
article “Kant’s Political Philosophy as a Theory of Non-Ideal Normativity,” in which he suggests a 
continuity between Kant’s earlier moral philosophy and his later political philosophy, a continuity 
which indicates a waning faith in the possibility of individuals acting free from external coercion.  
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overcoming of the desires of the flesh through the opposite reaction of a reasoning mind 
and, in isolation, is achievable by all humans. Humans, however, do not exist in isolation 
and worse still, the vast majority of them live lives of servitude, and as such are unable 
to dictate the course of their own actions, instead completely dependent on the will of 
some “Herr,” and not their own reason. For Lenz, free will is therefore contingent on 
external circumstances. The recurring bogey-men of soldiers are a danger to society 
because they are, by definition, not masters of their own destiny, but instead follow the 
direct orders of their superiors, thereby preventing them from taking the actions 
necessary to achieve equilibrium in their internal economies. As discussed in the final 
section,​ ​I believe it is the confrontation with contingency of free will for the majority of 
society which prevented Lenz from writing his own ​Götz​, and led to the creation of a new 
genre, one which through its structure highlighted the deterministic qualities of the 
everyday, and heralded the birth of a new “eisernes Schicksal,” Society.  
 
V. Society as Comedy of the Unfree  
Of “Anmerkungen Übers Theater’s” 30 pages, less than two pages are dedicated to the 
subject of comedy. Nor does there exist a parallel essay which lays out the theory of 
Lenz’s genre of choice in detail: in “Rezionsion des neuen Menoza,” comedy is once 
again dealt with at the margins of topics dearer to Lenz’s heart: free will, tragedy and the 
centrality of the acting character. Within these few pages, Lenz offers three interrelated 
explanations of the nature and function of comedy as he understands it: first, Lenz 
returns to an ancient understanding of comedy as “low,” that is, geared towards a 
popular audience. Second, he argues that comedies are the form in which the 
Begebenheiten are prioritized over the Personen, and that these events are organized 
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around a central idea. Finally, and partially in combination of the first two definitions, 
Lenz posits the comedy as a “Gemälde der Gesellschaft,” a tool intended to capture and 
shape the sum total of human interactions. This section will explore the audience/many 
focused nature of Lenz’s invented genre of choice, briefly examine modern criticism that 
Lenz’s works lacked true critical force, and conclude by suggesting Lenz’s self-created 
position as social-physicist uniquely opened his works to societal shifts, allowing them to 
serve as the mouthpiece for a non-identical Many. 
It is not difficult to find passages in Lenz’s essay that would seem to support a 
simplistic understanding of comedy as “low” entertainment, that is, entertainment for the 
masses. In “Rezension der Neue Menoza,” Lenz writes  “Die Komödien jener [den alten 
Griechen]...  waren für das Volk und der Unterschied von Lachen und Weinen war nur 
eine Erfindung späterer Kunstrichter,” a definition which he seemingly takes into the 
modern moment with no modification “Ich nenne durchaus Komödie nicht eine 
Vorstellung die Bloß Lachen erregt, sondern eine Vorstellung die für jedermann ist. 
Tragödie ist nur für den ernsthaftern Teil des Publikums, der Helden der Vorzeit in ihrem 
Licht anzusehen und ihren Wert auszumessen im Stande ist” (“Rezension der Neue 
Menoza” 703). Comedies are for “das Volk” in its entirety, whereas the tragedy is aimed 
at a more rarified audience, one capable of understanding and appreciating the actions 
taking place on stage. This same thread of comedy as the genre for the multitudes 
continues in the brief introduction Lenz provided to the translation of “Love’s Labor’s 
Lost:”   41
41 This is the ​only​ bridge Lenz provides his essay and the translated work, and after highlighting 
“Anmerkung’s” heavy tragedy-focus, the consternation of his reviewers over the inclusion of a 
lesser known comedy is perhaps understandable. 
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Wer noch Magen hat und ich kann ihm mit einem bisher unübersetzten -- 
Volksstück -- Komödie, von Shakespearn aufwarten…. Mensch, in jedem 
Verhältnis gleich bewandert, gleich stark, schlug er ein Theater fürs ganze 
menschliche Geschlecht auf, wo jeder stehn, staunen, sich freuen, sich 
wiederfinden konnte, vom obersten bis zum untersten. Seine Könige und 
Königinnen schämen sich so wenig als der niedrigste Pöbel, warmes Blut im 
schlagenden Herzen zu fühlen, oder kützelnder Galle in schalkhaftem Scherzen 
Luft zu machen, denn sie sind Menschen, auch unterm Reifrock, kennen keine 
Vapeurs, sterben nicht vor unsern Augen in müßiggehenden Formularen dahin, 
kennen den tötenden Wohlstand [Anstand] nicht. (“Anmerkungen” 671) 
Here “Komödie” is directly equated with “Volksstück,” but another element begins to 
crystalize, the hybridity of the comedic audience. Comedies are not ​exclusively​ for the 
lower strata of society, but rather attempt something more difficult, namely to capture a 
human truth which finds resonance in all portions of society. The diversity opposite the 
stage is reflected on it, with everyone from “Könige” to the “niedrigste Pöbel” able to see 
themselves represented, and through this representation “staunen, sich freuen, sich 
wiederfinden.” It is this doubled diversity which makes comedy “ein Theater fürs ganze 
menschliche Geschlecht.”  
The parallel diversity of stage and audience is a diversity of purpose: rather than 
simply reflecting that which is, Lenz imagines comedy as a specific kind of intervention. 
Lenz contends that comedy in its modern understanding, that is comedy as humor, took 
this form as writers began to understand that “der gröbere Teil des Volks geneigter zum 
Lachen als zum Weinen sein, und je näher es dem Stande der Wildheit oder dem 
Hervorgehn aus demselbigen, destomehr sich seine Komödien dem Komischen nährern 
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mußten” (“Der neue Menoza” 703). Lenz seeks to access this “Wildheit” of the lower 
social strata, not simply to increase the popularity of his productions, but because he 
seeks to reform the audience: “Daher müssen unsere deutschen Komödienschreiber 
komisch und tragisch zugleich schreiben, weil das Volk, für das sie schreiben, oder doch 
wenigstens schreiben sollten, ein solcher Mischmasch von Kultur und Rohigkeit, 
Sittigkeit und Wildheit ist. So erschafft der komische Dichter dem tragischen sein 
Publikum.” The tragic-comic nature of comedies as Lenz conceived, both reflects society 
as it exists, and is a pedagogical tool designed to create a new audience, a new society. 
Comedy is therefore a transitional genre, a critique which serves to indicate the gap 
between the world which is, and the world as it should be. By indicating that the 
audience for the tragedy as described in “Anmerkung” does not yet exist, Lenz indirectly 
explains the absence his own ​Götz​; ​Götz ​shows a kind of freedom which remains 
unintelligible to the life experience of the majority of society. As a result, Lenz’s call to 
arms at the end of “Über Götz von Berlichingen” is perhaps not as general as it first 
appears: Götz in this light seems specifically tailored to a group such as the Straßburger 
Sozietät, one capable not only of understanding the significance of Götz as an acting 
individual but, through a process of reenacting, potentially able to recreate the manner of 
living which it depicts within their own lives. Again, ​Götz ​is significant for Lenz because 
of its utopian potential. Despite being a historical tragedy, i.e. describing an 
already-failed attempt of an individual to exert their will in the greater world, Lenz 
believes that the character Götz nevertheless models a different kind of being in the 
world, demonstrating the potential of an individual properly harnessing their internal 
economy, and temporarily free from the external constraints which could inhibit the 
exercise of a free, creative will. From this shining example, the audience should learn:  
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[D]aß handeln, handeln die Seele der Welt sei... daß wir dadurch allein Gott 
ähnlich werden, der unaufhörlich handelt und unaufhörlich an seinen Werken 
sich ergötzt: das lernen wir daraus, daß die in uns handelnde Kraft, unser Geist, 
unser höchstes Anteil sei, daß die allein unserm Körper mit allen seinen 
Sinnlichkeiten und Empfindungen das wahre Leben... gebe, daß ohne denselben 
all unser Genuß all unsere Empfindungen, all unser Wissen doch nur ein Leiden, 
doch nur ein aufgeschobener Tod sind. Das lernen wir daraus, daß diese unsre 
handelnde Kraft nicht eher ruhe, nicht eher ablasse zu wirken, zu regen, zu 
toben, als bis sie uns Freiheit um uns her verschafft, Platz zu handeln, guter Gott 
Platz zu handeln, und wenn es ein Chaos wäre das du geschaffen, wüste und 
leer, aber Freiheit wohnte nur da und wir könnten dir nachahmend drüber brüten, 
bis was herauskäme -- Seligkeit! Seligkeit! Göttergefühl das! (“Über Götz” 638) 
Not only does Götz himself act with a rare freedom (a freedom at least in part made 
possible through his exalted position within society), in the idealized form presented by 
Goethe, Götz attempts through revolution to follow the Lenzian Imperative, namely to 
help create the possibility of exercising free will for those less fortunate. 
Compared with ​Götz​, the comedies of Lenz have an entirely different purpose; 
rather than show the potential of the world as it could be, they are a shocking reminder 
of the cruelty of the world as it is, and it is in this context that Lenz’s description of the 
comedic form as a “Gemälde” must be understood: ​“​Komödie ist Gemälde der 
menschlichen Gesellschaft, und wenn die ernsthaft wird, kann das Gemälde nicht 
lachend werden,” (“Rezension des neuen Menoza” 703). This also helps explain the 
vehemence with which Lenz denied the accusations that his works were “erfunden,” 
simply the surreal ramblings of an over-imaginative mind. Lenz describes his process for 
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creating ​Menoza​ as “Ich habe gegen diesen Menschen [Prinz Tandi] gewöhnliche 
Menschen meines Jahrhunderts abstechen lassen, aber immer mit dem mir einmal 
unumstößlich angenommnen Grundgesetz für theatralische Darstellung, zu dem 
Gewöhnlichen, ich möcht es die trefende Ähnlichkeit heißen, eine Verstärkung eine 
Erhöhung hinzuzutun, die uns die Alltagscharaktere im gemeinen Leben auf dem 
Theater anzüglich interessant machen kann” (701).  Not coincidentally, Lenz claims this 42
was also Shakespeare’s genius, his ability to represent “Die Mannigfaltigkeit der 
Charaktere und Psychologien,” which Lenz posits as “Fundgrube der Natur… sie allein 
bestimmt die unendliche Mannigfaltigkeit der Handlungen und Begebenheiten in der 
Welt” (“Anmerkungen” 661). The ordering here is important: even in the absence of a 
free actor such as Götz, both the Handlung and the Begebenheiten contained within it 
are the result of the complex web of interactions between the realistically depicted 
“Psychologien” and “Charaktere” of the figures within the play. One of Lenz’s chief 
grievances against Voltaire and other French playwrights is that their plays are too 
artificed, they are “willkürlich zusammengesetzten Fabel, die nur in den Wünschen des 
Dichters… nicht in den Charaktern den Grund hat” (662). Lenz compares these works 
repeatedly with carefully choreographed “Tänze,” inhabited only by 
“Marionettenpuppen.” Their actions seem false, and their words ring hollow, and Lenz 
suggests amusingly that the audience can hear Voltaire’s “Perücke” in every elegant turn 
of phrase. The resulting work is therefore “nicht ein Gemälde der Natur, sondern seiner 
[Voltaires] eigenen Seele” (661). 
42 In the case of ​Menoza​, Prinz Tandi functions as a perfect foil against these slightly exaggerated 
figures of the real world, and is described as “ “Ein Mensch, der alles, was ihm vorkommt, ohne 
Absichten schätzt,” thereby acting as an audience stand-in.  
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It is significant that Lenz uses “Gemälde der Natur” to describe comedy while 
elsewhere he refers to it as a “Gemälde der Gesellschaft.” This interchangeability 
suggests that in the move from tragedy to comedy, Lenz has moved closer to both 
Herder, and the formulations of Aristotle: “Die Hauptempfindung in der Komödie ist 
immer die Begebenheit, die Hauptempfindung in der Tragödie ist die Person, die 
Schöpfer ihrer Begebenheiten” (668). The only difference between this definition and 
that of Aristotle is, first, that it is describing a comedy and not a tragedy and second, that 
it qualifies the importance of each with the addition of “Empfindung.” The parallels to 
Herder seem even closer: Herder’s definition of the tragedy as the genius channeling 
nature, reflecting God’s divine creation through their own creation, orchestrating figures 
who appear to be acting “im Wahn des Freyen” around a central idea, finds almost exact 
expression in “Anmerkung:” “Meiner Meinung nach wäre immer der Hauptgedanke einer 
Komödie eine Sache, einer Tragödie eine Person… Die Personen sind für die 
Handlungen da -- für die artigen Erfolge, Wirkungen, Gegenwirkungen, ein Kreis 
herumgezogen, der sich um eine Hauptidee dreht -- und es ist eine Komödie” (669). 
According to Lenz’s theory, therefore, a comedy functions as a hybrid: part reflection of 
nature/society, part artifice of the author. The characters must behave and speak as 
someone of their station would, and taken together, their interactions determine the 
course of the Handlung. In other words, it is only collectively, unconsciously that they 
shape the Begebenheiten of the play, and the author, by arranging them around a 
central idea, can control the course these Begebenheiten take. The figures act ​as if ​they 
were free, but in reality their trajectories are entirely calculable, like that of a flying 
“Bombe.” “Im Trauerspiele aber sind die Handlungen um der Person willen da -- sie 
stehen also nicht in meiner Gewalt… sondern sie stehen bei der Person, die ich 
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darstelle. In der Komödie aber gehe ich von den Handlungen aus, und lasse Personen 
Teil dran nehmen welche ich will.” Like the imagined audience in front of which they 
presented, and unlike the figure of Götz, they are “unmündig,” unaccountable for their 
own actions which are merely the product of natural temperament interacting with 
external circumstance.  
One of the accusations often leveled by modern-day critics against Lenz’s 
theatrical works is that they either fail to serve as a critique for society as it existed in the 
late 18th century, or more charitably, while these plays successfully capture the 
problems plaguing society, Lenz was unaware of their true (economic, class-based) 
causes, a type of analysis which would have to wait another fifty years. In Franz 
Werner’s 1981 dissertation, ​Soziale Unfreiheit und 'bürgerliche Intelligenz' im 18. 
Jahrhundert: Der organisierende Gesichtspunkt in J.M.R. Lenzens Drama “Der 
Hofmeister oder Vorteile der Privaterziehung​,​” ​he describes Lenz’s comedic form in the 
following manner: 
[D]ie Komödie [erweist sich] als die geeignete literarische Gattung, Verhältnisse 
darzustellen, die sich stärker als das Individuum erweisen. Nicht im Sinne 
dessen, was lachen macht, sondern die Erfahrung der Unfreiheit, 
Fremdbestimmung, Entfremdung von der Gesellschaft und Bitterkeit der 
Ohnmacht werden auf der Inhaltsebene zum Konstitutiven Definitionsmerkmal 
einer Komödie.” (206)  
Werner, therefore, recognizes Lenz’s genre of comedy as an attempt to capture the 
unfreedom of modern existence. However, Werner’s central thesis, as indicated by the 
title, is that ​Hofmeister​ is first and foremost an autobiographical work, and as such, that 
“das Movens” of the piece​ ​were Lenz’s own experiences of “Unfreiheit,” specifically 
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during his time as Hofmeister, but also more generally as part of the underprivileged 
“bürgerliche Intelligenz” (213). Werner argues that this autobiographical perspective 
necessarily blinds Lenz to the systemic nature of the problems, causing Lenz to instead 
universalize his own personal feelings of alienation. As a result, instead of creating a 
critique of the inequities of the current status quo, Lenz seeks resolution through 
improbable personal solutions (for example, characters winning the lottery or inexplicably 
escaping from prison off stage). Worse, Werner holds that as ​comedies​, Lenz’s plays 
enact a public catharsis designed to remove the “Bedrohliche” from social injustices, and 
in so doing, “die Ausweglosigkeiten der Realität durch Bagatellisierung zu bewältigen” 
(209). Through this process, Werner contends that both the direness of the situation of 
the subaltern, as well as the culpability of those in power, is weakened and effectively 
defanged. As such, Lenz’s ​Hofmeister​ is ​only​ a “Gemälde” and not a “Protest,” and by 
provoking “Überlegene und Unterlegene auch über das gleiche [zu lachen],” Lenz 
creates a false “Gruppensolidarität:”  “[wer] eine Kritik Ernst machen will, muß auf das 
Lachen verzichten” (212). The chapter concludes that Lenz “war nicht mutig genug, den 
‘Kleinen’ die Würde des Tragischen zuzugestehen und die ‘Großen’ der Komik des 
Lächerlichen preiszugeben,” and as such reveals himself to be merely a “bürgerlicher 
Aufklärer.” 
Michael Thiele is much more charitable in his 2014 essay, “Der Pietistische 
Schulmeister, der Aufgeklärte Hofmeister?: Lenz und Brecht schreiben Schule.” Unlike 
Werner, Thiele does not strip Lenz of his critical potential, and convincingly describes 
Lenz’s writing as an “einheitliches Schreibprogramm,” highlighting that Lenz made no 
distinction between his theoretical and theatrical texts. According to Thiele, the central 
problem this “Schreibprogramm” sought to address was: 
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Wie eine allumfassende ganzheitliche Selbstbildung, die alle Talente des 
Individuums harmonisch, echt und tabufrei hin zu vollständigen autonomen 
Menschen ausformt, zu vermitteln ist mit seine Eingründung in eine Gesellschaft, 
die sich von einem ständisch aufgebauten geschlossenen zu einem funktional 
ausdifferenzierten offenen System hinbewegt. (Thiele 80). 
In other words, to explore the possibility of an individual reconciling their inner impulse 
towards Vollkommenheit with the necessary external material circumstances, resulting in 
Glückseligkeit.  But like Werner, Thiele concentrates almost exclusively on Lenz’s 
proposed solutions to this problem, rather than the writing from in which the problem is 
posed. And indeed, it is difficult to overlook Lenz’s “solutions,” since they are utterly 
bizarre by modern standards; for while Lenz determined the central problem to be a 
“Kluft zwischen Trieb und Gesellschaft,” Thiele notes that the solutions offered to this 
problem tend to be purely authoritarian. In other words, Lenz seeks to close the gap 
between the desires of the individual and societal reality, not through ushering in the 
potentially chaotic “Platz zu handeln” so adamantly argued for in “Über Götz von 
Berlichingen,” but rather through modifying the internal economy of the individual 
through authoritarian state intervention. In order to curb the “Konkupiszanz” at the core 
of the moral economy, Lenz suggested “staatlich unterhaltenen Pflanzschule… das sind 
Soldatenbordelle mit vom König besoldeten Konkubinen… eine Eheerlaubnis für die bis 
dahin zur Ehelosigkeit verurteilten Soldaten und weitet diese zu einem Programm 
militärischer Erziehung aus, das zu einer nahezu kompletten Söldnerisierung in 
sämtlichen Ständen der Gesellschaft führen würde” (Thiele 80). By connecting these 
strategies to Lenz’s pietistic upbringing, Thiele is much more convincingly able to argue 
for the fundamental conservatism of Lenz’s writings, as well as indicate his potential 
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misdiagnosis of the problems plaguing 18th-century society, before concluding that it 
was only much later in Brecht’s 20th-century production of “Der Hofmeister” that the 
economic, systemic inequalities responsible were addressed.  
The limitation to these approaches is, by focusing on the (auto)biographical 
components of Lenz’s writing along with his too private, insufficiently systemic solutions, 
they neglect the most important aspect of Lenz’s writing: form. For it is in the form, both 
in his plays and theoretical writings, that something new emerges. To recapitulate the 
core principles of Lenz’s comedic form: it contains representations of people from 
various estates, talking, behaving and interacting as realistically as possible, that is, not 
as in a choreographed “dance,” but as if operating in accordance with their own will. 
Collectively, their actions combine to create the Begebenheiten of the play, and with 
them, the Handlung. This Handlung neither adheres to the Aristotelian unities, nor do the 
scattered scenes focus around the actions of a single acting protagonist, as suggested 
by Lenz’s tragic ideal. Instead, all of the elements “[drehen] sich um eine Hauptidee.” 
Schmid already noted this organizational pattern in his assessment of Lenz’s oeuvre: 
“Seine Schauspiele habe ausserdem das Eigne, daß sie zur Bestätigung eines 
philosophischen Satzes geschrieben sind; der Hofmeister, um der Privaterziehung, der 
romantische neue Menoza, um mit Herder des kultivirten Europa zu spotten” 
(“Fortsetzung der kritischen Nachrichten” 183). But Schmid implies a degree of 
intentionality which I do not believe was the primary organizing force of Lenz’s work; 
Lenz operated under rigorous, self-imposed laws of authenticity.  This is evidenced by 
both his disdain for hearing Voltaire’s “wig” in the overly polished words of Voltaire’s 
characters, regardless of economic station, and also in his description of his protagonist 
Prinz Tandi as “Ein Mensch, der alles, was ihm vorkommt, ohne Absichten schätzt,” a 
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character trait which Lenz lauds as “in unserm eigennützigen Jahrhundert der einzige 
hochachtungswürdige Mensch” (“Rezension des neuen Menoza” 700). Lenz has tasked 
himself with the creation of a world parallel to the existing world, one in which the 
inhabitants operate under the same material laws, are affected by the same internal 
libidinal economies conflicting with external circumstance. Lenz is a physicist and his 
plays are a laboratory; he places the pieces and charts motion, action-reaction.  
Lenz’s sense of objectivity prevents him from moment to moment meddling with 
the internal economy of the figures presented. Figures such as the Geheimer Rat in 
Hofmeister​, Tandi in ​Menoza​, and Eisenhardt in ​Soldaten​ are often indicated as Lenz’s 
mouthpieces within his plays, voicing theories or proposals mirrored in Lenz’s theoretical 
works and therefore theoretically indicating the ​true​ meaning or intent of the play. But 
these figures are subject to the same laws as all other actors within the world of the play, 
and their opinions are colored, situated and often undermined by the events which 
surround them. The Geheimer Rat expounds to Läuffer’s father that his son’s fall is 
exclusively the result of his ​choice ​to become a Hofmeister. As a result, Läuffer is 
directly culpable for all of the misfortune which befalls him over the course of the play. In 
so doing, the Geheimer Rat echoes Lenz’s own fears for the free will (or lack thereof) of 
domestic servants, as well as Lenz’s critiques of private vs. public education. But the 
audience also knows that Läuffer’s “choice” was hardly that, since the play opens with 
Läuffer bemoaning his impossible position, that he is too young to become a pastor like 
his father, too poor to continue his studies at the university, and has no chance of 
obtaining a state position--all problems the Geheimer Rat even tacitly recognizes. In the 
interim, Läuffer must eat, and like his father before him, the only possible position for him 
at this age is that of Hofmeister. It is because these opinions are always situated within a 
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larger context, because the world Lenz creates is not a carefully orchestrated explication 
of a theory, but rather a dynamic world operating in accordance with immutable laws, 
that Lenz’s own theories often ring hollow or improbable. The audience is free to draw 
conclusions other than those provided by the author. This is why Werner’s critique, that 
Lenz offers only private solutions to a systemic problem, a truth which Lenz’s bürgliche 
perspective blinds him to, is so empty. In a later chapter, Werner attempts to 
demonstrate how the private alienation Lenz felt was universalized in ​Hofmeister​, 
enumerating all of the relationships within the play and showing them all to be in various 
stages of dissolution. What Werner fails to recognize is that a systemic problem is 
hidden in plain sight; by Werner’s own account, every relationship is clearly, visibly 
poisoned by creeping economic inequities and the increasing fungibility of the 
interpersonal. That Lenz himself may not have correctly determined the root cause of the 
problem is irrelevant; the problem is there, and sows great disquiet in both the figures on 
the stage and in the minds of the audience. It is also for this reason that Werner’s 
contention that the laughter caused by Lenz’s plays was a cathartic release of tensions 
which built a false sense of “Gemeinde” on top of ongoing systemic inequality, is itself 
laughable. In the 200+ years that people have been reading and viewing Lenz’s plays, 
no one has ever left with the warm assurance that “things are really not as bad as they 
seem!” The laughter which these plays evoke is a nervous, skittering laughter of unease: 
these are plays which gnaw, plays which produce an uncertainty which lingers and 
puzzles, as reflected by their reception both then and now. These plays reveal difficulties 
which are both private and public. The figures within them are both victims of 
circumstance and also implicated in their grim fates.  
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 This is because the “Hauptidee” of Lenz’s comedies is revealed to be Society 
itself. It is this emergent sense of a collective force comprised of individuals but greater 
than any single element which is the acting character shaping the Begebenheiten of the 
play to its will--“individual” here understood not in the modern sense of individuality, the 
unique self, but rather a strictly relational term in the sense of separated-off, dislodged 
from traditional bonds and reconfiguring in a heterogenous group defined by exclusion. It 
is in the service of Society that time and space tear, bombarding the audience with 
“Schattengemälde” blinking rapidly one after the other before a blinding light. Society is 
the “Hauptidee,” not because this was the intent of the theorist Lenz, but because this is 
what the combined physics of a diversity of believable humans acting under modern 
circumstances reveal. This accounts for the gap between Lenz’s theoretical ideal, the 
tragedy which serves as a pedagogical model for the possibility of a new kind of human 
existence, and the reality of his literary production, comedies marked by unfreedom and 
temporal and spatial disruption. Lenz claims that he chose this form in order to create 
the audience of tomorrow, to shape the heterogeneous population before him into one 
which was homogenous in its universal enlightenment and personal freedom. But it 
would be more accurate to state that it was this heterogeneous audience, this unseen, 
unknown, uncharacterizable Many, which chose the form for him, coauthoring plays 
which allowed for an expression of a new kind of existence cresting from the rubble of 
traditional society. The next chapter will explore a parallel developing crowd-media, the 
journalistic form as represented by the explosion of enlightenment journals at the end of 
the 18th century.  
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Chapter 3: Reaching for the Many 
This chapter examines the rise of Enlightenment journals and journalistic writing at the 
end of the 18th century. It begins by detailing the physical form, circulation, and reading 
practices upon which these journals were built, before transitioning to the open, iterative, 
a-disciplinary form of writing which developed alongside them. This writing form is read 
as a dialectic motion, on the one hand the result of popular pressure from an unseen, 
heterogeneous public, and on the other hand as an active attempt by journal authors 
and editors to (re)incorporate this non-identical Many through the collaborative 
enlightenment of society. The chapter ends by examining the works of Christian Garve 
as an example of the penetrative force of the will of this Many, demonstrating the way in 
which even his traditional scholarly books must be re-imagined as an extension of the 
same journalistic impulse. 
 
I. A Changing Audience, a Changing Medium 
When the first issue of the ​Braunschweigisches Journal ​was published in January of 
1788, it represented the newest entry in a crowded field, the enlightened monthly 
journal. Already five years earlier when the first issue of the ​Berlinische Monatsschrift 
was published, editors Johann Erich Biester and Friedrich Gedike wrote:  “Unter den 
vortreflichen, guten, mittelmäßigen und schlechten periodischen Schriften, womit unser 
Vaterland vereichert, beschenkt, überschwemmt, und heimgesucht wird,-- tritt nun auch 
unserer Berlinische Monatsschrift auf...”, before restating pages later in the article “Die 
neue Monatsschrift: Eine Allegorie:” 
Kannst du sie zählen, die drängende Schaar der funkelnden Sterne, 
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Dort an des Himmels Gewölb? -- 
Zählen -- sie rollen dahin, dein spähendes Auge verirrt sich 
In der unendlichen Zahl. 
Tausende steigen am Himmel empor, und tausende sinken 
Nieder in Oceans Schooß… (Biester and Gedike 1) 
Over 6000 new journals emerged between 1700-1790, with the “überschwemmung” only 
getting more severe in the last the last three decades of the 18th century (McCarthy 
177). However, as implied by the “tausende sinken… Nieder in Oceans Schooß,” the 
vast majority of these new publications would disappear just as quickly; successful 
journals typically had a run of 1-2 years, and it was even more common for a new 
publication to collapse after only a few issues. Periodicity likewise often suffered as 
publishers and editors struggled to keep subscriptions high enough (and payment of 
subscriptions regular enough) to defray the costs of publication, while simultaneously 
maintaining a flow of articles, either through soliciting articles or self-authorship, 
sufficient to sustain frequent publication (Fischer 19). By this metric, the 
Braunschweigisches ​was a solid if not remarkable success, running monthly without 
interruption for four years between 1788 and 1791, but still paling in comparison to the 
titans of the industry, such as Wieland’s ​Teutsche Merkur ​(16 years)​,​ Friedrich Nicolai’s 
Allgemeine deutsche Bibliothek ​(32 years), or the ​Berlinische Monatsschrift​ (14 years). 
These numbers are somewhat misleading, however; the ​Braunschweigisches 
represented merely one iteration in a chain of related publications by its publishers, 
Joachim Campe, Johann Stuve and Ernst Christian Trapp. It continued a discussion 
begun in the mixed-media publication ​Allgemeinen Revision des gesammten Schul- und 
Erziehungswesens​, a conversation which was once more picked up in 1792 after the 
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disappearance by the ​Braunschweigisches Journal ​by the ​Schleswigsches Journal​--in 
the second case, the relocation was an attempt to escape the the heightened censorship 
pressures imposed by the Wöllnersche Religionsedikt of 1788, just as the the 
Berlinische, Teutsche ​and ​Allgemeine​ would all have “neue” affixed to their titles in the 
early 1790’s (Kerstin 277). 
Information is scarce regarding the subscription numbers of the Enlightenment 
journals which emerged in the last three decades of the 18th century, and even less can 
be concretely stated about the specific makeup of the population of subscribers. 
Subscription took various forms in the 18th century: journals could be ordered through 
Pränumeration, a system of preorder unique to German book fairs, or via a monthly 
subscription directly through the publisher or second hand through a local bookstore, 
depending on location. In its first year, the ​Braunschweigisches Journal​ had 750 
subscribers, a number which again marked it as a not-unheard-of success: the 
Braunschweigisches ​was dwarfed by ​Merkur’s​ peak of 2500 copies sold (although this 
number had already shrunk to a more comparable 800 copies by 1783), but its numbers 
were comfortably above 500 copies considered necessary for sustained publishing, 
putting it close to the ideal of 1000 sold, of which 750 would typically be subscribers 
(Kerstin 277, McCarthy 179, 188). 750 subscribers, however, should not be mistaken for 
750 readers (or perhaps more accurately, a broader idea of “consumers”); the nature of 
the individual subscriber varied from private individuals to institutions such as 
booksellers, universities, Leihbibliotheken and Lesegesellschaften (Haefs 336). The 
exact make-up of the readership, real and imagined, will be the subject of speculation 
throughout this chapter, but at this point it is worth mentioning some basic statistics on 
literacy. Of the private individuals who subscribed, it is likely that many were themselves 
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fellow-authors: writing had become a viable source of (typically supplemental) income as 
early as 1730, with rapid expansion of the profession in the tail-end of the century, the 
number of authors increasing from 2000-3000 in 1766 to 10,000 by 1800 (McCarthy 176, 
Fischer 20). Beyond those actively employed as writers, another large percentage of the 
readership would have belonged to the traditional “Gelehrten,” a vaguely circumscribed 
group which included Beamten, the clergy, and scholars, whose total numbers are 
estimated at 20,000 in 1773. The face of literacy was changing rapidly, however, and it is 
estimated that by 1800, 300,000 people were literate, or roughly 1.5 percent of the 
population (Wittmann 426). This change is more complicated than a simple expansion of 
the Gelehrten, and many factors contribute to the difficulty of assessing literacy at the 
end of the 18th century.  The largest hurdle to quantifying literacy is presented by the 43
many different kinds of literacy which existed, all of which described very different 
competencies; it is estimated that a full 50% of the population had some basic ability to 
decipher letters, while 10% of the population read regularly, and only 1% read books 
(Rothe 89). Furthermore, literacy at this time did not necessarily describe the ability to 
read ​and​ write, as writing was to some extent a gendered activity reserved primarily for 
literate men, while many women could read without having been trained to write 
(Wittmann 426). Literacy and reading practices also varied based on location; generally 
literacy rates were far higher in the rapidly growing city centers than in rural areas 
(although cities still only accounted for 20% of the population); similarly, literacy rates 
43 Not least of which is the fact that the very idea of ​statistics​, that is, a historical “freeze frame” in 
which a present moment is preserved was itself first in the process of becoming, and with it, the 
tools necessary to document these kinds of transformations. Surveys, censuses, and even 
address numbers were recent innovations (Walker 241, “Literatur der Gegenwart” 203).  
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tended to be higher in Protestant principalities, although much of the difference can be 
accounted for by those who exclusively read the Bible (Wittmann 423). 
As will be explored below, changes in literacy not only make a retrospective 
analysis of the reading public difficult, it also led to great uncertainty for the editors and 
authors of the time as to whom, exactly, they were writing, a circumstance which was 
further complicated by the fact that the number or kind of subscription in no way 
represented the actual audience or reach of a particular journal. Reading culture of the 
late 18th century was still, by and large, a social endeavor. As detailed by Matthias 
Rothe in ​Lesen und Zuschauen im 18. Jahrhundert​, writing and reading practices of the 
18th century, as well as the distribution networks and patterns of written media, were all 
based upon a specific model, namely the personal letter. The personal letter had 
emerged at the end of the 17th century, prior to which the letter form had been reserved 
almost exclusively for military or courtly missives, and steadily grown in popularity during 
the intervening century. And yet, the designation of “personal” is misleading and cannot 
be understood in the modern sense: personal here indicated only that these were letters 
addressed from one private citizen to another, not that they were intended to be ​private​. 
For although letters of this kind were addressed to an individual, they were 
simultaneously intended for a community, since letters were traditionally repeatedly read 
aloud in various social settings, as well as passed from person to person. It was 
understood that the striven-for intimacy of the personal letter was therefore nevertheless 
a public-intimacy in the modern sense; indeed, it was not even illegal to read mail 
intended for another person until 1794. This reality of reading practice was necessarily 
reflected in writing practices of the time, as “Briefe waren zuerst an den Einen und dann 
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an alle gerichtet” (Rothe 96).  This formulation must be inverted in the case of journals, 44
that is: journals were in the first case directed at a vague sense of an “alle,” and then in 
the second instance at the concrete individual. While the journal authors and editors did 
go to great lengths, trying to imagine the individual potential consumer (see below: 
“Gutdenkende Leute aus allen Ständen: Reaching for the Many”), their first intended 
recipient was always the public, the nation, the audience. This was not only a rhetorical 
flourish, but reflected in the individual subscribers to the journals, which again included 
not only private individuals but also “Journal- und Leihbibliotheken, Lesegesellschaften, 
gesellige Vereine, patriotische und ökonomische Sozietäten, Universitäten und 
Akademien” (Haefs 333). As a result, “ob Lesegesellschaften oder Privatbezug - ist 
davon auszugehen, daß die einzelnen Hefte von Zeitschriften jeweils mehrere Leser 
gefunden haben; die Auflagenhöhe gibt also nur bedingt Auskunft über das tatsächliche 
Ausmaß der Rezeption” (Fischer 18). The number of subscribers or even total journals 
sold could therefore only ever represent a fraction of the total reader base, and even the 
term “reader base” must be viewed as anachronistic, as the consumants of journals were 
by no means limited to those who could themselves read the written word from the page. 
Reinhard Wittmann describes this broader, non-gelehrte form of reading as “‘wildes’ 
Lesen, das naiv, vorreflexiv und undomestiziert, zum allergrößten Teil auch laut 
betrieben wurde,” and notes that it was particularly prevalent in those rural areas in 
which literacy was lower, a type of reading which gained popularity as political interest 
increased surrounding the French Revolution (428, 429). 
 
44 There was also a critical assumed symmetry of the letter writing process, in that “jeder konnte 
Briefe senden und empfangen,” a symmetry which will again be presupposed by the editors of 
journals, highlighting another parallel between the two mediums. 
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II. Monthly Bestsellers 
Perhaps the most remarkable aspect of the “explosion” of new journals at the end of the 
18th century is that it occurred without any significant technological innovations to the 
printing process: typesetting, printing, paper production had remained almost entirely 
unchanged for well over a hundred years (Fischer 10). What this meant was that monthly 
journals like the ​Braunschweigisches Journal ​, weekly newspapers and books were all 
printed in the same manner, and not dissimilar to the method established centuries 
earlier with the publishing of the Bible. It also meant that there were certain hard limits to 
the speed and cost at which any print media could be produced: cheaper paper of 
varying sizes could be used, and the degree of ornamentation could be varied, but the 
overall production process, cost per written word and general form of publication 
remained more or less inflexible. In the introduction to their handbook, Fischer, Haefs, 
Mix describe the format of the typical “literarisch-kulturellen und 
historisch-geographischen oder territorialen Zeitschriften:” 
Die Mehrzahl von ihnen [Zeitschriften/Journalen] wies Oktavformat auf, die 
originalbroschierten Umschlägewaren meist blau oder blaugrau, die Titel oft mit 
zeitüblichem typographischen Ornament (Putten, Ranken, Leisten, kleine 
symbolisch-allegorische Darstellunge etc.) geschmückt. Die Innenseiten des 
Umschlags sowie die letzte Umschlagseite erfüllten gleich mehrere Funktionen: 
Sie enthielten das Inhaltsverzeichnis der einzelnen Hefte, boten Bücheranzeigen 
und warben so für andere Titel des Druckers oder Verlegers der Zeitschrift; oft 
brachten sie Anzeigen anderer Buchhändler oder Hinweise und Mitteilungen auf 
Subskriptionen und Pränumerationen. (21) 
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The ​Braunschweigisches Journal​ fit this mold exactly: it was a modest book printed in 
Oktav with blue-grey covers and limited ornamentation (Figure 1). The “Oktav” format 
refers to the manufacturing process of journals and books: both forms of publishing were 
measured by the number of sheets (Bogen) required for publishing, while page number 
and size were dictated by the number of times each sheet was folded. As the name 
suggests, Oktav meant that each sheet is folded eight times, resulting in pages 
diminutive by today’s standards: the ​Braunschweigisches Journal​ measured roughly 18 
cm at the spine, with each printed page containing only around 200 words due to wide 
margins. Although the sizes of publications would not be standardized until nearly a 
hundred years later, this format closely approximated the ​Berlinische Monatsschrift, ​ but 
was somewhat smaller than the large, bright pages of Wieland’s ​Teutsche Merkur​, most 
likely indicating a cheaper manufacturing process. Both the ​Braunschweigisches Journal 
and the ​Teutsche Merkur​ lacked the copper embossed portraits which emblazoned the 
bi-annual compendiums of the ​Berlinische Monatsschrift​, for example in the attached 
likeness of Benjamin Franklin (Figure 2). Similarly, the ​Berlinische Monatsschrift ​also 
frequently featured special fold out sections foreign to the other two publications, 
providing more space for sheet music, a map, or an enlarged diagram (Figures 4, 5, 6). 
These copper embossings were a known selling point, with the editors writing in the 
“Vorrede” to the ​Berlinische Monatsschrift,​ “Der Gedanke der Verlegers, zuweilen 
(wenigstens vor dem ersten Stük jedes Bandes) ohne Erhöhung des Preises, einen 
saubern und getreuen Kupferstich von einem merkwürdigen verdienten und noch nicht 
durch Bildnisse bekannten Mann zu liefern, kann unmöglich anders als dem Publikum 
gefallen” (2). While the weight attached to these likenesses may seem strange to a 
modern audience, it is important to remember that this would have been the only means 
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for a large percentage of the readership to see any representation of the people in 
question, and this period also marked the height of miniature portraiture for the same 
reason. Still, that did not place the lofty practice above ridicule: in his compendium of the 
weekly ​Der Wandswecker Bothe​, Matthias Claudius likewise provided a “saubern 
Kupfer” likeness of one “Lars Hochedeln” (Claudius 78, Figure 3).  
It is possible that the choice to abstain from a copper emboss was not purely 
financial, but also had a philosophical motive: because the ​Braunschweigisches Journal 
was positioning itself as a purely pedagogical journal, embossings or inserts could have 
been viewed as unnecessary and/or ostentatious. Mix writes of the earliest journals for 
women:  
Da eine regelmäßige Geldausgabe für Literatur zur Zeit der Frühaufklärung als 
unüblich angesehn wurde, hatten die wöchentlichen Lieferungen einen 
bescheidenen Umfang von einem oder einem halben Bogen. Gemäß ihrer 
didaktischen Intention appelierten sie an die Ration und vermieden demonstrativ 
jede Form von Bücherluxus. (Mix 57-58). 
Mix here is comparing Wochenschriften and Journale over and against the Almanachs of 
the time, which were specifically engineered as consumable objects, and quickly 
became objects of financial speculation on the part of investors and a means of 
conspicuous consumption for those who purchased them, the material form of the 
publications reflecting this with “immer extravagantere Formen” including but not limited 
to “ausgesuchte und matt getönte Papiere, kolorierte Kupfer, eingebundene Kupfer von 
bekannten Stechern, Lesebändchen, Gold- und Farbschnitte” (58). What this tension 
highlights is that ​both​ forms of publication, as already indicated by the dynamics of scale 
necessary to continued journal production, functioned as consumable objects adhering 
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to nascent dynamics of supply and demand. According to Benedict Anderson, books, 
beginning with the first Bible printed from the Gutenberg press (newspapers representing 
in this case merely an, in his words, “extreme form” of book) represented the “first 
modern-style mass-produced industrial commodity” (34). Anderson’s reasoning for this is 
twofold: first he claims, quoting Febvre and Martin’s ​The Coming of the Book​, that the 
production process introduced by the printing press “looked more like modern workshops 
than the monastic workrooms of the Middle ages… a business geared to standardized 
production.” What this expresses is that from its inception, book production has been 
production by assembly, production via interchangeable parts. So while very little had 
changed in the printing process by the end of the 18th century other than a rise in the 
number of individual productions, that process already anticipated the capitalist mode in 
significant ways. Anderson further argues that, in contrast to other early products of 
proto-industrial production such as textiles, sugar etc., a book is a discrete commodity: it 
“is a distinct, self-contained object, exactly reproduced on a large scale… each book has 
its own eremitic self-sufficiency.” Anderson suggests that in this light, the newspaper of 
the 19th and 20th centuries must simply be viewed as an “extreme form” of the book, 
sold on “a colossal scale, but of ephemeral popularity… [a] one-day best seller” (34-35). 
The continuity between the book form and 18th century journals such as the 
Braunschweigisches Journal​ is even more pronounced, as aside from the frequency of 
publication, no distinction was made in the form or manufacturing process: journals truly 
were “monthly best sellers,” purchased, rented or shared from emergent but in most 
cases extremely limited disposable incomes. 
 
III. Selling Journals 
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The editors and authors of the day unquestionably recognized the journal’s position as a 
commodity, and this status was both something they actively sought to foster, as well as 
a source of discomfort.  A not inconsequential portion of each publication was dedicated 
to advertising for the journal itself, as well as other publications available through that 
publisher: even the modest ​Braunschweigisches Journal ​reserved the back cover of 
each issue for a list of such publications, including prices as well as where they could be 
purchased, while the inside of the front cover of each issue provided the exact cost 
along with subscription instructions to the ​Journal​ (Figure 7, 8).  As previously 
mentioned, the ​Berlinische Monatsschrift ​presented its copper embossings as a “value 
add” to potential consumers, something which could be included without increasing the 
cost of an issue. The ​Berlinische Monatsschrift ​positioned itself as a serious, scholarly 
enterprise, and these embossings, along with the expanding inserts, were presented as 
pedagogical tools, a unique opportunity afforded by the medium of journals to make 
resources and information available to a broader audience.  But, as indicated by the 
satirical embossing of “Präsident Hochedeln” (President High-nobility), the staging of 
these images had already become a bit too predictable by 1774 for them to be intended 
exclusively for the edification of the reading populace. Other publications were more 
brazen in their sales pitch: in the introduction to the 5th bound volume of ​Blätter 
vermischten Inhalts​ published in 1792, the publishers speak proudly of the acclaim their 
journal has found in the pages of their better known contemporaries such as ​Die 
allgemeine deutsche Bibliothek​ and the fact that previous publication numbers have 
been inadequate to meet popular demand for issues. To remedy this, the initial “4 ersten 
vergriffenen Bände” were to be republished “auf Seine [the publisher’s] Kosten” 
(“Vorrede” II). These reprints were to appear “alle 2 Monate ein Heft von 5 bis 6 Bogen… 
136 
welches, im blauen Umschlage, brochirt, hier an Ort und Stelle 4 gute Groschen oder 12 
Grote kostet. Sechs Hefte machen einen Band. Einzelne Stücke kosten 5 gute Groschen 
oder 15 Grote, den Louisd`or zu Rthlr. rerechnet, weil man nicht anders als auf einen 
Ganzen Jahrgang pränumeriren kann.” Finally, for those with “Zeit, Lust und 
Gelegenheit” to subscribe for a year in advance via Pränumeration, or for previous 
subscribers, “erhalten [Sie] das 10te Exemplar für ihre Bemühung unentgeltlich.” In a 
scant two pages, the reader has thus been met with a flurry of advertising techniques 
which continue to this day: an endorsement from a famous source, the simultaneous 
stressing of popularity and scarcity, passing on the savings of no-shipping costs, and 
finally, one of the earliest instances of buy 9, get one free. 
But as already indicated, the journal’s status as a commodity, and the 
commodification of writing in general, was far from unproblematic. The unease with 
books-as-business is already visible in the wording of the previously quoted texts from 
the ​Blätter Vermischten Inhalts ​and the ​Berlinische Monatsschrift​; the insistence that the 
republishing would be done “at the publisher’s expense” or that the copper embossings 
were added “ohne Erhöhung des Preises,” functioned not only or, perhaps, even 
primarily as a sales tactic in the minds of the editors, but also as an attempt to absolve 
themselves from a stink which was settling on the publishing ​industry​, namely the 
accusation of greed. The fear of the accusation of greed is even more apparent 
elsewhere: in the 1787 “Vorbericht” to the ​Blätter Vermischten Inhalts​, the editor 
declares  “Die Fortdauer deselben [​Blätter Vermischten Inhalts​] hängt lediglich von der 
Unterstützung des Publicums ab. So lange wir Mitarbeiter und Leser haben, liefern wir 
ungefähr alle 2 Monate ein Heft von 5-6 Bogen, für einen Preis, der unmöglich geringer 
seyn kann” (8). As will be explored below, such direct appeals to the audience were 
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commonplace; what is important here is that this quote presents the journal purely as a 
service to the community, one which exists entirely at the discretion of the reading 
public, provided at as low of a cost as possible. This particular formulation intentionally 
blocks the possibility of speculating as to the motivations underlying the publication: the 
journal is not something ​sold​ to the public ​by​ the publishers and editors of journal, rather, 
it is a resource ​demanded by​ the public as a whole and provided only as a service.  45
Similarly, when Joachim Campe announced a new publishing project in the 1783 August 
issue of the ​Berlinische Monatsschrift​, namely the previously mentioned predecessor to 
the ​Braunschweigisches Journal,​ the ​Allgemeinen Revision des gesammten Schul- und 
Erziehungswesens: von einer Gesellschaft praktischer Erzieher​, he is quick to justify the 
announced cost per issue: 
...ein Preis, der in Betracht der vielen Kosten, welche die weitläuftige 
Korrespondenz, das Hin- und Hersenden der Handschriften und das für die 
Preisschriften bestimmte hohe Honorar, verursachen werden, so ungewöhnlich 
gering ist, daß ein jeder, der da weiß, daß man ein Alphabet solcher Schriften 
jetzt fast durchgängig zu 1 Rthl.verkauft, leicht die Bemerkung machen wird, daß 
Gewinnsucht an dieser Unternehmung wohl keinen Theil haben könne. (“Plan zu 
einer allgemeinen Revision” 171) 
As made clear by Campe’s protestations, the underlying impetus for such an explanation 
is fear of the accusation of “Gewinnsucht;” it is this fear which prompts Campe to explain 
45 In this formulation, the publishers/editors attempt to assume a role not dissimilar to what E.P. 
Thompson said was retroactively ascribed to bakers/millers/farmers und paternalism, as 
discussed in Chapter 1: Markets. Thompson argues that it was this collective memory of food 
providers acting as servants to the community, similar to priests, which was the utopian core of 
the sustained, unified resistance to the onset of capitalism carried out by peasants over the 
course of centuries.  
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the publishing process, to remind the audience of the huge amount of (presumably 
costly) correspondence involved, the, in some cases, high honorariums which need to be 
paid, and the relatively modest asking price compared to other similar publications. And 
to a certain extent, the numerous self-justifications which crop up in journals when 
matters of price, circulation and sales are discussed seem valid: again, most journals 
only existed for one to two years, closing due to insufficient income or submission. And 
despite the editorial complaint of “high honorariums,” compensation for writing articles 
was notoriously low, something only the most successful authors could afford to pursue 
as a full-time career, for most instead offering limited supplemental income to existing 
professions in academia or the state apparatus. Nevertheless, the universality of the 
defensive posture assumed by the editors of the Enlightenment journals suggests an 
equally broad level of critique or concern surrounding the ascendant media form, one 
which will be explored at length below. 
 
IV Mercantile Monopoly vs. the Free Market of Ideas 
Perhaps unsurprisingly, it is Jakob Michael Reinhold Lenz who provides one of the most 
scathing, nuanced, albeit it internally inconsistent critiques of the journal publishing 
industry. Lenz’s 1776 essay  “Verteidigung des Herrn W. gegen die Wolken: von dem 
Verfasser der Wolken.” “Verteidigung” is a bizarre work even within Lenz’s experimental 
oeuvre; in 1775, Lenz had written the play, ​Die Wolken​, a satirical play modeled loosely 
after Aristophanes’ play of the same name. The play was never published; after 
manuscripts circulated amongst his friends and members of the Straßburger Sozietät, he 
was urged by Lavater, Schlosser and Goethe not only to forego release to the public, but 
to have the extant copies destroyed. Lenz initially refused, writing Schubart “Wehe über 
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mein Vaterland, wenn ​Die Wolken​ nicht gedruckt werden!” but eventually relented, 
something Sigrid Damm attributes to a combination of the influence of his friends, in 
particular his friend Sophie Laroche who was a mutual friend of Wieland, as well as the 
practical knowledge that he would soon be moving to Weimar and so perhaps releasing 
an excoriating play about one of the most powerful figures in its publishing industry was 
not tactically sound (Damm 925). Eventually, all copies were indeed burned, including a 
store of copies which had already been printed for sale by Heinrich Christian Boie’s 
publishing house, as a last minute favor to his, by this time, frantic friend. Very little is 
known of the work, as no copies of the play have ever been discovered, with only a few 
pages from Lenz’s Nachlass believed to be from an earlier version. What is known is that 
Die Wolken​ took aim at both Wieland and Nicolai, and that like its namesake, the 
protagonist is Socrates (this time a stand in for Wieland), a figure whom the few 
remaining pages depict as a scholastic fool interested only in deflowering one of his 
pupils. Unfortunately the destruction was thorough and did prevent the work’s 
dissemination.  
Lenz, however, worrying that copies had or would leak, decided to take the 
tactically ill-advised step to write an apology to Wieland for the unpublished work, the 
aforementioned essay “Verteidigung des Herrn W. gegen die Wolken: von dem 
Verfasser der Wolken.”  In his review of the essay, Christian Friedrich Daniel Schubart 46
would later glow “so kühn, so steif und gutsinnig, so gedankenvoll und tiefsinnig, so im 
Feuerstrome ausgegossen, ist noch wenig geschrieben worden, wie hier diese drey 
Bogen” that “jeder Leser (versteht sichs, wer lesen kann) [wirds] gar leicht sehen, daß 
46 Lenz later had a change of heart on this essay, too, trying once again to suppress publication, 
in this case with no success. 
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diese Bogen einen unserer ersten und vortreflichsten Köpfe zum Verfasser haben. 
Feuer muß da seyn, wo einem die Flamm’ ins Gesicht schlägt” (Schubart 462). As 
Schubart’s repeated use of fire metaphors should suggest, “Verteidigung,” is a bad 
apology, functioning less as a defense of Wieland (and recanting none of the criticism of 
Nicolai), and more as an apologia for the stillborn play. For while Lenz admits that he 
may have gotten carried away with his “aristophanic spleen,” his primary goal in 
“Verteidigung” is to demonstrate that ​Die Wolken​ was not written in petty anger in 
response to negative reviews of his works by Wieland and Nicolai in ​Teutsche Merkur 
and ​Allgemeine deutsche Bibliothek​ (for an in depth discussion, see “Chapter 2: 
Theatrical Reception/Theoretical reception”), but rather sprang from a deep-seated 
concern for the state of the publishing industry as a whole. The problem is one of a 
consolidation of power: “Monopulien” have developed in which a few individuals have 
positioned themselves as author, publisher and reviewer, attempting thereby to control 
all aspects of the literary community. This is problematic, because “Poeten als Kaufleute 
anzusehen sind, von denen jeder seine Ware, wie natürlich, am meisten anpreist. Wie 
ungerecht, wenn da einer aus ihren Mitteln entscheiden, die letzte Stimme geben soll! 
Und wenn er ein Engel wäre, wie ungerecht!” (719). While the use of “Kaufleute” may 
seem like a slight to the literary profession, Lenz here is setting it up as the progressive, 
open-market alternative to mercantilist consolidation. Lenz acknowledges that “auch 
Dichter Leben und Othem haben müssen, und daß wohl niemand mit mehrerem Recht 
auf Belohnungen der Republik Ansprüche zu machen habe als ein Dichter, der 
ausgedient hat,” and that indeed nothing is more tragic than a poet who has sacrificed 
so much to their craft “am Ende seines Lebens einen Karren ziehen, oder ein Mühlrad 
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umdrehen zu sehen wie Plautus,” thereby tacitly acknowledging the social precarity of 
most authors at the end of the 18th century (718).   47
For Lenz, the problem is rather what he sees as the prevalent monopolization of 
the industry, which is why Friedrich Nicolai, son of a publisher and simultaneously one of 
the German speaking world’s most prominent novelists, editors and critics, is used 
metonymically to represent all that is wrong with the publishing industry: 
Was soll man aber zu einem Dichter sagen, der mehr Buchhändler als Dichter 
auf diesen Grund fortbaute, das heißt Kunstrichter aus ganz Deutschland 
zusammenmietete, um endlich auf diesen ungeheuren Obelisk sein Bild, mit 
desto mehrerer Sicherheit aufstellen zu können, der alle Offizinen und 
Druckerpressen auf gewisse Art in Anspruch nahm, um nichts in seinem 
Vaterlande ans Licht kommen zu lassen, das nicht von ihm und seinem 
Geschmacksrat vorher war gestempelt worden. (720-721) 
Nicolai, like Wieland, Campe and many others, owned the publishing house which 
produced the journal of which he was chief editor, in addition to serving as a primary 
contributor of both original essays and reviews. Furthermore, in his capacity as editor, 
Nicolai was also responsible for both directly soliciting submissions from authors, as well 
as determining the fitness of the submissions once received--submissions which, in the 
case of reviews, were largely published anonymously. Lenz argues that this had 
necessarily produced a stifling atmosphere, one in which “alles, was Freiheit, Tugend 
47 As an immigrant from the lower ranks of the bourgeoisie, this was a social precarity Lenz knew 
only too well. Lenz never experienced financial success through his works, and depended instead 
on both the advocacy and sometimes direct support of more successful friends such as Goethe, 
Lavatar, Herder. Read today, “Vertheidigung” carries a darker significance, indicating his 
imminent rejection from the cultural center of Weimar, the collapse of his friendship with Goethe, 
and the eventual complete deterioration of his mental state.  
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und Ehre atmet,” was suppressed “oder wenigstens… nicht zu Kräften kommen zu 
lassen, es sei denn, daß es zu seinen Privatabsichten diene,” where those individuals, 
such as presumably himself, who “die Vorteile des Lebens verachteten, und aus zuweit 
getriebener Sorglosigkeit dafür sich auch die Mittel abschneiden ließen, ihren Brüdern 
nützlich zu sein.”  
Particularly troubling to Lenz, and heightening his belief that would-be authors 
were victim to an invisible cabal orchestrated by self-serving men such as Nicolai, was 
the fact that many of the reviews of the time were published anonymously. Lenz 
describes this apparatus as the “verborgenen Triebfedern” which  “unser ganzes 
Vaterland in Bewegung setzt, und von niemand abhängig, alles von sich abhängig 
machen will,” one in which “die Guten die Schlechten unterstützen,” and collectively they 
form the “Geschmacksrat,” without whose approval nothing can reach the light of day, to 
which Lenz poses the question, “das unser Tribunal? --von dem sich nicht appellieren 
ließe? --das die bewährten Zeugen unseres Werts? Warum nenne sie sich nicht? --Laß 
sie hervortreten, wenn das Vaterland ihnen glauben soll--” (721). This anonymity is 
inextricably tied to not only the greed of Nicolai, but to the anonymous authors 
themselves, suggesting that these “gemieteten Kritikern… nur lobten, weil sie sich sonst 
beim Volk nicht hätten erhalten können.” The anonymity is not reserved only for the 
public (or for the victims of the harsh reviews, such as Lenz), but is so pervasive that the 
reviewers do not know each other, producing a situation: 
etwa wie jener geschickte Taschenspieler, der in eine Gesellschaft unbekannter 
Leute hereintrat von denen jeder glaubte, er sei der Freund des andern, und ihm 
alle mögliche Hochachtung bezuegte, die er denn so gut zu nutzen wußte, daß er 
mit dem ganzen Silberzeuge, auf dem sie gegessen, davon ging. (722-723) 
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Within this quote, Lenz’s larger fears for the publishing industry become apparent: on the 
one hand, recognizing the necessity of a free market and a loosening of the points of 
access to publication, the need of a growing group of authors to financially support 
themselves, on the other, mistrusting the increasing anonymity which accompanies this 
process. For while he blames this anonymity on mercantilist, anti-competitive practices 
of an elite few, there is no overlooking the fact that as both the publishing industry and 
reading audience swelled, anonymity is an inevitable byproduct, with authors no longer 
knowing each other or the audience which they addressed. 
It is in this context that Lenz begins his “defense” of Wieland, whom he paints as 
a man appalled by the “merkantilischen Joch” weighing so heavily on his countrymen 
(the masculine pronouns are intentional here, as will be explained below), establishing 
himself as a counter weight, building his own authoritative critical apparatus over and 
against the Nicolais of the nation, reviewers governed only by “kaufmännische 
Kunstgriffe,” and “Buchhändlerinteresse.” But the defense is muddled at best (and 
frequently simply further insulting), because Lenz lacks a clear vision as to what an 
alternative to the publishing industry as it exists would look like. Much of what Lenz 
proposes is simple nostalgia for a pre-capitalist era: reaching to the more distant past, he 
envies the freedom from financial concerns he imagines was enjoyed by the court bards 
accompanying the Scottish kings. Lenz also recollects fondly the recently-passed era in 
which “Abbt, Mendelssohn, Hamman und ihresgleichen gehört wurden, da war noch 
sicherer Richtscheid des Geschmacks derer, die ihr Gefühl an den aufwachenden 
Sängern ihres Vaterlandes übten” (720). In so doing, Lenz seems to construct overly 
simplistic binaries, in which greed and self interest are set over against nobility and 
selfless patriotism, the cowardice of anonymity against a manly self-assertion.  
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It would be unfair and inaccurate to characterize these critiques as purely 
regressive; as detailed in the first chapter, the use of utopian visions of the past can 
serve as a legitimate and often effective mode of critique, and Lenz’s blending a modern 
call to patriotism  with a nostalgic sense of chivalry and nobility could almost be 48
characterized with Caroline Levine as a “canny” usage of forms, that is, the recognition 
and manipulation of the overlap of several different society-organizing principles. As 
shown, Lenz astutely links the growing anonymity of the authors and reading public and 
the consolidation of the possible voices within the printing industry to its changing nature 
as a capitalist venture. However, unlike the peasants of the English Bread Riots or 
Levine’s canny manipulators, Lenz’s protests seem to have achieved nothing other than 
his own ruin, failing to produce temporal deceleration in a changing society. Some of this 
failure surely rests with Lenz’s abiding lack of tact: at one point within his “defense” of 
Wieland, he offers the “dreiste Zumutung” that Wieland’s “Mißtrauen… in seine 
Landsleute” even after what Lenz characterizes as his campaign to enlighten national 
taste,  “zeigt, mein Gegner verzeihe mir, und meine Leser verzeihen mir, von einer 
Seele, die ihr erstes Gepräge ein wenig auslöschen lassen, und vielleicht durch 
physische, vielleicht durch ökonomische Ursachen zu Mißtrauen und Kleinmut 
herabgewürdiget worden” (717).  But what this passage primarily indicates are the 49
48 It is worth noting that “patriotism” carried a very different valence in the late 18th century than 
the nationalist meaning it would gain in the 19th century (and continues to this day). In 18th 
century Germany,  “patriotism” was often used to cloak subversive positions critical to the state. 
By positioning oneself as a patriot, it was possible to critique the political organization of the state 
while maintaining loyalty by characterizing these as merely the “concerns of a passionate citizen,” 
of which Kant’s essay “Beantwortung der Frage: Was ist Aufklärung?” provides a perfect 
example. For more see Heinrich Bosse, “Patriotismus und Öffentlichkeit.”  
49 The dig at Wieland’s “physische” state indicates another important aspect of the conflict 
between the Sturm und Drangers and earlier Enlightenment figures such as Wieland and Nicolai, 
namely age; born in 1751, Lenz was only 25 at the time of writing “Vertheidigung,” where as his 
targets were both a positively ancient 43. Age had special significance to the Sturm und 
Drangers, in part because of the influence of French materialism: youth, vitality, genius were all 
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conflicting impulses within Lenz’s critique: on the one hand, he wishes to restore the 
“wahren Adel des Herzens” of literary production and evaluation in the truest sense of 
the word, that is, to make the production and consumption of literature the purview of a 
privileged few chosen from birth through natural talent. On the other, Lenz makes 
frequent oblique references to the newfound maturity of the people of the German 
nation, an assertion which surfaces every time he is forced to justify his request of 
Wieland to abdicate his self-appointed throne as the arbiter of taste. According to this 
line of reasoning, Wieland was at one point justified in his appropriation of the 
“unleidlichen Wir,” but that the public has evolved to such an extent that “sein Wir nicht 
mehr gilt, als jedes andern ehrlichen Mannes von seinem Wert…” (722). This tension 
becomes even more pronounced in light of Lenz’s alternative to the Nicolaiischen 
Geschmacksrat: 
Wem soll also das Urteil über uns zustehen, wenn es nicht dem zusteht, für den 
wir da sind, dessen Beifall uns leben und atmen lässet, ich meine dem ganzen 
Volk. Ich nehme hier das Wort im gemilderten Verstande, so daß ich den Pöbel, 
der weder Dichter noch Gelehrte anders als von Hörensagen kennt, davon 
ausschließe. Dagegen zähle ich auch die Väter des Volks zum Volke, die wie alle 
Helden und großen Männer des Altertums auch in ihren Vergnügungen sich bis 
zum Volk herunterlassen, da sie wohl wissen, daß dieses von jeher das einzige 
und höchste Mittel war, sich seiner freiwilligen Treue und Ergebenheit in allen 
auch den schwersten Erfordernissen zu versichern. (719) 
linked, provoking Schubart to wonder aloud in his review if 40 is the new “Greisenalter des 
dichters,” before reminding himself that in some instances (Homer, Klopstock) people remained 
productive well beyond this point, and that even Wieland’s imagination is not yet “aufgetrocknet,” 
and that his latest poetry in the ​Teutsche Merkur ​ still shows indications of “lebensfeuer” (462).  
146 
This passage is both incredibly murky and key to Lenz’s alternative; in the initial 
egalitarian statement, the new judges of taste are simply the recipients of the media, 
namely “das ganze Volk.” But this “ganze” is immediately qualified, excluding a 
particular, unnamed “Pöbel,” before then reintroducing an even more vaguely 
characterized group of “Väter des Volks” to the judging body. The problem is that while 
Lenz believes it should be left to “the people” to judge, he has no faith in their ability to 
do so: “Dieses Volk muß aber geführt werden, da es sonst in seinem Geschmack eben 
so unbestimmt und schwankend sein würde, als es in seinen Handlungen zu sein 
pflegt…” He seeks, in other words, to fuse the egalitarian and radically democratic 
impulses of the Enlightenment with the restoration of an imagined past in which artistic 
judgement lay in the hands of “Philosophen, die das ganze Reich der Wissenschaften 
durchwandert und von diesen Wanderungen mit den schärfsten und reichhaltigsten 
Einsichten und dem feinstem Geschmack, aber auch mit dem unverdorbensten 
zärtesten Gefühl, für alle Rechte der Menschheit,” men (and again, necessarily men) like 
“Herodot, Solon, Lykurg… Demokrit und Pythagoras” (720). Lenz continues, “Diesen und 
nur der vereinten Stimme dieser überlasse man es, ein Endurteil über den Dichter zu 
fällen, der mit dem Volk stehen und fallen muß,” once again combining a nominally 
populist notion of the people, with the unanimous will of philosopher kings/cultural critics.  
Lenz can perhaps be excused for not providing more detail on exactly ​how​ this 
interaction between “das Volk” and “die Philosophen” will play out, as in Lenz’s theory of 
society, this interplay represents not only the ideal through which a national 
“Geschmack” is to be formed, it is the essence of all statecraft and the very sinews of 
society: 
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[Das Volk] muß sich in einem Punkt mit dem verfeinerten und bessern 
Geschmack der Edlern anschließen können, das einzige Band zwischen Großen 
und Kleinen, Beherrschern und Untertanen, das einzige Geheimnis aller wahren 
Staatskunst, ohne welches alle bürgerliche Verhältnisse und Beziehungen 
auseinander fallen, ohne welches der Bürger immer den Staat als den 
Unterdrücker und der Staat den Bürger als den Rebellen ansehen wird. 
And while these formulations may seem wildly utopian, Lenz is insistent that such 
circumstances can and have existed; again, Abbt, Mendelssohn and Hamman provided 
such a voice 20 years prior. And more than that, Lenz sees the German “nation” as 
uniquely positioned to realize the promise of an enlightened republic governed by an 
educated elite, and it is this very real possibility which makes the practice of anonymous 
reviews so troubling to him:  
Ich begreife aber nicht, wie unter diesen Voraussetzungen von Privatabsichten 
freie Gelehrte gezwungen sein sollten, ihren Namen zu verstecken, in einem 
Lande, wie Deutschland, das durch soviel besondere Staatssysteme und 
Verbindungen eben denen darin befindlichen Gelehrten die größte Freiheit, ihre 
Meinung herauszusagen, und keinen weitern Zusammenhang läßt, als der der 
Wahrheit so vorteilhaft ist, den sie gemeinschaftliche Diener einer und derselben 
Wahrheit haben, sie auszubreiten, und zu befördern. Wenn in einem Lande, wo 
wenig oder gar keine politische Rücksichten zu nehmen sind, wo Luther allein 
dem Aberglauben einer halben Welt die Spitze bieten konnte, da er in jedem 
andern bald seinen Platz im Tollhause oder auf den Galeeren gefunden haben 
würde, wenn da nich Freiheit zu denken und zu schreiben herrschen soll, wo soll 
sie denn herrschen? (724-725) 
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Not only is Germany the only place in the world in which Luther could have nailed his 
theses without ending his life in a madhouse or prison, not only are the German lands 
blessed with the unique “Staatssysteme,” provided by Frederick II, under which Gelehrte 
are offered untold freedom, within Germany the pursuit and dissemination of the Truth 
has been raised to an imperative, the only acceptable goal of any scholar. Within this 
context, the ​only​ reason imaginable to Lenz for the anonymous reviews and for the 
consolidation of publishing/editing/reviewing into a single body are “Privatabsichten,” the 
threat of mercantilist monopolies. Lenz’s dismissal of the very real problems of state 
censorship and material pressures which were producing the publishing climate seem to 
stem less from naivety and more from desperation. “Vertheidung” is a plea to his 
contemporaries; if not here, where? If not now, when? Lenz even tries to partially walk 
back his unrelenting derision of Nicolai, who he still values as “Buchhändler und 
anfänglichen Liebhaber und Beförderer der deutschen Literatur, auch in seinem N. als 
unterhaltenden Romanendichter.”  It was never Lenz’s intent to stem the tide of journal 50
media, as he himself was “von dem Nutzen gelehrter Anzeigen zu sehr überzeugt.” 
Instead, what Lenz’s fears and hopes within “Vertheidigung” indicate is the extreme flux 
50 Nicolai clearly relished his role as a thorn in the side of the serious young men of Sturm und 
Drang, writing biting critiques of their work in addition to penning satirical novels such as ​Freuden 
des jungen Werthers ​. Nicolai ignored Lenz’s insults for a full four years before publishing a 
devastating rebuttal in the 1780 Anhang to the ​Allgemeine Deutsche Bibliothek.​ In this article, he 
refers to Lenz as someone “von dem eine Zeitlang einige Leute ein gewaltiges Lärm machten, als 
ob er, wer weiß was für ein Genie wäre,” indicating not so subtly Lenz’s precipitous fall into 
obscurity during the intervening years (774). Nicolai then promises that he is not going to bother 
defending himself and instead will limit his defense to his friend Wieland, a promise he keeps, 
before quoting at length a rather embarrassing passage from “Vertheidigung” in which Lenz fails 
to muster precisely this kind of restraint, with Lenz listing the kinds of nasty things he ​could​ say 
about Wieland’s recent operetta but ​won’t ​ (it bears repeating, within the framework of what is 
possibly the world’s worst apology/defense). Like Lenz, Nicolai plays up the age difference, 
calling Lenz a  “rüstigen Knaben” and noting that it was “sehr possierlich” of Lenz to believe 
himself the equal of a great man like Wieland. Nicolai ends with a final barb at Lenz’s “verfehlte 
Schakespearische Manier,” a blow which would have particularly stung the young playwright.  
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of the current moment: Lenz both welcomes the advent of a free market of ideas and 
criticizes the old, top-down model of control represented by older representatives of the 
Enlightenment such as Wieland and Nicolai. At the same time, there is a strongly 
anti-democratic bent to his writing, a fear of the anonymous “Pöbel,” a sense of loss for 
the close intercommunication within the Gelehrten community, and a nostalgia for the 
imagined bygone security of the royal artist. Lenz advocates for free expression and 
transparency in the public sphere while simultaneously dreaming of wise aristocratic 
philosopher kings who will guide the German people into a new era. 
 
V. An Epistemological Threat and a New Temporality 
Criticism of journals was not limited to their entanglement in capitalist modes of 
production. There also existed a simultaneous unease with the kind of writing which 
occurred between those grey-blue covers, namely the journal article. To return to the 
inaugural January edition of the ​Braunschweigisches Journal ​, this issue was divided into 
nine separate articles, ranging between 4 to 26 pages in length and, as indicated by the 
journal’s full title, ​Braunschweigisches Journal philosophischen, philologischen und 
pädagogischen Inhalts​, the journal dealt with topics similar to those found in the dozens 
of other monthly journal which had sprung up in the past ten years: orphanages, secret 
societies, religious freedom, the best means of combating superstition, reviews of recent 
literature, travel literature, and “news.”  The ​Braunschweigisches Journal ​attempts to 51
distinguish itself from other journals in two ways: first, through the area of  expertise of its 
51 The idea of “news” will be explored in greater detail below: at this juncture, it is worth simply 
noting that the concept differed from its contemporary usage in that it included ​relative ​as well as 
absolute​ newness. The news was therefore not only events which were temporally “new,” but 
also included any knowledge which could be unknown to the audience reading it.  
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founding editors, which included Ernst Christian Trapp, Johann Stuve and most 
importantly Joachim Heinrich Campe, all of whom were noted pedagogues. As 
previously mentioned, the journal was published by Campe’s Verlag der 
Schulbuchhandlung, whose other noted publications included encyclopedias, 
pedagogical handbooks, and textbooks designed for school instruction, further marking 
the journal as an instructional resource. Nevertheless, the “pädagogische” aspect of the 
journal also proves a rather thin distinction: for while the journal did certainly foreground 
education in a way that not all Enlightenment journals did, in general pedagogy ​was​ a 
central concern of the Enlightened journals as a whole, and as previously noted, the 
range of topics often remained close to that of publications such as the ​Berlinische 
Monatsschrift​ or the ​Teutsche Merkur​. In part, this lack of distinction was simply the 
result of mutual authorship: all three editors had been and would continue to be frequent 
contributors to other journals such as the ​Berlinische Monatsschrift, ​just as the authors 
featured there would often appear in the pages of the ​Braunschweigisches Journal​. The 
second differentiating feature of the ​Braunschweigisches Journal​ was its titular link to a 
specific region, namely Braunschweig. And yet, while the specific space demarcated 
was relatively unique, the act of spatial differentiation itself was one shared by nearly all 
new publications: whether a city like Frankfurt or Berlin, a region like Silesia or 
Braunschweig, or just the ill-defined cultural, linguistic and geographic “space” of 
“Teutschland,” in almost all cases the journals linked themselves explicitly to a specific 
place.  52
52 It is worth noting that there exists a rather nebulous distinction between Enlightenment journals 
with regional markers, and the so-called “Territorialzeitschriften,” as described by Wihelm Haefs 
in his article of the same name. Territorialzeitschriften were regional journals or newspapers 
which worked towards the enlightenment of local populations. Unlike the Braunschweigisches 
Journal, Berlinische Monatsschrift, Teutsche Merkur, and the other similar journals which are the 
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But what truly sets the first edition of the ​Braunschweigisches Journal​ apart and 
makes it of particular interest in comparison with its contemporaries is its intensive 
grappling with the media form. A discussion of method and intent at the beginning of a 
new journal was itself far from unique. As Fischer, Haefs and Mix note:  
Entscheidender Indikator der sich wandelnden Verhältnisse ist das 
Reflexivwerden des Mediensystems ab etwa 1760/1765: In zunehmendem Maße 
entsteht in Zeitungen und Zeitschriften ein Gespräch über Zeitungen und 
Zeitschriften, so daß sich, mindestens für die Phase der Spätaufklärung, treffend 
von einem fortwährenden “dialogue des journaux” sprechen läßt. (15) 
Nearly all new publications of this era included a manifesto-like essay by the editors as 
the first article, in which the editors would explore methodology, what they believed their 
objects of study  would be, and for whom they believed they were writing.  What sets 53
the ​Braunschweigisches Journal ​ apart is therefore not the existence of such a discourse, 
but rather the length of this discussion: in addition to the meanwhile standard manifesto 
(here titled “Von der Absicht und den Gegenständen dieser Zeitschrift”), it also includes 
primary focus of this chapter, journals such as​ Das Journal von und für Franken ​, ​Schwäbisches 
Magazin von gelehrten Sachen ​, ​Westphälischischen Beyträgen zum Nutzen und Vergnügen​ and 
hundreds of others tended to be the production of either very small groups of all local authors, or 
primarily the work of a single author, as opposed to the collectives typical of the larger 
publications. As such, their run times were short even in comparison with those of the more 
nationally/internationally oriented Enlightenment journals. Furthermore, their content tended 
towards the empirical, practical and historical, instead of the pedagogical, philosophical and 
political, with more space devoted to rudimentary statistics, economic reports, as well as local 
artistic production. But more than this, the type of regional-focus present in the 
Territorialzeitschriften also represented a different philosophical outlook: the authors and editors 
still “fühlt[en] sich der deutschen Gelehrtenrepublik zugehörig” and in many ways attempted to 
function as a bridge between the local and the (inter)national, but at the same time, “Sie wollen… 
gleichermaßen Landespatriotismus und Reichspatriotismus vermitteln,” and “dient nicht zuletzt 
der kollektiven Identitätsversicherung einer Gruppe von meist nur lokal oder regional bekannten 
Autoren” (Haefs 331, 332). The attitude of region/nation first produced writing which was “eher 
skeptisch bis ablehnend” of the kind of cosmopolitan-universalism advocated for by a more 
“radical” enlightenment, as represented by Wieland, Nicolai and Mendelssohn.  
53 As will be explored below, this self-reflexive writing about writing is constitutive to the emergent 
understanding of time as a series of all-encompassing now-moments. 
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a letter written by Christian Garve to Joachim Campe, “Ein Einwurf wider die Nützlichkeit 
periodischer Schriften,” in which Garve voices concerns over both the ubiquity of 
journals as well as their fundamental mode of knowledge production, as well as Campe’s 
rebuttal, “Beantwortung diese Einwurfs.” Together, these three articles account for nearly 
50 of the initial issue’s 130 pages, and offer one of the most in depth discussions of the 
journalistic medium as it existed at the end of the 18th century. Within this discussion, 
three determining aspects to the new media emerge; a new temporality, a new audience, 
and a new writing form. These three elements are more than interconnected; they are 
intrinsically linked, mutually substantiating aspects of an indivisible whole. The new, 
empty, but also self-reflexive, understanding of time is the space in which the journal 
article exists. It denotes both a unifying, universal now-time experienced simultaneously 
by all people, a universal experience journals as a medium were helping to establish, as 
well as reflecting a diverse, individualistic and relative experience of time as something 
intensely local and always in flux. The short, iterative, heterogenous writing forms within 
the journal reflected this new fascination with the current, with relative and transitory 
knowledge, stressing the need for multiple-perspectival, collaborative writing efforts. 
Temporality and audience thereby blend, with the writing form bending to the will of an 
unseen, heterogenous Many whose experiences journalists sought to capture as well as 
control: the irregularity and unknowability of the audience was viewed as a source of 
limitless potential, but one which needed to be carefully harnessed, educated and 
contained. The ephemeral, reading/listening/conversing public, real and imagined was 
therefore in a constant process of writing and being written by the journalistic form, all 
within a new, self-reflexive understanding of now-time. The remainder of this chapter will 
be dedicated to a discussion of these three constitutive elements of the Enlightened 
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journal medium at the end of the 18th century. While some attempt will be made to 
speak to each aspect individually, to explore its own unique character and contribution to 
the medium as a whole, it is impossible to create absolute boundaries between the three 
elements. Consequently, their discussion will likewise be iterative and recursive by 
necessity, reflecting their own interconnection. 
A new understanding and concern for the present moment and the relativity of 
time permeates all three introductory pieces. The combined editors write in “Von der 
Absicht” that while the interrelated sciences of pedagogy, philosophy and philology are 
the tools appropriate for “die gesittete Menschheit dermalen in Europa steht,” they are 
quick to concede that this knowledge is not universally applicable, and that: 
Es hat freilich Zeiten und Länder gegeben und giebt dergleichen noch in Asia, 
Afrika und Amerika, wo man von keinem philologischen Studio… wußte und weiß 
und doch -- wenn wir von den conventionellen Vorzügen abstrahiren und nur 
aufwahren und wesentlichen Menschenwerth sehen -- mit unter gar edle und 
trefliche Menschen bildete und noch bildet. (3) 
The editors explicitly link these “times and places” with those of ancient Greece, the 
paradigm of high cultural production in the 18th century, in order to underscore how 
seriously this cultural relativity is to be taken: there exist and have existed other worlds in 
which the knowledge contained within the pages of the ​Braunschweigisches Journal 
would be of little value. However, “jene Zeiten sind nicht die unsrigen; in jenen Ländern 
wohnen nicht wir, die wir in dem ablaufendem achtzehnten Jahrhundert und mitten in 
Europa unter einer zahllosen Menge neuer Verhältnisse und neuer Bedürfnisse, also 
auch andere Arten der Menschencultur und andere Mittel dazu;” drawing lines of 
demarcation around both the geographical area of Europe, and the time of the 
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“ablaufendem achtzehnten Jahrhundert,” allows the editors to make the claim that ​under 
these circumstances​, “Bei uns sind Litteratur und Wissenschaft das vorzüglichste, das 
allgemein beliebte, also auch das unentbehrlichste dieser Mittel,” with the “bei uns” once 
again underscoring the relative, relational value of this approach. This emergent idea of 
something like a Gegenwart, that is, a Jetztzeit, a ​temporal ​space which is both shared 
but individually experienced was new, and this newness can be felt in the proximity it 
shared with a lingering ​spatial​ understanding of Gegenwart: in a special edition of the 
Internationales Archiv für Sozialgeschichte der deutschen Literatur ​, Johannes Lehmann 
and others created a collection of essays which sought to explore the changing face of 
Gegenwart at the end of the 18th century by contrasting it with publications from the late 
17th century. As Lehmann notes in the introduction, “Editorial: ‘Gegenwart’ im 17. 
Jahrhundert? Zur Frage literarischer Gegenwartsbezüge vor der ‘Sattelzeit’” even by the 
end of the 18th century,  “‘Gegenwart’ wird bis zum Ende des letzten Drittels des 18. 
Jahrhunderts... noch allermeist gebraucht im Sinne von Anwesenheit, Präsenz, im 
selben Raum sein, mit dem eigenen Körper (beziehungsweise der Seele) auf die 
räumlich anwesende Umgebung wirken können” (110). 
The idea of Gegenwart prior to the late 18th century was intimately linked to the 
concept of an ever-present (gegenwärtig) God: what this meant was that there was no 
sense of the “now” as a discrete (temporal) place. As discussed in the first chapter, 
Koselleck’s famous distinction stipulated that prior to the “Sattelzeit,” people lived in a 
state of “eschatological time,” that is, in the no-time which existed between creation and 
the end of days. It is through this distinction that Koselleck is able to explain what the 
modern viewer perceives as the wild anachronicity of Albrecht Altdorfer’s 
Alexanderschlacht​, both in the intentionally anachronistic inclusion of banners carried by 
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the troops indicating the number of soldiers who will soon die in the coming battle, as 
well as the unintentionally anachronistic attire of the troops themselves, who are 
dressed, not like 3rd century B.C. Greek and Persian troops, but rather as 16th century 
A.D. Austrian and Ottoman soldiers, thereby merging the ancient and modern conflicts 
into a single struggle. Rather than indicating a mistake, what this reveals is a particular 
understanding of time. For Altendorfer, the battle between Alexander and the Persians 
and the Austrian conflict ​were​ the same, both part of the same eternal conflict between 
Christianity and the forces of darkness, a perfect expression of the time-less quality of 
eschatological time. Four years later, Benedict Anderson likewise picked up the thread of 
eschatological time in ​Imagined Communities​. Anderson noted that in the traditional 
world, time did not progress, but rather was prefigured, cyclical; every event indicated 
other events which had happened and would happen again, not in the progressive 
linkage of cause and effect but in the return of the perpetually same and as a result, the 
moment of existence itself was less a span of time than it was a single recurring day. 
Quoting Auerbach, Anderson highlights the a-temporal nature of prefigured time; that 
which occurs “is simultaneously something which has always been, and will be fulfilled in 
the future; and strictly, in the eyes of God, it is something eternal, something 
omnitemporal, something already consummated in the realm of fragmentary earthly 
event” (24). From the divine perspective posited by the traditional world, time is by 
necessity static. God is everywhere and every-when simultaneously, and the future, to 
the extent that it can be said to exist at all, is merely a substantiation of that which has 
been prophesized (as will be explored shortly, it is therefore less a future [Zukunft] and 
more a posterity [Nachwelt], something which follows and is already fixed). In this way, 
Anderson is able to explain the seemingly anachronistic dress of biblical figures in 
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religious iconography, for example “the Virgin Mary… figured as a Tuscan merchant’s 
daughter” in stain glass; while the artisans creating these works were blind to the 
“inaccuracy” of their creations, the nature of the “error” would have been 
incomprehensible and ultimately rejected (22). The Virgin Mary wasn’t a person who had 
existed for a certain length of time during a specific period in the historical past, but 
rather an eternal archetype who had been, was, and would always be in an ever 
returning cosmic dance. Time in traditional society was therefore a “juxtaposition of the 
cosmic-universal and the mundane-particular,” a mix which to the modern observer 
appears as a heterogeneous mish-mash of disparate elements but to those who 
experienced it was simply the symbolically charged eternal presence of the divine. 
To summarize: in the traditional world, time did not exist in any modern sense. 
The sun rose, the sun set, the stars turned, the seasons changed, but one did not live 
life ​in​ time, that is, life was not imagined as a journey through time/history, with each 
second, minute, hour, day, building on the past, a series of unique nows stacking 
towards infinity. Instead, the world was as frozen in amber, a crystalline edifice of divine 
will. What fascinates Koselleck and Anderson therefore is the temporalization of time. 
Koselleck attempts to reveal this shift by describing Friedrich Schlegel’s reception of 
Altdorfer’s work some 300 hundred years later “Schlegel weiß das Bild sowohl von 
seiner eigenen Zeit zu unterscheiden wie auch von der antiken Zeit, die es darstellen 
vorgibt. Die Geschichte hat für ihn eine spezifisch zeitliche Dimension, die bei Altdorfer 
offensichtlich fehlte” (18-19). Why is it that in the mere 300 years separating Schlegel 
and Altdorfer seemingly more time has passed than in the milenia separating Altdorfer 
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and Alexander the Great?  Before attempting to address the question of why and how 54
time became temporalized, it is worth noting that rather than an abrupt rupture, the 
dilation of something known as “the present” was a long process, and its becoming is 
very much visible in Campe’s defense of journalism. One of Campe’s chief rebuttals to 
Garve’s critique is the timeliness of journals:  
[I]ch bin versichert, daß die Journale, trotz ihrer ephemerischen Existenz, auch 
dadurch zur Erweiterung und Aufklärung des öffentlichen Ideenkreises, mehr 
geleistet haben, als manches vortrefliche literrarische Kunstwerk, welches 
vielleicht noch dann in Bibliotheken prangen wird, wann die Journale schon 
längst den Weg alles Makalaturs werden gegangen seyn. (34) 
The reason Campe gives for the greater effectiveness of journals over books in the 
spread of Enlightenment ideals is “daß darin mehr, als in andern Werken, Rücksicht auf 
die jedesmaligen Bedürfnisse der Zeit genommen wird” . So even as the physical form of 
the journal rots as “Makalatur,” the ideas contained within have achieved more influence 
due to their “jedesmaligen” relevance. “Der Werth einer jeden Art von Aufklärung und 
Belehrung ist, wie der Werth aller andern Dinge in der Welt, relativ, d.i. er steigt oder fällt 
in Beziehung auf unser jedesmaliges grösseres oder geringeres Bedürfniß oder in 
Beziehung auf den größern oder geringern Nutzen, den wir davon haben” (41). Just as 
pedagogy, philosophy and philology are of ​relative​ importance and utility to those 
peoples inhabiting Europe at the end of the 18th century, the journal’s value lies is in its 
ability to continually adjust to a constantly changing “present.” The newness of the idea 
can be felt in the terms used: Campe here does not talk about a stabilized, singular 
54 For a detailed look at ​why​ temporality was changing in the late 18th century, see Chapter 1, 
“The Disappearing World: Labor” 
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Present, but rather refers repeatedly to the “jedesmalig,” or “in every instance/moment” 
useful character of the journalistic medium. The Present is still elusive, something which 
must be described quite literally as a series of individual moments, each with its own 
unique “Bedürfnisse.” Campe tries to illustrate the idea of relative, temporal value 
through metaphor: 
Wer in einem ganz vorzüglich mückenreichen Sommer uns ein Mittel lehrte, 
diese Insecten uns vom Leibe zu halten, der würde sich zuverläßig weit 
verdienter um uns machen, als ein anderer, der uns zu eben der Zeit mit einem 
Arcanum an die Hand geben wollte, wie man Tiger, Löwen, Flußpferde und 
Elephanten bändigen könne. Und doch ist die Mücke nur ein erbärmlich kleines 
Object, der Elephant ein ungleich größeres! Also nicht das Object einer 
Belehrung an sich, sondern die Beziehung, die dasselbe auf unser Wohlseyn 
oder auf unser Uebelbefinden hat, bestimmt allein den verhältnißmäßigen Werth 
derselben. (42) 
The intent of this passage is clear: by comparing the seemingly insignificant problem of 
mosquito bites with being rent limb from limb by the world’s most fearsome animals, 
Campe is able to give an example where the ​relative​ value of knowledge is more 
significant than its ​absolute​ value. But the example provided nevertheless feels awkward 
to a modern reader: the difference between the dangers of a mosquito and a lion is less 
one of temporal than it is of spatial distance--it’s not as if there is a lion season in 
Braunschweig. However, the apparent clunkiness of Campe’s metaphor, rather than a 
failure of imagination, provided a necessary bridge to a particular understanding of time. 
In order for temporal difference to be understood, it was necessary to link it to spatial 
differences: on the one hand, the geographic difference between the Serengeti and the 
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Norddeutsches Tiefland, on the other the difference in scale between a hippopotamus 
and a mosquito. These differences were manifest, imaginable in a way that local, 
temporally situated challenges facing individuals were not.  
Part of the problem with understanding temporal difference in the way which is 
necessary to construct a temporal space known as “die Gegenwart,” a present which is 
“jedesmalig,” continually presenting new, unique challenges, is that this concept is 
fundamentally contingent on rupture with all that has preceded it. Heinz-Dieter Kittsteiner 
deals with this problematic in ​Naturabsicht und Unsichtbare Hand​, arguing that in the 
late 18th century, “Erfahrungsraum” and “Erwartungshorizont” were irrevocably blasted 
apart (34). This severing of expectation and experience occurred as the daily experience 
of the individual (“Erfahrungsraum”) continually confounded the realm of what was 
previously considered possible (“Erwartungshorizont”). Instead of experiencing life as an 
eternal return, the cosmic-universal recreated infinitely in the local and specific, new 
experiences create new expectations for the future, rendering all past experience 
irrelevant. Where history once had served as the ultimate teacher (historia magistra), 
with the past dictating both the present and future, in the modern it is within the present 
that the future is decided, a future which will be unlike either the past or the present in 
which it is created. This has fundamental implications for the kind of knowledge which is 
valued: instead of the historical, a premium is placed on new, relative, relational 
knowledge.  To return to the earlier quote from Campe, “Der Werth einer jeden Art von 
Aufklärung und Belehrung ist, wie der Werth aller andern Dinge in der Welt, relativ, d.i. 
er steigt oder fällt in Beziehung auf unser jedesmaliges grösseres oder geringeres 
Bedürfniß.” The value of knowledge is determined by the spatial ​and ​temporal location of 
the individual in relation to the rest of the ever changing world. And while Campe 
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concedes that “viele geistige und sittliche Bedürfnisse der Menschen von Jahrhundert zu 
Jahrhundert fast immer die nemlichen, und werden die nemlichen bleiben, so lange die 
Menschen Menschen sind,” what concerns him is another species of need, needs which 
“wechseln wie die Moden; entstehen und verschwinden oft eben so schnell als diese… 
Heute ist es daher diese, morgen jene Grille, von der er [der Mensch] sich irre leiten läßt; 
heute entsteht dadurch diese, morgen jene Modethorheit; Modeverblendung!” (42, 
42-43).  If the problems facing the public are indeed in a constant state of flux, what 55
better medium to address them than one which can change as rapidly as the challenges 
do? In order to provide information that is useful to relational, relative problems, Campe 
holds that it is necessary for the “Gemeinnützigkeit strebender Schriftsteller” to focus on 
the “sittliche Bedürfnisse” of his “Zeitgenosse,” rather than concern himself with the 
“Nachwelt,” “deren mögliche Bedürfnisse er nur vermuthen kann” (21). It is therefore not 
only historical knowledge, but additionally knowledge which was previously believed to 
be a-historical, a-temporal, eternal truths of life and existence which is called into 
question. The constantly shifting face of reality and the emergence of “die Gegenwart,” 
have destabilized a particular concept of Truth, and made its pursuit in Campe’s eyes a 
largely fruitless endeavor.  
This desire to find the appropriate cure for the “Modethorheiten” of one’s 
contemporaries highlights another important change linked to the emergence of a 
“Gegenwart:” the dilation of the present moment, the creation of a “now” in which 
55 The repeated use of “Mode” to describe the afflictions affecting the modern audience is 
significant, as the very idea of fashion itself was a relatively recent occurence, with the first 
fashion journals having appeared in Germany in the 1780s. As Wolfgang Cilleßen defines the 
concept in his essay “Modezeitschriften,”  “Der Begriff ​Mode ​bezeichnet… das Phänomen des 
permanenten Wandels der allgemein akzeptierten Kenntnisse und Wertvorstellungen und daraus 
resultierender gesellschaftlicher Verhaltensweisen, des Wandels des gängigen ästhetischen 
Geschmacks” (205). 
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humankind exists, is also the condition of possibility for the existence of free will. If free 
will exists, it can only exist in the here and now, in the moment to moment decisions 
made by the acting individual. The eschatological time of traditional society specifically 
precludes this possibility: the past is set, the future is known, and daily experience 
functions merely as a substantiation of the divine plan. It is only with the rupture of the 
present from the past, combined with the unknowability of the future, that free will 
becomes thinkable.  The reality, or at least possibility, of shaping the future brings with it 56
moral imperatives, as the individual grapples with how best to intervene in the current 
constellation of the present in order to ensure the best possible future outcome. For 
Campe, this is the ultimate duty of the journalist: 
Da ist es nun zwar die Pflicht eines jeden gemeinnützigen Schriftstellers 
überhaupt aber doch ganz besonders und recht eigentlich die eines 
Journalisten… von seinem Standorte aus rund um sich her zu blicken; das Thun 
und Lassen der innerhalb seines Gesichtskrieses ihr Wesen treibenden 
Zeitgenossen ruhig, unbefangen und scharf zu beobachten; zu bemerken, wann 
und wie sie von Zeit zu Zeit, ohne daß es ihnen ahndet, auf neue Irrwege 
gerathen oder alte, beinahe schon begrasete, von neuem wieder aufzutreten 
beginnen; ihnen dann sofort wohlwollend zuzurufen, sie über ihre Verirrung zu 
belehren, vor den Folgen derselben zu warnen, und sie so auf den Weg der 
Vernunft noch zu rechter Zeit zurückzuführen. (43) 
This passage shows all of the constitutive elements of the new understanding of 
Gegenwart. First, it demonstrates the intrinsic self-reflexivity of the modern 
56 For a further discussion of the reality of free will, see Chapter 2: Synthesizing Free Will and 
Material Determinism: A failed Resolution of Conflicting Enlightenment Ideals. 
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understanding of Gegenwart: Gegenwart is defined as an ever-changing present, 
recognized as unique from all preceding moments by the individual experiencing it. 
Second, this passage shows the fundamentally collective, aggregate nature of 
Gegenwart: the Gegenwart exists as the sum total of the web of all interactions between 
individuals, collectively determining an uncertain future. Together these two features 
combine to create a third aspect of the Gegenwart, what Johannes Lehmann refers to as 
the Gegenwart’s intrinsic “Implikationen für Politik und Öffentlichkeit,” in his article 
“‘Literatur der Gegenwart’ als politisches Drama der Öffentlichkeit” (193). By shifting to 
local perspectives and emphasizing individual agency, the creation and control of the 
future is no longer strictly the purview of the state through policy creation. Of course, 
institutional methods of control not only continued to exist but expanded radically in 
scope and societal penetration at this time, as indicated perhaps most famously by 
Michel Foucault in ​Discipline and Punish​: the idea of progressive time and a changeable 
future simultaneously exposed society to be an infinitely mutable object, something 
which could be squeezed or coerced into almost any form. But parallel to (and, as 
Lehmann points out, not entirely distinct from) institutional forms of regulation and control 
emerges not only the possibility of influence from “below,” but also the moral duty to 
enact social change where possible. This is what Campe means when he refers to the 
“Pflicht eines jeden gemeinnützigen Schriftsteller:” it is the patriotic duty of not only every 
author, but as will be shown in the following section, potentially every person within 
society to record, reflect and offer suggestions towards the improvement of the current 
moment. For this reason, Lehmann defines the patriotism of this era as “[d]ie 
Verhältnisse der Gegenwart zu verbessern, Missstände zu beobachten und auf sie mit 
Vorschlägen zu antworten” (“Literatur der Gegenwart” 207).  
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It is within this new sense of Gegenwart that journals emerged as ​the​ medium of 
expression. Time was no longer experienced as the static, infinite return of a prefigured 
past/present, but as a series of dynamic, lived moments which broke fundamentally from 
the past and were building to an unknown future. Instead of the truths contained in 
books, truths presumed to be as atemporal and unchanging as the reality upon which 
they commented, journals could provide information which was “current,” knowledge 
which could both comment on and change the present moment. The Gegenwart, as the 
collective interaction of all individual actors, could only be apprehended collectively, 
demanding not only that each journalist “von seinem Standorte aus rund um sich her zu 
blicken,” but also that the greater population be conscripted to the project of 
understanding and reality creation. The next section will examine the fundamental 
epistemological openness of the journalistic medium, arguing that its form, a form which 
was designed to foster and nourish the half-thoughts of the individual in the care of a 
unified public, was itself the product of a collaborative interaction between the authors 
and editors of the journals and an unseen, non-identical Many. 
 
VI. A question of Form: The Co-Authorship of the Many 
In his letter to Campe expressing skepticism over the journalistic medium, “Ein Einwurf 
wider die Nützlichkeit periodischer Schriften,” Christian Garve raises two primary 
critiques of periodical media. First, Garve questions the degree of collaboration among 
authors which actually occurs within the pages of journals, despite the “blendenden 
Schein” that bringing so many great names together may have: 
Aber sagen Sie mir, werden im Grunde die Gedanken derselben dadurch, daß 
sie in einem Bande zusammengedruckt sind, besser mit einander verbunden, 
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zielen sie genauer zu einem gemeinschaftlichen Zwecke ab, als wenn jeder ein 
eignes Buch geschrieben hätte, in welchem eben dieser Gegenstand wäre 
behandelt worden? (“Einwurf” 16) 
Garve’s question  is: does the act of publishing articles within the same physical pages 57
of a single journal constitute real collaboration? “Was entsteht für Vortheil für das 
Publicum, wenn Gelehrte, die an Fähigkeiten, Denkungsart und Absicht einander gleich, 
immer als gemeinschaftliche und Verbundene Arbeit im Reiche der Wahrheit angesehen 
werden können, ihre Aufssätze neben einander drukken lassen?” (Einwurf 17). As 
Garve’s phrasing implies, he believes the “Gelehrte” authors of the journal articles are 
already unified, not only in the “Reiche der Wahrheit,” but more importantly, within the 
minds of the audience itself “diese Vereinigung der Arbeiten geschieht besser in den 
Köpfen und Gemüthern der Leser, als in den Büchern der Schriftsteller” (“Einwurf” 16). 
Garve’s theory of reading and language, along with the journalistic alternative it 
produces, will be explored at length below: what is of importance now is that not only 
does Garve contend that no real collaboration happens within the journalistic medium, 
he argues further that the journalistic form is actively harming the intellectual production 
of the authors who take part in it. Garve sees this as a necessary side-effect of human 
nature: humans are naturally motivated by “Ehrbegierde und durch die Begierde nach 
Vortheil” (“Einwurf” 16). These selfish motivations are best satisfied by individual 
publication, and not through becoming one of dozens of listed authors, or even worse, 
being published anonymously within a journal. The result of publishing in this manner is, 
“daß selbst die guten Köpfe, die sich zu solchen periodischen Schriften vereinigen, für 
57 Incidentally, a question which still plagues conference panels and academic journals to this 
day. 
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dieselben nur die flüchtiger gearbeiteten Aufsätze bestimmen, die vielleicht eben so gut 
dem Publico ganz entzogen werden konnten” (“Einwurf” 17-18). Not only does this 
negatively affect the quality of the articles published within the journal, Garve believes 
that the time commitments of producing for journals, combined with the kind of slovenly 
writing which journalism encourages, can prevent great writers from publishing works of 
lasting value. Throughout his critique, Garve remains characteristically deferential and 
open to rebuttal, and also recognizes that such collaborative writing is necessary “wenn 
das Publicum zu gewissen bestimmten Zeiten ununterbrochen mit Untericht oder mit 
Unterhaltung versorgt werden soll;” nevertheless, Garve allows himself “einem Freunde 
meine Meinung über diese Puncte aufrichtig mitzutheilen,” and brings this opinion 
sharply into focus one last time: “Je größer die Zahl der Mitarbeiter wird: desto 
unvollkommner, oder wenigstens desto ungewisser wird der Erfolg des Werks” (16, 19). 
Campe’s measured response begins by picking up on Garve’s assertion that, for 
good or for ill, journalism has become ​the​ medium of the late 18th century, a time when 
“die Hauptlectüre des Publicums in Journalen Besteht, und wo der Strom der 
gemeinnützigsten Ideen und Belehrungen aus so vielen guten, zum Theil vortreflichen 
Köpfen, sich in das Bett der periodischen Schriften drängt,” (“Beantwortung” 19). The 
very ubiquity of journals makes answering Garve’s challenges all the more pressing; to 
do so, Campe turns to metaphor: 
Ich könnte Ihren Einwurfe zuvörderst und im Allgemeinen entgegensetzten, daß 
der moralische Arzt, wie der physische, wenn er es mit verzärtelten und 
eigensinnigen Kranken zu thun hat, sich in Ansehung des Vehikels seiner 
Heilmittel, der Wirksamkeit derselben und seiner eigenen Würde unbeschadet, 
gar wol nach dem Geschmacke oder den Launen seines Patienten bequemem 
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dürfe, und in Fällen, wo sich nichts ertrotzen läßt, sich darnach bequemen 
müsse. Ich könnte hinzufügen, daß dem zufolge ein nach Gemeinnützigkeit 
strebender Schriftsteller, der mehr auf seine Zeitgenossen, deren wirkliche 
sittliche Bedürfnisse er kennt, als auf die Nachwelt, deren mögliche Bedürfnisse 
er nur vermuthen kann, zu wirken wünscht, keine von dem jedesmaligen 
herrschenden Geschmacke seines Publicums ihm vorgeschriebene Form und 
Einkleidungsart seinser moralischen Recepte verschmähen dürfe; und daß man 
daher, wenn dieses sein Publicum einmal auf die sonderbare Grille verfiele, 
nichts als Frachtzettel lesen zu wollen, es ihm zur Weisheit anrechen müßte, 
wenn er sich auch dazu bereitwillig finden ließe, ihm seinen Rath, seine 
Vorschläge und Belehrungen im Geleite Gottes durch Fuhrmann N.N. zu senden. 
Denn was ist Weisheit, wenn sie nicht wahl der besten und wirksamsten Mittel zu 
guten Zwecken ist? (“Beantwortung” 20-21) 
I have reproduced this rather long passage in its entirety, because within it, Campe 
succinctly brings together temporality, writing form, the authorial/editorial desire for 
control, and, most importantly, the influence of audience demand. The temporality 
present here has already been quoted and discussed at length: journals are the medium 
of the Now, dealing with current, unique problems afflicting the modern audience. The 
positioning of journal authors as the “moralische Ärzte” of society is telling, but 
unsurprising, particularly in the context of a pedagogical publication: as previously 
mentioned, and as discussed in the first chapter, the latent violence of the Enlightenment 
has long been understood. The Enlightenment meant both freedom from serfdom as well 
as freedom from the means of production, freedom from corporal punishment as well as 
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the freedom to do violence to the self, freedom from myth and the unfreedom of the 
natural sciences and capitalism.  
What is uniquely illuminated within this passage is the close linkage of writing 
form and audience, and the agency indicated. Again and again, it is the imagined 
audience, not the authors or editors of the journals, who dictate the form of the medium: 
it is the “Geschmack” the “sonderbare Grille” of the public “verzärtelten und 
eigensinnigen Kranken” whose will is demonstrated in the format peculiar to journals. 
The “doctor,” by contrast may, or rather ​must​ accommodate “den Launen seines 
Patienten.” Campe, echoing Garve, states that would-be authors currently find 
themselves in times in which the ​audience ​“durchaus monatlich unterhalten seyn will,” 
times “wo man sich also gezwungen sieht, entweder mit dem Monden zu laufen oder 
sich ein Publicum in dem Monde zu suchen.” For Campe, the question as to the absolute 
value of the periodical medium is moot: it is the form of writing the audience demands, 
and it is this form which “wol unmöglich ohne eine Zusammentreten mehrerer 
Schriftsteller ins Daseyn kommen oder sein Daseyn langen behaupten könne.” Audience 
and form are inextricably linked, and it is the authors who must scramble together to 
meet their specific demands. Finally, there is no “vorgeschriebene Form und 
Einkleidungsart” dictated by this public of which the author-as-moral-doctor can be 
ashamed for “seiner moralischen Recepte.”  
What form did these “moralischen Recepte” take? And who is imagined to be the 
“eigensinnigen Kranken” who make up the audience receiving them? To turn first to the 
form of the writing (to the extent that talking about form is possible without discussing 
audience), it is useful to return to Campe’s hypothetical of the “Frachtzettel:” should the 
audience demand “nichts als Frachtzettel lesen zu wollen,” then according to Campe, 
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the author must accept as the only wise course “seine Vorschläge und Belehrungen im 
Geleite Gottes durch Fuhrmann N.N. zu senden.” The “Frachtzettel” as a form of writing 
must be read as a productive provocation on the part of Campe: where Garve had 
worried that even that writing form which already existed within scholarly journals of the 
Gelehrte was producing slovenly works which “vielleicht eben so gut dem Publico ganz 
entzogen werden konnten,” Campe claims by contrast that there should be no limits 
placed on the form of writing; as a hypothetical example, the “Frachtzettel” and its 
method of delivery, the fictional “Fuhrmann N.N.,” have been selected as the “lowest” 
form of writing imaginable in order to push this hypothesis to its logical extremes. It 
would initially appear that Campe is arguing that there exists no connection between the 
kind of knowledge conveyed and the form of its conveyance; that ​Hamlet ​could just as 
easily have adorned powerball tickets, or ​A Room of One’s Own​ could have been 
released in a series of Tweets, without fundamentally changing the nature of the works. 
This is not the case: Campe readily acknowledges that there are kinds of knowledge 
which do not lend themselves to the “Frachtzettel:”  
...Werke des Geistes, welche eine genau bestimmte Einheit des Plans, Einheit 
der Manier und des Tons, feste Verbindung und wohl abgemessene Symmetrie 
zwischen den einzelnen Theilen erfordern, wie das z.B. bei jedem guten 
Gedichte, bei jedem drammatischen Stücke, bei jedem wissenschaftlichen 
Systeme und bei jeder als ein besonderes Ganze bearbeiteten Geschichte mehr 
oder weniger der Fall ist. (21-22) 
Any work which requires a unity of “Plan,” “Manier” or “Ton,” any work which requires 
symmetry  or a systematic linking of the small with the whole is necessarily excluded 
from the clutches of Fuhrmann N.N. Taken together, this means that all artistic and 
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scientific (in the sense of closed, internally coherent systems) are necessarily excluded 
from the pages of the Frachtzettel/Journal, or rather, if they do appear in limited form 
there, they cannot be the collective result of a collaboration between authors. Which 
begs the question: if the knowledge produced within “ein periodisches Werk vermischten 
Inhalts” is neither scientific nor artistic, is unified neither through schema, style or tone, 
what kind of knowledge is it? The positive description of the knowledge produced within 
monthly Enlightenment journals is the inverse: where a work of a genius is, by its very 
definition, singular in its origin, the knowledge of journals is collective and collaborative. 
Where the knowledge of the sciences and arts is internally consistent, symmetrical, 
homogenous and closed, the knowledge of journals is heterogenous, contentious, plastic 
and incomplete. Rather than the same information packaged differently, the journalistic 
knowledge of the late 18th century represents a fundamentally different ideal of 
knowledge production, one which owed its existence to the emergence of a non-identical 
Many and which disappeared as the radical heterogeneity of this group was reinscribed 
into new social classes. 
When the editors of the ​Braunschweigisches Journal ​attempt to describe the kind 
of “Gegenstände” which their fledgling journal will contain, they describe a hybrid 
knowledge: 
Wir wollen... weder ganz ausgemachte Wahrheiten mit ihren bekannten Gründen 
von neuem vortragen, noch unsere eigenen Privatmeinungen, Vorstellungsarten 
und Ueberzeugungen geltend zu machen und zu verbreiten suchen; sondern wir 
wollen uns bemühen -- und wir bitten alle unsere Leser und Beurtheiler sich 
dieses wohl zu merken -- den öffentlichen Unterssuchungsgeist anzuregen und 
zu nähren, und ihn auf solche Gegenstände zu lenken, welche für die 
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Menschheit vorzüglich wichtig sind, weil sie die fortschreitende Menschenbildung 
und Menschenbeglückung durch Erziehung und Aufklärung betreffen. (“Absicht” 
6)  
The editors seek something which lies between “ausgemachte Wahrheiten” and 
“Privatmeinungen” because “Wir wollen nicht dogmatisiren, sondern zu eigenen 
Untersuchungen reizen:” in this instance, the type of knowledge sought for the journal is 
framed strictly through its pedagogical function. “Dieser Vorsatz gründet sich auf die 
Ueberzeugung, daß es viel verdienstlicher sey, den Menschen Veranlassung und 
Anstoß zur eigenen Untersuchung und Prüfung zu gehen, als sie schlechthin zu 
belehren, auch wenn man der ausgemachten Wahrheiten noch so viel vor Andern zu 
besitzen wähnte.” This conviction is followed by the most likely already well-worn truism 
“so wie es uns auch in leiblichen Dingen viel wohlthätiger und nützlicher zu seyn scheint, 
dem Dürftigen Gelegenheit zum eigenen Erwerb zu verschaffen, als ihm das Geld mit 
vollen Händen baar und blank in den Schooß zu werfen, auch wenn man noch so 
vermögend wäre.” However, the claim that the choice of incomplete truths is ​only 
pedagogical is undermined even as it is written--the would be owner of “ausgemachten 
Wahrheiten” only ​believes ​(“wähnte”) to possess these solid truths to a greater degree 
than their peers, and even within the allegory, the beneficiary’s hypothetical ability to 
grant great riches directly is only given through the conditional “wäre.”  
Another possibility for the openness of the ideas within the journal is presented 
on the next page, namely the editors are interested in collecting “in unserm 
Gesichtskreise liegende Angelegenheiten und Fragen, worüber die Stimmen der 
Untersucher und Forscher bis jetzt noch getheilt geblieben sind” (7). The “Gegenstände” 
of the journal are therefore to be specifically those objects for which no “ausgemachte 
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Wahrheiten” exist, and rather, these truths are to be generated in interaction between 
collaborating authors and with the public itself: “Wir laden daher alle… ihnen 
problematisch oder völlig ungegründetscheinende Ideen und Behauptungen zu finden 
meinen, hiermit ein, die Gründe ihrer entgegengesetzten Meinung dem Publico in 
diesem Journale vorzulegen.” In the “Vorbericht” of the ​Blätter Vermischten Inhalts​, 
established one year earlier, the editors similarly appeal to their audience for the 
submission of half-ideas of this sort: 
Wer auch nicht Zeit hat, uns völlig ausgearbeitete Aufsätze zu geben, wird uns 
doch durch Mittheilung zweckmäßiger Nachrichten, Vorschläge, Berichtigungen 
u.s.w. eine fast eben so wesentliche hülfe leisten. Auch ist es gewiß, daß 
aufmerksame Landwirthe und Hausväter oft Erfahrungen machen, deren 
Kenntniß auch andern nützlich seyn würde, die aber gewöhnlich mit ihnen wieder 
ausstirbt, so daß andere dies immer von neuem durch eigenen Schaden lernen 
müssen. (“Vorbericht” 4) 
Here the lines between audience/authors, Gelehrten/Ungelehrten is muddied beyond 
recovery; the public as a whole is deputized as “Wahrheitsforscher” by the editors of the 
Braunschweigisches Journal​. Here, once again, the multiperspectival make-up of the 
Gegenwart is laid bare--there is no way to gain an overview of the truth(s) of the present 
moment except through the aggregation of as much individual experience as possible. 
Stated more strongly, at the end of the 18th century, journal authors and editors believed 
the truth to be in its essence collective. It is within this context that the editors of the 
Braunschweigisches Journal​ note that it would be terrible to imagine “daß der Spielraum 
unsers Forschungstreibes von den knappen Grenzen unserer jedesmaligen ärmlichen 
Einsichten für immer eingeschlossen sey,” suggesting instead that through collaborative, 
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collective effort it will be possible to achieve “neue Aussichten in das unermeßliche 
Reich der ewigen Tochter des göttlichen Verstandes, der allbeglückenden Wahrheit zu 
eröfnen!” (“Absicht” 9) 
In his response to Garve, Campe once again picks up the thread of the “[nicht] 
ausgemachte Wahrheiten,” and attempts to speculate more specifically about their 
possible nature and origin: 
Wie manche interessante und gemeinnützige Idee, die in dem denkenden Kopfe 
oft beiläufig hervorspringt, und sich nicht grade an diejenige Gedankenreihe 
anschließt, die er eben jetzt im Begriff ist, zu irgend einem größern Werke 
zusammenzuketten, würde für die Wissenschaften, würde für den menschlichn 
Verstand vielleicht unwiederbringlich verloren gehn, wenn der denkende Kopf, 
bevor er sie mittheilte, erst jedesmal auf eine, vielleicht nimmer erscheinende 
Gelegenheit warten sollte, sie in eins oder das andere seiner größern Werke 
einzuschieben! (“Beantwortung” 33) 
What this passage makes clear is the a-disciplinarity of the half-thought: they occur 
specifically outside the realm of not only the systemic, disciplined thoughts of the 
thinking individual, but also potentially beyond that individual’s own limited expertise: 
Man kann doch nicht aus jeder zufälligen Bemerkung, auf die man im Vorbeigehn 
stößt, nicht aus jeder wahrscheinlichen Vermuthung, die uns mitten unter andern, 
ganz heterogenen Beschäftigungen einfällt, nicht aus jeder kleinen Entdeckung, 
die uns vielleicht, ohne geflissentliches Suchen in einem Fache gelingt, welches 
nicht grade das unsrige ist, solgeich ein Buch machen und sie so in die Welt 
ausgehen lassen… (“Beantwortung” 33-34) 
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Time and again, the kind of half-thought Campe is describing is posited over and against 
the systemic, closed, disciplinary “größern Werke” which he argues the book as a 
medium is designed to contain. The thoughts which find a home in journals are “kleine 
Entdeckungen,” “wahrscheinliche Vermuthungen,” heterogeneous insights which reflect 
the heterogeneous lives of those who birth them. In other words, they are the “beiläufige 
Kinder des Geistes” which need to be given over to the “öffentlichen Pflege und weitern 
Ausbildung” of those who “vielleicht mehr Zeit und mehr Sorgfalt darauf verwenden 
können,” and ​not​ lost in a “Leibnischen Schubladen,” to be forgotten to the world, at best 
cobbled together posthumously, if at all. The pages of a journal such as the 
Braunschweigisches Journal,​ ​Blätter Vermischten Inhalts,​ ​Berlinische Monatsschrift, ​or 
the ​Teutsche Merkur​ are designed therefore not only as an open school for all those who 
write and read their pages, but also for the ideas contained on the pages themselves, 
ideas which first take their shape within an exchange between the many adoptive 
parents of the “beiläufige Kinder des Geistes.” These journals were intended from the 
very outset as medium to be formed in the space between a collective of reader/authors, 
a medium which could exceed the possibilities of the book form: everything is “kürzer 
und gedrungener” than when an author feels “seine Materie zu einem ganzen Buche 
ausspinnen muß.” The purpose of a journal, to bind “Unterhaltung und Belehrung, 
Vergnügen und Nutzen,” allows for a medium with a “picantern Ton,” and a greater 
plasticity, one which can reach deeply into the unknown recesses of “das Publicum” 
(“Beantwortung” 41). 
  
VII. “Gutdenkende Leute aus allen Ständen:” Reaching for the Many 
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Of course, when it came time to discuss for whom, exactly, the editors of the 
Braunschweigisches Journal​ believed they were writing, and who, exactly, it was who 
could step in and foster the nascent ideas to be found within the journal, the editors 
remain elusive. As a specifically pedagogical journal, the editors write they are interested 
in all topics which could exist “in dem Geischtskreise des Schulmanns, des Erziehers, 
des Beförderers der öffentlichen Aufklärung,” by which they mean ideas which are 
“gemeinnützig und nicht bloß für den Humanisten von Profession wichtig ist” (“Absicht” 
13). This hazy listing of professions/descriptors paired with the negative description that 
they are not interested only in serving those who are “Humanisten von Profession,” was 
typical for journals of this time. In the “Vorbericht” of the ​Blätter vermischten Inhalts​, they 
begin by stating that “[d]iese Blätter sind zum Nutzen und Vergnügen zunächst für 
unsere Mitbürger aus allen Ständen und namentlich auch für den nachdenkenden 
Bürger und Landmann bestimmt,” later asking “daß unsere Leser diese Schrift bloß als 
eine Zusammenkunft betrachten mögen, wo sich gutdenkende Leute aus allen Ständen, 
Prediger, Rechtsgelehrte, Cameralisten, Ärzte, Künstler, Hausleute, und wer sonst 
etwas gemeinnütziges weiß oder hören mag, mit einander über allerley Dinge 
freundschaftlich unterreden” (6). From this description, it is clear that the editors are 
trying to cast as wide a net of potential readers as they can--people, people from the 
country, city, any estate, from traditional literate professions down to “Hausleute” and in 
fact anyone who knows something or would simply like to learn something is welcome to 
join their “Zusammenkunft” (“Vorbericht” 3, 6). Others framed the influx of new potential 
participants less favorably: in Wieland’s “Vorrede” to ​Teutsche Merkur, ​ after having 
described its imagined role of delivering unbiased reviews of important new works, he 
notes “daß viele Leser sich selbst ein Gesetz sind, und keine fremde Leitung vonnöthen 
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haben”--unfortunately, this group makes up only “einen kleinen Theil des lesenden 
Publici,” a reading public which “täglich zahlreicher wird,” and of which “der größere Theil 
gerade derjenige ist, für den man am meisten besorgt seyn muß” (XX).  
Campe grapples with the question of who might read a journal and why 
frequently in his response to Garve. Returning to the potential advantages of periodicals 
over and against books, Campe emphasizes the ability of journals to better circulate 
through a populace: 
[Denn erstens] sind sie ein wohlausgesonnenes und zweckmäßiges Mittel, 
nützliche Kenntnisse jeder Art aus den Köpfen und Schulen der Gelehrten durch 
alle Stände zu verbreiten. Sie die Münze, wo die harten Thaler und Goldstükke 
aus den Schatzkammern der Wissenschaften welche nie oder selten in die Hand 
der Armen kamen, zu Groschen und Dreiern geprägt werden, um als solche 
durchs ganze Land zu rouliren und zuletzt wol gar in den Hut des Bettlers zu 
fallen. (32) 
Campe imagines a kind of trickle-down economics of ideas: in this telling, some 
“nützliche Kenntnisse jeder Art” begin their lives in the minds of the Gelehrte, too large 
and complex in their initial form for dissemination. It is only by breaking these ideas into 
smaller component pieces, that is to carry through the analogy, into short and accessible 
journal articles intended for a wide and not necessarily educated audience, that these 
ideas are able to circulate through the public--not only into the hands of “der Armen,” but 
into the beggar’s hat. This last metaphorical flourish is significant, as it represents most 
likely an indirect transference of knowledge: the smaller denominations come first to the 
relatively poor and only then through these poor to the utterly destitute. What Campe 
here imagines is most likely an accurate depiction of reading culture as it existed at the 
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end of the 18th century and described at the beginning of this chapter: by breaking great 
intellectual and social debates into the smaller, letter length (and many were indeed 
merely published letters, or written in the style of letters), they become transferable. 
Whereas it is doubtful that Kant’s ​Metaphysik der Sitten​ was read aloud in churches and 
town halls, the articles contained within ​Braunschweigisches Journal,​ or ​Berlinische 
Monatsschrift​ could have been, and so have reached not only the newly literate, but also 
through the culture of reading aloud, all of those adjacent to the newly literate.  In his 58
article “Wider das Lateinschreiben: an den Herrn Direktor Gedike,” published in the 
Berlinische Monatsschrift​ in 1783, Johann Stuve likewise uses an economic metaphor to 
explain how the task of spreading the Enlightenment has expanded beyond the 
Gelehrten, in this case thanks to the majority of scholarly writing switching from Latin to 
the vernacular: 
Der Umlauf der Kenntnisse, der Entdekkung und Erfindungen in den 
Wissenschaften unter den Nationen ist nie so groß gewesen als izt, da die 
Schriftsteller mehr als jemals in ihrerer Muttersprache Schreiben… Nunmehr 
verbreiten sich Aufklärung und Wissenschaft unter alle Stände; die sogenannten 
Studirten sind nicht mehr die alleinigen Inhaber und Monopolisten derselben. 
Reisende, und Geschäftsleute aller Art verpflanzen und vertheilen sie in alle 
Länder und Welttheile. So wie der Handel und das Verkehr unter den Nationen 
58 This isn’t to say that Kant was unconcerned with bringing his own ideas into circulation. First of 
all, Kant was a frequent contributor to journals, as evidenced by articles such as “Was ist 
Aufklärung?,” published in the ​Berlinische Monatsschrift​. Furthermore, within this context, his 
Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten ​can be viewed as his attempt at something like a more 
accessible, journalistic version of his ideas. Further, it could be argued that Kant even wrote his 
own “Frachtzettel” in the categorical imperative: the most simple distillation of his philosophy 
possible, something which he argues is understood even by those who have not even read it. 
177 
zunehmen, nimmt auch die Mittheilung der Kenntnisse und Wissenschaften zu, 
wozu die Gelehrten vom Handwerk nicht immer das meiste beitragen. 
Both authors thereby shift a portion of the process of enlightenment beyond the 
Gelehrten, greatly expanding the population who is imagined taking part in both the 
transference, and in Stuve’s example, the creation of knowledge. The linking of media, 
language and economy is likewise telling: the restructuring of society is occurring in 
tandem with changes in these three “currencies,” and with these changes, the place of 
the individual within society is likewise shifting. Campe continues that while books may 
be convenient for the intellectually “wealthy,” knowledge in this format does little to help 
the rest of society. In order to illustrate this point, Campe divides society into three 
classes of knowledge/wealth: the “Schatzmeister” and “Banquiers,” that is, the Kants, 
Garves and Wielands of the world, those responsible for greatly increasing the wealth of 
the “Nationalbank” (32). Below them he introduces a middle class, to which he modestly 
includes himself, those who “oft nur ein Zweigroschenstück zu erwerben wissen, und 
gleichwol auch dieses Zweigroschenstück gar zu gern in die öffentlichen Fonds zum 
öffentlichen Nutzen legen mögten.” At the very bottom of the economic pyramid of 
intellectual wealth he places “das Publicum,” that is, “Kreti und Pleti, welche nichts 
erwerben, und doch auch leben wollen, und doch auch an dem Nationalreichthum des 
Geistes, wäre es auch nur zu Leibes Nahrung und Nothdurft, Antheil nehmen mögten.” 
The interchange of ideas between these very different, but nevertheless now 
interconnected classes of people is precisely the kind of communication Campe believes 
the periodical journals can foster. The journals provide the “Scheidemünze” through 
which ideas “so durchs ganze Publicum in wohlthätigen Umlauf gebracht wird,” 
penetrating down to even the most desperately needy. 
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Not content with leaving the poorest described merely as “Kreti und Pleti,” 
Campe attempts one last deep dive into the imagined recesses of the reading public. He 
does this by postulating two very different kinds of readers who would conceivably 
benefit from journal media. The first reader is the nightmare case of the would-be 
enlightener, the high-society boor. Campe paints a vivid picture of this “verfeinerten 
Lesewelt:” they are “unstäte, weichliche, jede Art von Anstrengung fliehende, nur nach 
Vergnügungen der Sinne und der Einbildungskraft rastlos haschende, an Leib und Seele 
verzärtelte Menschen” (36-37). Nevertheless, even these “gute Leute,”  
...wollen denn doch auch einen gewissen Anstrich von Litteratur haben; wollen 
denn doch auch ein Wörtchen mitschwätzen, wenn in Gesellschaften von 
Litteratur geschwätz wird; wollen denn doch auch die langweiligen 
Zwischenräume zwischen ihren eigenlichen Berufsgeschäften--den 
Toilettenoperationen, den zu gebenden und anzunehmenden Besuchen, den 
Assembleen, den Spieltischen den Spectakeln und Prachtmahlzeiten,--mit irgend 
etwas ausfüllen, welches das… Spaßhaft genug ihren Geist zu nenne belieben, 
verhindern kann, sich in sich selbst, d.i. ins Vacuum zu versenken. (37) 
These most aggravating of readers are not interested in the pursuit of truth. They have 
no desire to achieve any degree of personal perfection in the sense debated so 
energetically within the Gelehrten circles.  They are soft, vain creatures, fleeing from 59
any sort of mental or physical challenge, interested only in the appearance of knowledge 
and culture. The image drawn here is unmistakably feminine, but the division between 
good and bad readers does not itself follow gender lines, as will become clear in the 
discussion of the ideal, non-gelehrten reader. Instead, a specific kind of femininity is 
59 Or as posited by Lenz, see Chapter 2: Synthesizing Free Will and Material Determinism 
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married to the activities of courtly life--a life full of meaningless social visits and hosted 
parties, gaming tables and empty spectacle. As the former tutor to Alexander and 
Wilhelm von Humboldt and one time Feldprediger to the crown prince’s regiment while 
stationed in Potsdam, Campe was no stranger to courtly life, and it is this class/estate 
which is roundly condemned as a “Vacuum” of no value, one which constantly threatens 
to consume those who inhabit it. It is this audience which “uns fast kein anderes Mittel 
[als Journalen] mehr übrig läßt;” it is this audience which Campe has a hard time 
imagining “ein Buch von dem Umfange und von dem tiefgedachten ernsten Inhalte Ihres 
[Garves] Cicero’s zur Hand zu nehmen, noch weniger ein solches Buch vom Anfange bis 
zu Ende nachdenkend durchzulesen” (36, 37).   60
Campe, on the other hand, ​can ​imagine how such a person would come to pick 
up the latest issue of the ​Braunschweigisches Journal ​, a process he depicts in vivid 
detail: 
Da sehen Sie nun, wenn nicht grade ein neuer Roman oder etwas Aehnliches 
zur Hand liegt, begierig nach einem Büchlein mit gefärbtem Umschlage aus, weil 
sie zum voraus wissen oder ahnden, daß sie darin wenigstens etwas finden 
werden, welches ihrem gegenwärtigen, der Vernichtung nahen Zustande 
angemessen ist. Diese Etwas wird aufgesucht und verschlungen. Jetzt ist es 
hinunter; aber die lange schwerfällige Stunde ist noch nicht zur Hälfte 
vorbeigekrochen. Was ist zu thun? Man blättert das Büchlein noch einmal durch; 
stößt auf einen Aufssatz, der zwar ernsthaften und bloß belehrenden-Inhalts, 
aber doch auch so kurz ist, daß man das Bisschen Kraft, welches zu Durchlesen 
60 Garve’s intent with his work on Cicero will be discussed in greater detail in the final section of 
the chapter, “The Journalistic Form seeps into Books.” 
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desselben erfordert wird, sich wol allenfalls noch zutrauen darf. Man wagt sich 
daran; und siehe! das Abentheuer wird glücklich bestanden; und siehe! es 
belieben wol gar ein Paar Ideen kleben, die auf eine odere die andere Weise, 
früh oder spät, zu Aufklärung und Veredelung auch dieser Seele ihre guten 
Dienste thun.  
The lazy, spiritually decrepit individual, driven to the brink of the abyss by their own 
moral dissolution, reaches for the “Büchlein mit gefärbtem Umschlage,” its very size and 
ornamentation telling them without words that it contains lighter diversions, not unlike 
those contained within the pages of the latest “Roman”--perhaps Campe imagines them 
flipping to the paragraph-length news items always printed at the end of the journal. 
These read, but with the experience of empty time still crushing down on them, they turn 
to a more serious essay, but one whose length communicates (again, non-verbally) its 
accessibility; perhaps in this inaugural edition they are interested to read a scant ten 
pages “Ueber die Glaubenspflicht,” or maybe local interests prompt them to learn more 
“Ueber das große Waisenhaus in Braunschweig” over the course of 12 diminutive pages. 
In either case, it is the length of the article, the accessible style of the writing which 
enables even this person (a person Campe refers to as “ein Extrem,” and one whose 
creation was the result of no little effort) to inadvertently take a small step towards 
enlightenment, leading to Campe’s triumphant, rhapsodic repetition of “und siehe!” and 
the conclusion “Der Dank dafür gebührt dem Journalisten; ohne ihn, ohne sein 
Zumachen wissen… würden diese Ideen dieser Seele wol niemals zugespielt worden 
seyn. Und das Journalwesen sollte nicht zu den gemeinnützigen Erfindungen gehören?” 
(38). Imagination and reality bend together in the illustrated scene: there does not exist a 
shadow of a doubt in Campe’s mind that scenes like this have and will play out countless 
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times across the German speaking world, and that the journalistic media is the ​only 
“Mittel” through which these ailing souls can be reached. 
But again, this represents for Campe the absolute worst case scenario, those 
readers rendered the most inaccessible, not through personal hardship but rather 
through the specific constitution of their estate, a constitution which has made them 
infertile (but, importantly, not sterile) ground for enlightened thought. This prompts 
Campe to ask, “geschieht das am dürren Holze, was wirds am grünen Seyn?,” that is, 
what does an ideal, non-Gelehrten reader look like?: 
Wie mancher schwerbelastete Hausvater, wie manche edle Hausmutter, welche 
ihre ganze Tageszeit der Erziehung ihrer Kinder und der Sorge für ihr 
Hauswesen widmet--also wie viel gute und achtungswürdige Menschen, die 
keine Zeit haben, größere Werke, die im Zusammenhange gelesen seyn wollen, 
für sich und ihren Geist zu nützen, finden etwan am Abend eines in rastloser 
Thätigkeit verlebten Tages in einem Journalaufsatze von etlichen Bogen 
Erholung, Vergnügen und Nutzen... (38, 39) 
In contrast to the noble estate, whose empty hours creep by, the lives of these 
“achtungswürdige Menschen” are marked by relentless activity and work. Where the 
noble socialite reader requires short articles as a result of their own inability to sustain 
any form of physical or mental exertion, those same short articles are likewise a 
necessity for this “grünes Holz” because Campe imagines them lacking the time 
necessary to read works of greater length and complexity, or works which require that 
the reader have the necessary “Zusammenhang” in order to be understood. And who 
are these readers? They are once again the “Hausleute” obliquely referenced in the 
“Vorbericht” to the ​Blätter vermischten Inhalts​: they are both the Hausväter ​and​ the 
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Hausmütter, people whose “ganze Tageszeit der Erziehung ihrer Kinder und der Sorge 
für ihr Hauswesen widmet.” Before exploring the implications of including women within 
the intended audience, it is worth applying the currency metaphor to this description of 
household reading practice: journals are intended ​not only​ for the rich philosophers and 
professional pedagogues, ​not only​ for those with a metaphorical “two cents” to 
contribute, that is, limited practical experience which may nevertheless provide new 
insights to the public as a whole, ​not only​ for “Kreti und Pleti,” who have nothing to 
contribute directly to the discourse but nevertheless wish to take part in only “zu Leibes 
Nahrung und Nothdurft,” ​but also​ “gar in den Hut des Bettlers zu fallen.” Read within this 
context, the “Hausvater und Hausmutter” are most likely only the second to last wrung 
within the economic pyramid of knowledge, those whose busy and productive lives 
preclude more active participation but who nevertheless hunger for spiritual sustenance, 
which they receive through the pages of the journal. To follow the metaphor to its 
conclusion, the beggars, then, are all those who benefit indirectly through the 
dissemination of knowledge via journals. Campe and the other editors and authors of 
periodicals like the ​Braunschweigisches Journal​ were not so deluded as to believe that 
their writing could be read by the entirety of the German speaking world. They knew the 
reading populace, though expanding, nevertheless accounted for only a miniscule 
fraction of the larger population. However, what the currency metaphor indicates is that 
they simultaneously understood that directly reading the pages of a journal article was 
perhaps the exceptional case and not the rule, and that the majority of their audience 
would experience their writing through other means, such as communal reading 
practices or other social interactions. To imagine with Campe: perhaps the Hausvater or 
Hausmutter reads articles of interest aloud to the household, a household which at this 
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time would have still contained a near-majority of non-biological family members, eating 
at the same table and sharing the common spaces of the home. Or perhaps it is hoped 
that these articles, now exchanged into more easily transferable denominations will 
exchanged in markets, churches and other public spaces across the nation.  
To return to the explicit inclusion of women within the subset of ideal 
non-Gelehrten readers, York-Gothart Mix notes in “Medien für Frauen” that media of the 
Enlightenment made a more concerted effort than ever before (and more than would 
follow in the decades to come) to include women in both the readership and authorship 
of mass media. The genre of “Frauen Journale” began life in the early 18th century as 
moral journals produced by men for women, though often under female pseudonyms: a 
famous early example of this was Johann Christoph Gottsched’s ​Die Vernünftigen 
Tadlerin​, which he wrote and produced in collaboration with his wife Adelgunde Victoria 
Gottsched. However, by the time of the 1788 publication of ​Braunschweigisches Journal, 
Charlotte Henzel had already established the first journal edited and written by women in 
the ​Wochenblatt für’s schöne Geschlecht​, first published in 1779. Perhaps more notable 
is that fact that the early Enlightenment’s conception of gender was more radically 
egalitarian than either the late Enlightenment or the Classicism and Romanticism which 
would supplant it: when the Gottscheds established the ​Tadlerin ​in 1725, it was 
envisioned as a seed periodical, that is, the fictive creation of an educated society of 
enlightened women authors and editors which would hopefully inspire such 
organizations in the real world. This is because, as York-Gothart Mix puts it, it was 
believed at the time that “in allen Menschen diesselbe Weltvernunft wirksam sei;” the 
differentiation of the genders within the modern era was a gradual process and one only 
in the becoming in the 18th century. Of course, print media played no small role in this 
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process of differentiation--as Rothe argues in ​Lesen und Zuschauen im 18. Jahrhundert, 
one example of this shift occurred as the written word moved away from its epistolary 
roots, in which all individuals were potentially both author and audience, to the 
differentiated cult of genius, in which a chosen few (men) poured their inhuman gifts into 
works considered to be utterly unique and unrepeatable, works which were then read by 
a (feminized) audience which cultivated those reciprocal reading skills, such as empathy 
and sensitivity, necessary to enter into communication with the now-absent author.  
By 1788, differentiation of this kind was well underway, but Enlightened journal 
media as a whole, and the ​Braunschweigisches Journal ​in particular, were 
philosophically and politically setting themselves against these divisions. Rather than 
segmenting and isolating portions of the populace based on gender or economic class, 
the ideal was to create a media, which, “durch öftere Abwechslung in Ton und Manieren, 
und durch eine große Mannigfaltigkeit und Verschiedenheit in Materien und Form” would 
be able to reach a “sehr vermischtes Publicum,” and through this “Mittel,” “gewisse 
unsern Zeitbedürfnissen entsprechende Ideen in sehr verschiedenen Köpfen aus sehr 
verschiedenen Ständen anzuregen und in Umlauf zu bringen” (23). The desire to control 
the populace through the means of journalistic media is, of course, unmistakable. 
Campe wishes desperately to warn in particular “diese schätzbare Classe von 
Menschen,” that is, the hard working Hausväter und Mütter, of the dangers of the 
“Modekrankheiten des Geistes und des Herzens,” to help them to understand the “Geist 
ihres Zeitalters mit seinen schönen und häßlichen Characterzügen” (37). Journals put 
the editor in a position to control the entire flow of information: where the selection of the 
individual books comprising an individual’s knowledge base is left entirely to the reader, 
it is the editor of the journal who is responsible for selecting and arranging those articles 
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which will be published, an entire discourse which Campe argues the reader will feel 
compelled to read from start to finish if for no other reason than to get their money’s 
worth: “was darin gegeben wird, das muß nun auch gelesen werden, wäre es auch nur 
aus dem haushälterischen Bewegungsgrunde, um für sein Geld genug zu haben” (41).  
But to discuss journals exclusively as a means of control is to misrecognize the 
kind of influence exerted by the editors and authors. At best, this influence could be 
classified as what Caroline Levine would term a “canny” manipulation: editors like 
Campe recognize the given structures underpinning the current moment (that journals 
have become the dominant media form), could see the “affordances” of those structures, 
that is, the internal flexibility of these structures (journals can be sites of public 
discussion, are capable of fostering nascent ideas, express a new sense of temporality, 
as well as the possibility of reaching a greater and more diverse public) and anticipate 
the ways in which those affordances overlap with their own objectives (to “enlighten” the 
public, that is, to educate, but also to homogenize and control). But as has been shown, 
even Garve, used rather unfairly as the stand-in detractor of the journalistic form, 
recognizes that it is not the editors of the journals nor their authors which have chosen 
this medium as ​the​ medium of this time, but rather it has been summoned into existence 
by the demands of an unknown but ever growing Many. Concluding his discussion of the 
hypothetical ideal and worst-case readers, Campe tries (rather feebly) to shift the agency 
away from this Many, not to the journalists, but rather to the journalistic medium itself, by 
noting that all of the aforementioned edifying moments would have been unthinkable, 
“wenn die Zeitschriften nicht das Mittel gefunden hätten, sich überall beliebt zu machen, 
sich in alle nur einigermaaßen gebildete Stände einzuschleichen” (38). If this formulation 
sounds familiar, it is because it relies on something akin to divine providence to guide 
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the fate of humankind via the unlikely tool of the journalistic medium. Not unlike an 
“invisible hand” guiding through laws of economics, or an inherent “ungesellige 
Geselligkeit” pushing humanity down the path of progress through the cunning of nature, 
periodical media has insinuated itself into all walks of life and is slowly but surely working 
towards the betterment of humankind. However, even by shifting agency to the medium 
itself, Campe acknowledges the influence of the Many once again: the form of the 
journal is entirely determined by the “Verschiedene Köpfen” for whom it was intended. 
Form and public make up two sides of an indivisible whole, even or perhaps especially if 
the nature of this public remains unknown and unknowable. The internal gravity of the 
periodical media form experienced by all authors must be read as a co-authorship of the 
emergent, heterogeneous Many.  
 
VIII. The Journalistic Form seeps into Books 
It would be an injustice to let Christian Garve serve exclusively as the conservative 
anti-journalism voice, railing against the dangers of periodical media; not only did Garve 
help establish and serve as editor to the ​Schlesische Provinzialblätter​, one the most 
successful journals established during this era, both in terms of longevity and circulation, 
Garve was a well-known and well-regarded journal author throughout his life, who 
contributed dozens of articles to publications including the ​Allgemeine deutsche 
Bibliothek​, ​Aurora, Berlinische Monatsschrift, Blätter vermischten Inhalts, Deutsche 
Monatsschrift, Braunschweigisches Journal, Deutsches Museum, Der Philosoph für die 
Welt​, in addition to writing many essays for the ​Schlesische Provinzialblätter ​itself. 
Campe’s frequent equation of Garve’s productivity and influence to the likes of Kant and 
Wieland was meant as an expression of genuine admiration, a recognition of Garve’s 
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centrality to many of the most influential intellectual exchanges within the 
German-speaking world--exchanges which took place almost exclusively within the 
pages of its many Enlightenment journals. It is therefore misleading to use Garve’s “Ein 
Einwurf wider die Nützlichkeit periodischer Schriften,” in order to position Garve as the 
voice of anti-journalistic sentiment; these scant pages are perhaps best read as Garve 
himself suggests, as the private/public expression of misgivings in a letter to a friend, 
from an author who had devoted and would continue to devote most of his production to 
the pages of journals. And yet, Garve’s interest in, and concerns with, language and 
writing forms are too central and pervasive to his writing for this letter to be dismissed as 
an anomalous or a fleeting concern. In the essay “Ueber die Frage: warum stehen die 
Deutschen, nach dem Geständniß ihrer besten Schriftsteller, in Ansehung einer guten 
prosaischen Schreibart, gegen Griechen und Römer, vielleicht auch gegen Franzosen 
und Engländer, zurück? und welches ist der besten deutschen Prosaisten 
charakterisches Verdienst?,” Garve attempts to answer the prize question issued by the 
Deutschen Gesellschaft in Mannheim. Garve has many reservations about the framing 
of the question. He argues that there are as many forms of writing as there are authors, 
and that this diversity is likewise reflected in the ideals to which these authors may 
aspire since there are “so viele Arten der Vollkommenheit” (62). Moreover, the possibility 
of a universal “Maßstab” is precluded by the “Verschiedenheit der Denkungs- und 
Empfindungsart der Leser;” as there exists no single ideal reader, there likewise can be 
no single ideal for the written form (63). Nevertheless, in order to address the question 
Garve guesses as to the metric intended by the judges, namely the “Ruhm [der 
Schriftsteller] und der Eindruck, den sie auf ihre Zeitgenossen und die Nachwelt 
gemacht haben” (64). Success is to be measured through a combination of fame and, 
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more importantly, the influence achieved by an author, influence which is understood 
both locally and internationally, as well as current and potential future impact. Already in 
the chosen measurement of success, parallels with Campe are visible: by linking the 
success of prose writing to the degree of influence achieved, Garve once again 
intrinsically links form with the demands of a diverse audience, a theoretical affinity 
which will be explored below.  
Having selected a “Maßstab,” Garve then assigns representatives of the best 
prose writing for each nation/time: Rousseau and Busson for France, Addison and Hume 
for England, Mendelssohn, Lessing and Engel for Germany, and Cicero for ancient 
Rome. While the majority of the essay is spent extolling the virtues of his fellow German 
authors, ultimately Garve agrees with the prompt: the prosaic productions of his country 
do seem to lag behind those of their contemporaries, particularly the scholarly 
productions of France as represented by Rousseau. The primary criticism leveled by 
Garve against all three of his friends and colleagues is the absence of any “größere 
Werke:” in lieu of coherent, fully fleshed out classics, he notes that his German 
contemporaries have instead primarily produced essays and fragments. Garve gives 
differing causes for this lack: in Lessing’s case, Garve blames his combativeness, and 
an inability to gauge the significance of his objects of study, confusing personal interest 
with public importance. Echoing Campe’s fears for the “Leibnizische Schublade,” Garve 
asks rhetorically why so many of Engel’s proposed works “als Fragmente in seinem 
Pulte untergehen,” before answering that perhaps the outcome would have been 
different “wenn mehr Fleiß oder mehr Muth sich mit seinen übrigen Talenten vereinigt, 
oder Gesundheit und Glück sie mehr unterstützt hätten” (80). For Mendelssohn, Garve 
repeats the idea of the essay/fragment as the malformed result of the physical infirmity 
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or external adversity experienced by the author, speculating that it was a combination of 
“[Mendelssohns] Hang zur Speculation, seine Begierde alles zu ergründen und alle 
Ideen bis in ihre Elemente aufzulösen verbunden mit seiner Kränklichkeit und den 
äußern Umständen, in welchen er lebte…” which prevented the creation of “größere 
Werke” which would have created a more lasting impression on “den großen Haufen” 
(72). Garve was particularly sensitive to external influences, as his own career and 
writing had been largely shaped by illness: in 1772, he was forced to give up a recently 
appointed chair as Professor of math and logic in Leipzig due to health problems, 
returning to Breslau to live with his mother where he would remain until his early death in 
1798 at the age of 46 (Altmayer 24)--indeed, even this essay on the prosaic form is itself 
part of this legacy, as it was only published posthumously in 1799 in the ​Neuen 
Bibliothek der schönen Wissenschaften und der freyen Künste​ as “Ein Fragment.” In the 
letter “An den Herrn Consistorialrath Spalding” which serves as the introduction to one of 
his most important works, ​Ueber Gesellschaft und Einsamkeit​, published in 1797 (the 
year before his death), Garve provides more insight into how his own illness had shaped 
his work against his will, noting that it had been produced “mit sehr ungleichen Kräften 
und bey sehr veränderlichem Zustande meiner Gesundheit” (VIII). Beyond the difficulty 
of sustained thought, Garve’s physical weakness and failing vision necessitated that the 
work be dictated, a change in the writing process which had a cascade of effects on the 
resulting text. Garve, with typical curiosity and openness, noted that the dictation 
process had potentially produced a work which was perhaps “origineller” than it 
otherwise would have been, “weil der Geist, ganz concentrirt auf die Sachen, durch 
keine mechanische Nebenarbeit zerstreut [ist]” (VIII-IX). However, dictation also brought 
its own complications, from a text which was “weitschweifiger und weniger vollkommen,” 
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since it was no longer regulated by the author’s eyes, to a writing style full of 
“mangelhaften Ausdrucke,” a byproduct of Garve’s professed unwillingness to 
inconvenience the transcriber by forcing them to wait for the perfect formulation.  
It is therefore entirely possible to find further examples in Garve’s writing which 
support the criticisms leveled against journalistic writing in “Einwurf:” that journalism’s 
essayistic style is the slovenly product of insufficient “Fleiß” and “Muth,” or more 
charitably, the unfinished form of a mind constrained by external adversity. Given 
Garve’s lifelong illness, this could also potentially explain his own reliance on the 
medium. This assessment, however, does not survive any amount of scrutiny: as will be 
shown, Garve’s essayistic, fragmentary and iterative style was the result of a 
philosophical choice towards a populistic, anti-systemic, a-disciplinary form of 
knowledge, one which he hoped could work towards the reconciliation of a population 
splintering under the centrifugal influence of the capitalist mode of production. At this 
point it is worth returning to the work on Cicero referenced by Campe. Campe uses this 
work paradigmatically to represent all “great works” of the kind which Garve advocates, 
believing it to be too great in “Umfang,” too “tiefgedacht” for the non-academic reader 
“zur Hand zu nehmen, noch weniger ein solches Buch vom Anfange bis zu Ende 
nachdenkend durchzulesen.” Nevertheless, Garve clearly intended it as a work with 
broad appeal, and furthermore, one which required no expertise. The exact composition 
of the “Cicero Book” itself requires explanation: much to Garve’s surprise, a translation of 
Cicero’s ​On Duties​ was commissioned from him by Friedrich II. The exact reasons for 
the commission were unknown to Garve, as several translations already existed, but 
Garve happily complied, producing not only a translation of Cicero’s work, but also three 
companion books, one for each book of Cicero’s ​On Duties​. These companion books, 
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titled ​Philosophische Anmerkungen und Abhandlungen zu Cicero’s Büchern von den 
Pflichten​ are remarkable on a number of levels; first, they absolutely dwarf the translated 
work, combining for a total of nearly 900 pages when compared with the 350 pages of 
the translation. More unusual still, the primary purpose of the essays is not to explicate 
the original text or to provide historical context, rather Garve describes the essays as: 
...eine Reihe von Gedanken, die durch die Ideen des Cicero veranlasset worden 
sind: bald auf eine nähere, bald auf eine entferntere Weise mit ihnen verbunden, 
bald zur Erläuterung, bald zur Entwickelung bestimmt; zuweilen bloß an sie 
angeknüpft; ungleich an Methode und in der Ausführung, und nicht frey von 
Wiederholung. (“Vorrede” I) 
Garve argues that by and large, no expertise is required to understand Cicero; that at 
times the reader will no doubt be curious as to a specific historical figure or location, but 
that the beauty and joy of Cicero is his approachability and comprehensibility. Garve 
continues that he has indeed written many such historical essays, which given enough 
public interest he would be happy to publish--but these first essays serve an entirely 
different purpose. They are an associative “Reihe von Gedanken” provoked by Cicero, 
an attempt to bring Cicero into a modern dialogue, a technique and form of writing which 
necessarily produces inconsistency in “Methode und in der Ausführung.” But rather than 
excusing this apparent failing as the product of external extenuating circumstances, 
Garve explains what he believes to be the fundamental flaw of systematized knowledge, 
“Einige Abhandlungen zum ersten Buche sind systematischer, und vollständiger 
ausgearbeitet; aber sie haben vielleicht hin und wieder den Fehler der Systeme, daß in 
denselben mehr auf den Zusammenhang der Ideen unter sich, als auf ihr Verhältniß zu 
den Thatsachen, und zum Gebrauche gesehen wird” (I-II). While the essayistic, iterative 
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and fragmentary style of choice for ​Philosophische Anmerkungen und Abhandlungen 
suffers from an uneven tone, and repetitions, as a whole it avoids the failing of 
systematicity, the preferencing of the interconnection and neat ordering of ideas, of 
conceptual symmetry over an attention to the object of study. The essays of the second 
book epitomize this object-first mentality, and consequently are described as “bloß 
meine Empfindungen oder meine Erfahrungen… bloße Bruchstrücke, einzelne 
Gedanken, ohne Zusammenhang, oder doch nur unvollkommen verbunden” (II). It is 
impossible to read this description and not hear Campe’s call to rescue the “beiläufige 
Kinder” of associative thinking from the “Leibnizische Schublade:” Garve has effectively 
created a journalistic book, one which empowers the reader to both read selectively and 
to foster nascent ideas, to bring their own experiences and perceptions to bear on 
material which is open and flexible. 
Garve’s gesture to empower the audience by making the release of his historical 
compendium to ​On Duties​ contingent on popular interest echoes Campe’s “Plan” for the 
precursor to the ​Braunschweigisches Journal, ​the ​Allgemeinen Revision des gesammten 
Schul- und Erziehungswesens: von einer Gesellschaft praktischer Erzieher​. In his 
proposal, Campe notes that publication is contingent “Unter der Voraussetzung, daß das 
Publikum dieses Unternehmen durch eine ansehnliche Zahl von Unterschriften 
unterstützen wird”--or in modern parlance, Campe invites (implores?) would be readers 
to “vote with their wallets,” that is, to directly decide the fate of a future publication 
through Pränumeration (“Plan zu einer allgemeinen Revision” 170). ​Allgemeinen 
Revision ​is also significant in the context of Garve’s essayistic writings because it is an 
example of the fluidity which existed between what are now thought of as distinct 
mediums: ​Allgemeinen Revision​ floated somewhere between encyclopedia, with 
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predetermined topics to be covered by specific people, and a limited-release journal 
running bi-monthly for ten issues. Further blending the predetermined top-down structure 
of books with journalistic practices, the announcement in the ​Berlinische Monatsschrift 
solicits not only funding from would-be readers, but also new authors and topics of 
discussion, with the “Plan” intentionally leaving huge sections ​unplanned​, in anticipation 
of a collaborative publishing process. Such announcements for forthcoming projects 
within the pages of existing publications were common practice, announcements which, 
when taken together with the repeated solicitations for contributions from the readership 
within the journals themselves, would seem to indicate an 18th century version of 
“crowdsourcing.”   61
Despite his purported longing for “great works,” works of singular genius, unified 
in tone and content, Garve’s unease with systematicity runs deeper than merely the fear 
that closed systems can lose connection with the subject matter. Claus Altmayer argues 
in ​Aufklärung als Popularphilosophie. Bürgerliches Individuum und Öffentlichkeit bei 
Christian Garve​ that the hidden motor propelling all of Garve’s work was concern over 
the alienation inherent in the division of labor. Garve, as the translator of the definitive 
German edition of Adam Smith’s ​Wealth of Nations​, and often indicated as one of the 
very earliest proto-sociologists, was acutely aware of the changes sweeping the relations 
of production and with them, society. He wrote innumerable essays on topics such as 
the circulation of currency, the abandonment of the German small town, the changing 
61 It bears mentioning, however, that through the conflation of the audience of the future 
publication with that of an existent journal, and further by blurring the lines between potential 
readers and contributors with this same audience, the actual reading/writing populace, that is the 
producers and consumers of journals, begins to look very much like the Gelehrte Republik which 
the Enlighteners hoped to replace, as already indicated by Fischer, Haefs and Mix’s supposition 
of the high degree of overlap between the reading and writing populace 
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nature of farming, not to mention his previously cited swan song ​Ueber Gesellschaft und 
Einsamkeit ​, an extraordinarily ambitious work which attempts something akin to an 
ethnographic study of all the distinct populations comprising modern German society, 
from court society to hand workers and rural farmers. As Altmayer suggests, fears of the 
splintering of society permeated all of his works, including those dedicated to writing 
forms and education: in his 1779 essay “Betrachtung einiger Verschiedenheiten in den 
Werken der ältesten und neuern Schriftsteller, besonders der Dichter,” Garve provides a 
concise description of what he views as the operative difference between economic 
classes and social estates: 
Das Verhältniß das der Befehlende gegen den Gehorchenden hat, kann er nur 
unter gewissen Umständen zeigen, und so lange, als die Art von Handlungen 
vorkommt, die er anzuordenen versteht. Hingegen der Unterschied, den der 
Reichthum macht, ist beständig und erstreckt sich auf alles. Wohnung, 
Hausgeräthe, Kleidung, Aufwand der Tafel, Kostbarkeit der Ergötzungen, alles 
was der Reiche hat und thut, ist anders als bey dem Armen. Der eine kann also 
seine Erhabenheit, und der andre seine Niedrigkeit niemals aus den Augen 
verlieren. (126) 
This is the same qualitative difference that Polanyi, Sagarra and others were indicating 
in the first chapter: whereas the division of rank is performative, something which is 
marked with specific ceremonies performed at specific times, the difference of wealth 
penetrates through every facet of life, encompassing, “Wohnung, Hausgeräthe, 
Kleidung, Aufwand der Tafel, Kostbarkeit der Ergötzungen, alles was der Reiche hat und 
thut.” This leads Garve to the conclusion that “Einen weit größern Unterschied unter den 
Menschen macht der Reichthum, als der Rang” (125). Garve (like Polanyi, Sagarra) is 
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not blind to the wild inequities of caste-based societies, but rather recognizes the radical 
restructuring society is undergoing, the “great transformation” in which profit becomes 
the​ organizing principle of society. Garve’s claim that the division between 
entrepreneur/pauper is greater than that separating king/slave is a provocation, one 
intended to set in stark terms the degree of social disintegration he associated with this 
restructuring. Garve argues that the degree of social stratification in modern society is so 
severe, that despite increasing population and heterogeneity among the members of 
society, people interact almost exclusively with members of their own economic class 
due to the division of labor. For Garve this is deeply problematic on a number of levels, 
not least of which was that this division in living habits was causing parallel divisions 
within the language and customs of the different members of society:  62
...durch die lange Absonderung [bildet sich] auch endlich ein Unterschied in dem, 
was man Anstand und Sitten nennt, in der Art, sich zu betragen und 
auszudrücken. So willkührlich auch diese Begriffe bald an die eine, bald an die 
entgegengesetzte Art etwas zu thun und zu sagen verknüpft werden, so sind sie 
doch das erste, wornach wir den Vorzug und die Verdienste des menschen 
messen; und dieß also setzt endlich die vorher schwankende und oft 
niedergerißne Gränze zwischen Leuten von Stande und gemeinen Leuten fest, 
und hebt alle Möglichkeit zur Wiedervereinigung auf. (127-128) 
Prolonged social separation calcifies differences in custom and language, differences 
which are again performed in every moment of every day. And while these differences 
62 Additionally, Garve’s theory of self and morality closely parallels that of Adam Smith’s in ​Theory 
of Moral Sentiments ​, believing the origins of self and conscience to be found in the observation of 
those people around us, leading him to conclude that the greater number and variety of those 
interactions observed, the more robust the moral fortitude. 
196 
begin life as arbitrary signifiers, over time they develop into something more troubling, 
particularly at the level of language. Garve’s theory of language held that there is an 
intrinsic link between language and thought, claiming “der Verstand [braucht] die 
Wörter... nicht bloß andern zu Sagen, was er denkt, sondern es sich auch erst selbst 
deutlich vorzustellen…. die Sprache [ist] nicht bloß das Werkzeug der Mittheilung, 
sondern auch der Bildung der Gedanken” (139). Idea and language, content and form 
are two sides of an indivisible whole, meaning that as the language of the different 
classes drift apart, so too do the very thoughts held by the different groups. What this 
means is where a Homer was acquainted with all facets of life and could write as 
knowledgeably about farming practice as he could describe current military techniques 
or bardic traditions, the modern author knows the language and objects of his own 
particular class: “Heute zu Tage ist der Dichter in allem, was zu den Arbeiten der niedern 
Klassen gehört, unwissend, und der Leser in Absicht derselben ekel. Der eine ist nicht 
im Stande, sie zu beschreiben, und der andere hat kein Interesse, sie kennen zu lernen” 
(173). The modern world is a place in which “das einzige Band der Gesellschaft,” the 
transference of ideas, no longer exists “unter Gliedern einer Nation, die eine sich fremde 
Sprache reden, und von einander weder geliebt noch hochgeschätzt werden können” 
(128-129). 
Altmeyer’s book refers frequently to Garve’s ​hidden ​emancipatory potential, 
positioning Garve as an unwilling radical, someone who was unable to follow his own 
theories to their logical conclusions. This reading is not without merit; for example, in the 
essay “Bruchstücke zu der Untersuchung über den Verfall der Kleinem Städte, dessen 
Ursachen, und die Mittel ihm abzuhelfen,” Garve is sensitive to the economic causes at 
the root of the decline of the small city, tying it to the dynamics of ever increasing wealth 
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disparity. Among other causes, Garve points to the relatively diminished purchasing 
power of the poor, claiming that the plight of the nation’s poor, property class has 
actually worsened in the past 100 years (411). He notes that those regions in which the 
difference between the rich and poor is the greatest are simultaneously the most 
economically depressed regions where only large cities continue to flourish. The 
solution, therefore, must be a redistribution of wealth and the creation of greater 
economic equality, one which will serve to bolster the financial situation of the nation as 
a whole (420). However, Garve, echoing Smith, does not believe that this redistribution 
can be the responsibility of the state, but instead must rather be the product of gradual 
(presumably “natural”) change over time. Garve is vehemently against not only 
reappropriation and redistribution of the state, which he argues corrects one evil through 
the creation of the larger evil of undermining the new-found “sanctity” of private property, 
but also opposes progressive taxation, fearing that such policies could serve to 
de-motivate the beneficiaries, thereby foreshadowing conservative rhetoric for the next 
two centuries. In other words, Garve was not a Marx before Marx; Garve was not 
attempting to foment a material revolution against the new bourgeois order whose 
establishment he painted in striking detail. 
And yet, the characterization of Garve as a reluctant-radical overlooks the major 
intervention he was trying to enact through his writing: the reunification of society 
through modifications in writing forms and public discourse. As Altmeyer notes, Garve 
proudly declared himself a “Populärphilosoph” at a time when it was already used as a 
pejorative, more or less synonymous with “Damenphilosoph,” that is someone who only 
deals with superficial matters such as courtly decorum. Garve’s anti-systemic, essayistic 
form, despite his own occasional protestations that it was merely the product of personal 
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deficits and adverse circumstances, was instead an intentional attempt at the creation of 
non-specialist knowledge at the very dawn of disciplinary division. Discipline is anathema 
to universal enlightenment: in order for a process of scientification, specialization and 
differentiation to occur, the fundamental precept of the universality of knowledge and the 
ultimate goal of unifying humanity in the realm of Truth must be abandoned. Garve, like 
Campe and other editors of Enlightenment journals, sought to break down the 
metaphorical walls which separated the greater populace from the knowledge of the 
Gelehrten, to counteract the growing animosity and class divides separating the 
population, chasing a utopia in which an enlightened humanity purses the Truth as a 
unified whole. Garve in one sense goes further than Campe, arguing that instead of 
viewing the burgeoning popularity of the novel form as a threat to general enlightenment, 
it is incumbent on the would-be enlightener to understand the reason for its popularity: 
Unsere Schauspiele, unsere Romanen, warum sind sie uns izt so reizend, oder 
vielmehr so nothwendig geworden? Zum Theil deswegen, weil sie uns in die 
menschliche Gesellschaft wieder versetzen, von der wir gewissermaßen 
ausgeschlossen sind; weil sie uns Menschen von allerley Ständen, und in weit 
wichtigern Auftritten ihres Lebens handelnd und redend zeigen, als wir selbst zu 
sehen Gelegenheit haben; weil sie uns wieder in die Häuser der Großen führen, 
zu denen wir keinen Zutritt mehr haben, und uns mit der Vorstellung 
schmeicheln, daß dort diese Großen uns ähnlicher und weniger über uns 
erhaben sind als sie zu seyn scheinen, wenn wir bloß die Mauern ihrer Paläste 
ansehen; weil sie uns in den niedrigsten Klassen, zu denen wir uns aus 
Vorurtheil und Stolz und angewöhntem Ekel nicht herablassen wollen, eben die 
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Aeußerungen der Natur zeigen, die uns bey uns selbst gefallen. (“Betrachtung 
einiger Verschiedenheiten” 129-130) 
Novels and plays in this sense represent a parallel project to that of Enlightenment 
journals, to provide a multi-perspectival account of the modern moment, to provide a 
space of mutual intelligibility and understanding. It is therefore not surprising that Garve 
lauds Rousseau’s creation of a hybrid, novelistic form for ​Émile, ou De l’éducation​, or for 
praising what he describes as Rousseau’s ability to choose those objects which are of 
the greatest interest to the most people. Garve’s writing, like the journalistic form he 
criticized, sought to create a form which engages as large an audience as possible, one 
which demanded a more active participation than did novels or plays. Like Lenz (and, for 
that matter, Campe) Garve was deeply conflicted by the changes sweeping society, both 
welcoming the “progressive emancipation” capitalism and the greater freedom of 
expression it brought with it, while concerned over increasing inequity and societal 
fragmentation. And like Lenz, Garve created a writing form which remained “open,” in the 
sense that it was “unvollkommen,” comprised of “beiläufige Kinder,” fragments and ideas 
given over to public care, for others to complete as part of a collaborative process. Later 
critics such as Friedrich Schlegel and Friedrich Schleiermacher mocked Garve’s 
apparent mediocrity with glee, anointing him the chief representative of a “negative 
canon,” coining the term Garvinismus to describe anything which was little more than 
superficial or common sense. They mistook the iterative, experimental and experiential 
content of Garve’s work for the product of a lazy mind, one unable to penetrate into the 
true origin and essence of things. We must instead read the works of Garve, and the 
Enlightenment journals with which they were so closely associated, as the performative 
acts they were: as an (for a time, successful) attempt to create a place of conversation 
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between heterogeneous members of a fracturing society, to build a place of 
reconciliation through the collaborative creation of universalized, non-specialist 
knowledge.  
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Conclusion: The Revolutionary Resurgence of the Non-identical 
Many 
The formal plasticity and openness pioneered by the likes of Christian Garve, Joachim 
Campe and Jakob Michael Reinhold Lenz was not to last. Lenz was found dead on the 
streets of Moscow in 1792, but his work had been buried years earlier, as interest in 
Sturm und Drang waned and his mental health and relationship with Goethe and others 
deteriorated. After a life of infirmity, Garve died in 1798. Unlike Lenz, Garve enjoyed a 
brief spike in popularity after his death, with multiple collected works published, as well 
as a number of commemorations in journals in the years following his death. However 
this popularity, which built on the acclaim he had enjoyed in life, was short lived. As 
previously indicated, within only a few years of his death, Garve was used metonymically 
to disparage the entirety of the Enlightenment movement. Representatives of 
Romanticism, such as Friedrich Schleiermacher and Friedrich Schlegel, took particular 
delight in mocking Garve’s work, with Schlegel ascribing Garve to the “negative 
classics,” and even coining the term “Garvianismus” in ​Zur Philologie I​ as a means of 
describing work he deemed lazy and superficial, a “common sense” knowledge which 
lacked all scientific rigor or willingness to strive for origins. As a result, Garve would join 
Lenz in the ranks of the forgotten ten years after his death. Of course, not every 
would-be enlightener died so neatly within the confines of the 18th century: Campe, 
Nicolai, Wieland would live until 1818, 1811 and 1813 respectively. But the shape of 
society was continuing to change, and the role of journals within it. As Patrick Eiden-Offe 
argues in ​Die Poesie der Klasse​, the first half of the 19th century prior to the 1848 
revolutions can still be characterized as a moment ​before ​the emergence of class 
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consciousness, in which the working classes still represented, in the words of Marx, a 
“buntscheckiger Haufen” (Eiden-Offe 21). However, the complete anchorlessness and 
absolute irreducibility of the Many was already undergoing accelerating material changes 
in the first decades of the 19th century. More and more lives had long since been 
wrested from the amorphous, atemporal traditional world, converted into a fluid labor 
poor for the capitalist mode of production. The creeping social stratification characteristic 
of the division of labor was mirrored by a spreading disciplinarity of the sciences and the 
arts, a trend which would be characteristic for much of the 19th century. The rise of 
systematicity and radical specialization in the natural and social sciences finds its mirror 
in the shifting understanding of the Geistigkeit of the Romanticists, who position 
themselves as experts of the pure expression of the spirit. Both the sciences and the 
artistic production of the early 19th century can be seen as different aspects of the same 
phenomenon, as both are defined through that which they exclude, as the fundamental 
claim of specialization is that it describes work which is not achievable by the majority. 
To advocate for scientific rigor or true artistry is to deny the possibility of universal 
knowledge, and to reject those forms of knowledge which present themselves as open to 
general understanding and collaboration. The necessary precursor to the creation of 
consciousness along the lines of class is therefore the destruction of those forms of 
knowledge co-created with a Many which defied classification. 
Strict social classificatory systems, however, remain imaginary conceptual 
frameworks, no matter how apparently solid or influential. In the wake of the first World 
War, the October Revolution, and the spread of Taylorism, the neat borders of the 
economic classes, carefully established over the course of the previous century, were 
eroded, with more and more of the population pushed into an amorphous mass. 
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Concurrent with this changing material reality, new mass-media forms, such as radio and 
film, emerge, while old forms, such as newspapers, plays and novels, are reimagined 
and gain new resonance. In “Autor als Produzent” Walter Benjamin describes Brecht’s 
Epic Theater in strikingly familiar tones: 
[Brecht] stellt dem dramatischen Gesamtkunstwerk das dramatische 
Laboratorium gegenüber…  Im Mittelpunkt seiner Versuche steht der Mensch. 
Der heutige Mensch: ein reduzierter also, in einer kalten Umwelt kaltgestellter… 
Aus kleinsten Element der Verhaltungsweisen zu konstruieren, was in der 
aristotelischen Dramaturgie ‘handeln’ genannt wird, das ist der Sinn des 
epischen Theaters. (245) 
Lenz’s “comedies” pull the every-day realities to the fore, organizing the play’s structure 
not around a free-acting hero, but rather around the social and material limitations which 
collectively form a new actor, Society, against which no individual actor can be described 
as free. Similarly, Brecht’s Epic theater focuses not on the heroes of classical epics, but 
on the “reduced” individual, an individual reduced through a cold, calculating reality. 
Benjamin further describes Brecht’s works as defined by the Montage, a technique 
borrowed from other mass phenomena of the time, naming film and photography. Just 
as Lenz “ruined” his lifelike depictions of people as they really are through seemingly 
erratic staging and a disregard for classical unities, Brecht’s plays famously operated 
through a dynamic of perpetual interruption, the denial of bourgeois conditioned 
response to enjoy or consume art. Instead of imagining creative production as part of the 
“superstructure” of society, Benjamin argues that writers such as Brecht were defining 
their position ​within​ the relations of production; instead of the product of a production 
process, the media form becomes a means of production, one which demands the 
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mutual labor of author, actor, audience, a collaborative effort at whose end new relations 
become imaginable.  
Benjamin characterized this genre/media form bending as part of a larger 
“Umschmelzungsprozeß,” one which was eroding not only medial and formal 
boundaries, but other long-standing divisions, including author/audience, 
individual/masses, human/non-human. In the possibility of eradicating the border 
between writer/reader, Benjamin acknowledges a debt to Sergei Tret’jakov, a soviet 
journalist, playwright and theorist whose writings served as a major source of inspiration 
to both Benjamin and Brecht. Because Tret’jakov believed that creative production must 
be viewed as “ein Produktionsprozeß unteranderen Zweigen der Produktion,” he 
vehemently rejected the old, mystifying model of artistic reception, which made the artist 
a “Magier… Zauberer… begnadeten Seher und Propheten,” a “Kaste von Spezialisten, 
die von irgendwoher, fast aus dem Überirdischen, in ‘Anwandlungen von Inspiration’ das 
heilige Feuer ausdrucksstarker Worte und Bilder, von Farb- und Klangkombinationen, 
herniederholt” (“Die Kunst in der Revolution” 10, 12). The production of this special, 
near-divine caste of geniuses necessarily simultaneously produces an audience which is 
“ein passives Publikum, Menschen, die einen großen Teil ihres Lebens für eine sinnlos 
eingesetzte, ungeliebte Arbeit hingeben” (10). Creative production understood through 
this bourgeois lens can only ever be the art of distraction, an opiate to deaden the 
masses, regardless of its potentially “revolutionary content.” Tretʹjakov asks how it is 
possible that the old paradigm of form/content has been universally rejected, while the 
dichotomy of author/audience is left untouched? How authors can imagine that 
substituting “partisan” for “flower” and “revolution” for “nature” represents a satisfactorily 
revolutionary art form? This kind of empty iconography merely introduces new works in 
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which “[die Menschen] sich… in Kontemplation [versenken]’, ‘erleben und leiden mit’, 
anstatt ein Gedicht als einen ersten Versuch der Organisation der lebendigen 
menschlichen Sprache, der Mitschaffen fordert, aufzunehmen; das Theater als ersten 
Weckruf zur Rhythmik des gemeinsamen Aufbaus des Lebens usw” (13).  
In order to create this kind of interactive, “agitative” art form, a radical process of 
“Entindividualisierung und Entprofessionalisierung” of artistic production is necessary 
(“Fortsetzung Folgt” 75). By this Tretʹjakov imagines a reciprocal process, one in which 
both authors recognize and take a more active role in the relations of production, but 
more importantly, where the expression of the great working-masses is facilitated. When 
confronted with the reality that all children sing, dance, seek the perfect word, Tretʹjakov 
muses “Ist denn der Verlust des aktiven künstlerischen Instinkts des Menschen, der ihn 
aus einem aktiven Produzenten in einen Zuschauer und Konsumenten verwandelt, als 
normal anzusehen?” (“Die Kunst in der Revolution” 12). The answer is resolutely no: 
“Jeder Mensch kann und soll ausdrucksstark sprechen, sich bewegen, allen Dingen mit 
ausdrucksstarken Farben Schönheit verleihen, in jedes von ihm produzierte Ding jenes 
Maximum an Genauigkeit, klarer Kontur und Zweckmäßigkeit einbringen” (12). The only 
acceptable understanding of “Kunst für alle” is not that the whole world is converted into 
“Zuschauer,” that is, that the old bourgeois forms are merely made universally 
accessible, but rather that “Jeder soll ein Künstler sein, ein vollendeter Meister in der 
Sache, die er im gegebenen Moment tut” (13) Those tools which are currently the 
purview of a chosen few must be made the universal right of all people. This is how the 
“Entprofessionalisierung” necessarily entails an “Entindividualisierung” of art as well; to a 
certain extent, all that the “Entindividualiserung” requires is the recognition of the 
creative work already being done by “non-artists.” The reality of creative production is 
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that it never has been and never will be the product of a single “genius.” Tretʹjakov 
illustrates this with the traditional novel: 
Wenn das “künstlerische” Buch gewöhnlich einen Namen auf seinem Umschlag, 
den Firmennamen seines ‘Schöpfers’ trägt, so ist das nur ein scheinbares 
Phänomen. Auch ein Buch stellt schon das Produkt vieler Hände dar, und nur auf 
Grund alter Gewohnheit verdrängt die Hand des Schriftsteller-Fürsten die 
übrigen… Als ob wir nicht wüßten, daß unsere ästhetischen Feudalherren, die 
bedeutendsten Schriftsteller, schon längst in Produktionsgenossenschaften 
arbeiten, indem sie ihre literarischen Sekretäre und Schüler einsetzen. 
(“Fortsetzung Folgt” 76) 
Novels and other artistic works have hidden the collaborative reality of their creation 
behind the fiction of the author-as-brand, a fiction which directly masks the labor of 
dozens of workers, in addition to pretending ignorance to the discourses from which 
such works necessarily emerge. 
By contrast, Benjamin and Tretʹjakov argue that the salient media forms of the 
current moment, newspapers, films, journals, even textbooks and certain scientific works 
openly announce their collaborative, multiperspectival origins. Tretʹjakov explains this as 
a fundamental “Interesse am Material… und zwar am Material in seiner rohesten Form: 
Memoiren, Chronik, Skizze, Artikel, Rechenschaftsbericht” (“Wir Schlagen Alarm!” 41). 
Benjamin argues that no form better reflects these “raw materials,” or demonstrates the 
dissolution of old dichotomies, than newspapers: 
Ihr Inhalt, ‘Stoff’, der jeder anderen Organisationsform sich versagt als der, die 
ihm die Ungeduld des Lesers aufzwingt. Und dies Ungeduld ist nicht allein die 
des Politikers, der eine Information, oder die des Spekulaten, der einen Tip 
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erwartet, sondern dahinter schwelt diejenige des Ausgeschlossenen, der ein 
Recht zu haben glaubt, selber mit seinen eigenen Interessen zu Wort zu 
kommen. (“Autor als Produzent” 235) 
The words of Campe, Nicolai, Biester and dozens of other journal editors of the late 18th 
century seem to echo across the century divide; it is an undefined “Ausgeschlossene” 
whose felt presence organizes the structure and content of the newspapers, a voiceless 
majority who finds expression in the very form of the medium. “Mit der wahllosen 
Assimilation von Fakten geht also Hand in Hand die gleich wahllose Assimilation von 
Lesern, die sich im Nu zu Mitarbeitern erhoben sehen”--Benjamin’s usage of  “wahllos” 
here seems contradictory (after all “dahinter schwelt… [die] Ausgeschlossene), 
nevertheless it indicates an important turning point; while on the one hand, it is important 
to indicate that influence which the Many already have on creative production, as 
indicated by Brecht’s Epic theater, the larger goal must be to foster forms of expression 
which necessitate and expand participation. For Tretʹjakov, the model for all new media 
must once again be the newspaper. While the “Künstköche” may “drehen die Nase weg 
vor solchen ‘niedrigen’ aktuellen ‘Zeitungsformen,’” preferring instead to nail “das 
lebendige Material in die Schablonen-Särge von Erzählungen und Romanzen,” the fact 
remains that (“Wir Schlagen Alarm” 41): 
[J]ene literarische Form, die mit dem Tempo des heutigen Tages mitziehen will, 
hat die Kräfte eines einzelnen längst überstiegen. Beispiel der Zeitung ist ein 
ganz erstaunliches literarisches, gerade für unsere Zeit spezifisches Faktum. Nur 
die kollektive Arbeit, verbunden mit innerer Spezialisierung, macht die Existenz 
der Zeitung möglich. (“Fortsetzung Folgt” 76) 
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Again, the points of resonance with 18th century discourse surrounding journals are 
remarkable: the same assertion that collective writing is the only means of capturing a 
reality which has grown too complicated for any one individual to express. The emphasis 
on the here and now, Jetztzeit, is once again central, but this is hardly surprising: as has 
been shown, the idea of the Present is in its essence collective experience. Simultaneity 
is the idea of shared temporal space, the same moment viewed from different 
perspectives by multiple individuals, and to claim that something is simultaneous with 
itself is to descend into abstraction ad infinitum. 
The question then becomes, what new collective, multi-perspectival forms are 
possible, and who should write them? Benjamin suggests that fundamental to the 
techniques which emerge must once again be an “Umschmelzung” of different forms and 
genres, specifically: the frames of classical art forms must be shattered by text, the 
assumed unity of art interrupted, thereby pushing these works from their position of 
passive enjoyment into one of active engagement. Art must be editorialized, become a 
site of debate: just as Brecht famously used text within his plays to add layers of 
meta-commentary on top of the more traditional actions carried out through actions and 
dialogue, Benjamin notes how Hanns Eisler reintroduced words to symphonic music, 
undoing a practice which in part had its origins in bourgeois consumer society, and 
thereby transforming the passive experience of a concert into a political meeting. 
Conversely, his critique of the photography of Neue Sachlichkeit is that it does ​not 
fundamentally alter the relationship between text and image, and so instead of 
commenting meaningfully on the grim, material realities of modern life, the photos 
produced end up beautifying the objects it captured. Just as a poem does not become 
revolutionary merely by swapping naturalist/humanist themes for those of a class 
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struggle, photos taken in the classical mold of a still life merely create new objects of 
distraction and pleasure, commodities to be consumed in the leisure time of the 
well-to-do. As to who should create these works of art, Benjamin again points to the 
newspaper where the borders between audience and authors is infinitely more porous 
than in traditional forms of expression. Theoretically anyone could find their own words 
printed on its pages: in the form of a letter to the editor, as an expert of their field, no 
matter how limited or specialized, in a report from abroad, as an eyewitness to an event, 
etc.. The frequent solicitations of the 18th-century journals for unfinished, unpolished, 
firsthand reports from all members of society were being realized to an ever greater 
degree.  “Damit ist der Unterschied zwischen Autor und Publikum im Begriff, ihren 
grundsätzlichen Charakter zu verlieren... Der Lesende ist jederzeit bereit, ein 
Schreibender zu Werden. Als Sachverständiger.... gewinnt er einen Zugang zur 
Autorschaft” (“Das Kunstwerk” 33). The very process of extreme specialization and 
isolation created by the division of labor has inadvertently produced its opposite, 
providing each member of society a unique voice, highlighting the way in which each 
individual is an expert of their own particular experience. Additionally, Benjamin argues 
that the mere possibility of expression was having significant knock-on effects: readers, 
feeling individually addressed by the newspaper, take a more active stance to the read 
material, with everyone feeling like a “half-specialist,” able to weigh in on those aspects 
which are beyond their immediate life experience: to argue the finer aspects of foreign 
policy, labor disputes, or even just the favorite of a sporting event. 
Tretʹjakov describes what the dissolution of the boundaries between writer and 
reader would necessarily entail in even greater detail. He sees this as a reciprocal 
process: on the one hand, the traditional author caste must make themselves experts of 
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their own locality, and the material reality of their neighbors. This requires that each 
individual author must fully immerse themself into the production process, not as a 
spectator or tourist, but working side by side with those she or he would describe. 
Tretʹjakov modeled this in his own life, and his most famous works, such as the play 
Brülle, China!​ and the novel, ​Feld-Herrn​ were the result of living and working over the 
course of years in Beijing and the farming communes of the Soviet Union respectively. 
The genres created by Tretʹjakov, such as the bio-interview and the biography of things, 
actively resisted common literary tropes, characters and narrative arcs by foregrounding 
material specificity. Tretʹjakov is infuriated by the use of the material world as “setting:” 
“Ich habe einen idealen Fabel-Spezialisten beobachtet. Er braute eine Fabel zusammen 
mit einem Bettler und einem stolzen Mädchen, sog sich eine Intrige aus den Fingern und 
danach begann er sich für den Ort und die Epoche der Handlung zu interessiere”  (“Das 
Produktionsszenarium” 53). Because the traditional narrative form focuses on the 
actions of a protagonist, irrespective of historical and material circumstances, the 
material world is necessarily reduced to backdrop, and at most the buffalo are 
exchanged for camels or donkeys by turn in order to provide “Lokalkolorit.” By focusing 
on the actions of the protagonist (actions carried out almost exclusively in their free time, 
as Tretʹjakov notes), the material world is flattened and all of the other individuals 
integral to constituting that material world are likewise reduced to a “Häufchen von 
gesichtslosen Kupfermünzen der verschiedenen Gruppen der Bevölkerung…” (“Die 
Biographie des Dings” 81).  By contrast, Beijing in ​Brülle, China! ​is not used as an 
abstract site of a universal struggle of mankind against the powers of oppression, but a 
culturally and historically specific location presenting unique challenges and hardships. 
When confronted with the criticism that his play is nothing more than a jumble of 
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“Zeitungsartikel,” Tretʹjakov responds “Die Feinde haben das Wesen meines Dramas 
also ganz richtig erkannt,” “Die Zeitung lehrte mich, Tatsachen zu schätzen und sie für 
die literarische Produktion auszunützen” (“Autobiographie” 56). The communal farm 
featured in ​Feld-Herrn ​is likewise the organizing principle of the book; its structure as a 
“bio-interview,” is a mixture of autobiographical writing, interviews and reportage, 
providing a multiperspectival account, one which does not seek to reflect reality, but 
rather to show it in process and to actively intercede in the relations of production. 
Tretʹjakov further suggested an additional form of writing, the “Biographie des Dings.” As 
the name suggests, rather than focus on a place or an occupation, the biography of the 
thing, which would perhaps better be translated as the “biography of the product,” “stellt 
gleichsam ein Fleißband dar, auf dem sich der Rohstoff fortbewegt, der durch die 
Anstrengungen der Menschen in ein nützliches Produkt verwandelt wird” (“Die 
Biographie des Dings” 84). By focusing on the manufacturing process of a single product 
instead of the actions of a single individual, people in numbers come into focus, can be 
followed for a length of time, as well as people from “both sides of the conveyor belt,” 
that is both workers and capitalists. Tretʹjakov sees the biography of things as a 
necessary “cold shower” for the author, one which forces a shift of perspective and 
breaks the grip of old literary techniques. 
Tretʹjakov, however, was not convinced that the traditional author caste would be 
willing or able to exert the great effort necessary to fight against the influence of 
canonical writing styles. More importantly, while forms such as the biography of things, 
the bio-interview and the play-as-newspaper respond to and integrate more perspectives 
and, through quotation, more voices to artistic genres, the fundamental structure remains 
undemocratic. For this reason, Tretʹjakov (and Benjamin) held the far more important 
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goal of masses-oriented media to be the integration of those masses into the production 
process itself. Tretʹjakov expresses this as a lack: in a clear inversion of the conservative 
tutting over the glut of book production frequent in both the 18th and 20th century, 
Tretʹjakov writes: 
Uns fehlen allzu viele Bücher… Die am Aufbau teilnehmenden Menschen 
sammeln eine kolossale Erfahrung an, aber diese Erfahrung liegt bestenfalls in 
Form von Dienstberichten bei den Behörden… Nicht beschrieben sind unsere 
Betriebe, die Häuser der Kinder, die Sowchosen, die Sanatorien, die Kolchosen, 
die Hirschzucht und die Traktoren Fabriken. Uns fehlen Lehrbücher und 
populärwissenschaftliche Bücher, Merk- und Nachschlagebücher, 
Faktensammlungen, die zur Auseinandersetzung anregen, und Montagen, die 
uns die verschiedenen Prozesse, angefangen von den nervlichen bis zu den 
geologischen, erklären. (“Fortsetzung Folgt” 77) 
The change must be formal but also structural, requiring a complete reimagining of the 
publishing process, central to which reimagining must be a new kind of author, the 
Faktograph: “an Stelle der professionellen Schriftsteller, Menschen, die das neue, sozial 
bedeutende spezifische Material beherrschen” (78). On the one hand, Tretʹjakov argues 
that the legions of Faktographs are already there, waiting to be unleashed: “Die Masse 
der Amateurfotografen, die Tausenden von Reportern und Arbeiterkorrespondenten sind 
bei aller Ungebildetheit und Unqualifiziertheit potentielle Faktographen” (79). At the 
same time, Tretʹjakov, like the Enlighteners before him, insists on the need to educate 
these masses, to give them not only the language and skills necessary to express their 
reality (“die Fähigkeit zu schreiben muß zu einer so grundlegenden kulturellen 
Eigenschaft werden wie die Fähigkeit zu lesen”), but to inform their revolutionary 
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impulses, to help them understand that “es [kann] keine Fakten als Solche geben. Es 
gibt das Faktum mit Effekt und das Faktum als Defekt. Das Faktum, das unsere 
sozialistischen Positionen stärkt, und das Faktum, das sie Schwächt.” The works of the 
Faktographen are therefore not to be understood as a naturalist montage, a mimicry of 
the world as it is, but again always as an explicit critique, and as such, a critique which 
must in part be learned. Tretʹjakov introduces further elements of control in the 
suggested structure of reformed publishing: while unquestionably more egalitarian, he 
nevertheless suggests a three-tiered division of labor within the 
Produktionsgenossenschaft, namely; Sammeln, to be carried out by the non-expert 
Faktographen, Bearbeiten, the work of trained writers, and finally a process of 
Überprüfen by trained field specialists. So while the hopes for the many in the 18th 
century were tinged with a fear of their transformation into a revolutionary horde, in the 
20th century the revolutionary hopes for the masses were held in balance against the 
fears of a descent into fascist brutality. 
In examining the early 20th century as a new instance of the influence of 
“Ausgeschlossene” masses, a non-identical Many, on media forms, it is important not to 
overstate the parallels with the late 18th century. The tendency towards collective media 
forms such as newspapers and journal, the penetration of fractured, multiperspectival 
accounts, the focus on the here and now, the local all indicate major points of resonance 
between the two historical moments, and the comparison can be illuminating to an 
extent. However, it is important to recognize those elements which have changed 
substantially in the intervening century, most notably the perception of the Many itself. 
The idea of the individual itself begins to lose integrity in the 20th century: not only were 
the borders between genres, forms, and author/audience weakening, the divisions 
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between individual/many, as well as non-human/human begin to erode. This erosion is 
perhaps nowhere more apparent than in Siegfried Kracauer’s “Ornament der Masse,” 
which shows the centrifugal force Taylorism, science, capitalism and mass-media have 
had on the imagined sanctity of the biological form: from the overhead camera, dancers 
are reduced to kaleidoscopic flashes of legs and arms, the factory worker to the hand 
which pulls the lever and the eyes which survey the rolling conveyor belt, the biological 
specimen disappears into a borderless mass of organs, cells, and symbiotic interspecies 
relationships at the microscopic level. For Kracauer the dissolution of the discrete 
individual is emancipatory in the first instance, it is the explosion of the prison of the 
biological form, the overcoming of the last deterministic fate set against the liberation of 
human agentic potential. Similarly, Tretʹjakov’s biography of things aimed to decenter the 
human, to deflate their cosmic importance, in order to  resituate people into their actual 
worlds, to gain sensitivity to the real limitations imposed on them and overcome those 
hindrances. What is the physical cost of labor? What are the real maladies of the modern 
world? How is human life shaped by its material conditions? These questions only 
become answerable when the agency of the material world is recognized. 
The passivity of the invisible hands of the Enlightenment have also been 
replaced with the revolutionary potential of the masses. Lenz, Garve and Campe all 
sought to activate and engage a vaguely characterized audience/public: to bring them 
into the writing process, to tear down the social barriers to knowledge and personal 
betterment. However, the liberation was to be contained to a certain extent by the media 
created by these authors, as well as occur within the prescribed limits of current state 
structures. By contrast, the masses-theorists and authors of the 20th century sought to 
unleash the potential of masses, to enable them to create a new world order which 
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exceeded their own forms and concepts. As previously mentioned, currents of fear still 
existed, and with them the desire for a degree of control, the ability to guide the Many; 
the threat of fascism, of the Many led astray, was ever present. Nevertheless, there still 
existed a faith that given tools of expression and the social freedom in which to use 
them, the “Ausgeschlossene” multitudes would create unimaginable new forms of media 
and social order. The imagined shape of these new forms as well as the precise 
relationship of the non-identical Many remains to be discovered, work which would 
necessitate the analysis of works already mentioned, such as Sergei Tretʹjakov’s 
bio-interviews, biography of things and agitory plays, the epic plays and theoretical 
writings of Bertolt Brecht and Siegfried Kracauer’s journalistic novels, but also the mass 
plays of Ernst Toller, the political works and speeches of Rosa Luxemburg and the early 
novels and autobiographical works of Anna Seghers. It is hoped that through the 
continued exploration of the influence of a non-identical Many on writing forms new 
insights into the emergence of social-media of the current moment can be gained.  
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Figures 
 
Figure 1: On the right, the front cover of the ​Braunschweigisches Journal​, October 1788, 
on the left the back cover of the September issue. The covers of the individual issues 
were made of card stock only moderately thicker than the pages contained within, 
perhaps most similar to construction paper in terms of stiffness and thickness. Other 
features of the cover: “Ranken” of ivy mark the border, an image containing the 
caduceus, quills, books and other generic symbols of learning, the title of the journal, the 
four editors, number in the series, date, and the publisher, in this case the 
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Schulbuchhandlung Verlag, a Braunschweig-based publisher established by Joachim 
Campe in 1787. 
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 Figure 2: Benjamin Franklin, ​Berlinische Monatsschrift​, December 1783. 
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 Figure 3: “Lars Hochedeln,” ​Asmus omnia sua Secum portans​, 1774. 
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 Figure 4: Diagram of glass harmonica, ​Berlinische Monatsschrift​, June 1787. 
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 Figure 5: Untitled song by Johann Friedrich Reichardt, ​Berlinische Monatsschrift​, 
December 1783. 
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 Figure 6: Map of the Greek island of Paros, ​Berlinische Monatsschrift, ​ December 1783. 
223 
 Figure 7: Inside of the back cover of the ​Braunschweigisches Journal​, September 1788, 
listing other publications by Campe’s Braunschweigisches Schulbuchhandlung Verlag at 
the Leipziger Michaelmesse, even listing the specific buildings in which they were to be 
sold. 
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 Figure 8: Inside of the front cover of the ​Braunschweigisches Journal ​, October 1788, 
providing both subscription instructions and prices, along with a table of contents for that 
issue. 
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